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Une approche basée sur la réutilisation de la connaissance pour l’ingénierie 
des exigences de sécurité 
Résumé  
Au cours de ces dernières années, la sécurité des Systèmes d'Information (SI) est devenue une 
préoccupation importante, qui doit être prise en compte dans toutes les phases du 
développement du SI, y compris dans la phase initiale de l'ingénierie des exigences (IE). 
Prendre en considération la sécurité durant les premieres phases du dévelopment des SI 
permet aux développeurs d'envisager les menaces, leurs conséquences et les contre-mesures 
avant qu'un système soit mis en place. Les exigences de sécurité sont connues pour être "les 
plus difficiles des types d’exigences", et potentiellement celles qui causent le plus de risque si 
elles ne sont pas correctes. De plus, les ingénieurs en exigences ne sont pas principalement 
intéressés à, ou formés sur la sécurité. Leur connaissance tacite de la sécurité et leur 
connaissance primitive sur le domaine pour lequel ils élucident des exigences de sécurité 
rendent les exigences de sécurité résultantes pauvres et trop génériques. 
Cette thèse explore l'approche de l’élucidation des exigences fondée sur la réutilisation de 
connaissances explicites. Tout d'abord, la thèse propose une étude cartographique 
systématique et exhaustive de la littérature sur la réutilisation des connaissances dans 
l'ingénierie des exigences de sécurité identifiant les diférentes formes de connaissances. Suivi 
par un examen et une classification des ontologies de sécurité comme étant la principale 
forme de réutilisation. 
Dans la deuxième partie, AMAN-DA est présentée. AMAN-DA est la méthode développée 
dans cette thèse. Elle permet l’élucidation des exigences de sécurité d'un système 
d'information spécifique à un domaine particulier en réutilisant des connaissances 
encapsulées dans des ontologies de domaine et de sécurité. En outre, la thèse présente les 
différents éléments d'AMAN-DA : (i) une ontologie de sécurité noyau, (ii) une ontologie de 
domaine multi-niveau, (iii) des modèles syntaxique de buts et d’exigences de sécurité, (iv) un 
ensemble de règles et de mécanismes nécessaires d'explorer et de réutiliser la connaissance 
encapsulée dans les ontologies et de produire des spécifications d’exigences de sécurité. 
La dernière partie rapporte l'évaluation de la méthode. AMAN-DA a été implémenté dans un 
prototype d'outil. Sa faisabilité a été évaluée et appliquée dans les études de cas de trois 
domaines différents (maritimes, applications web, et de vente). La facilité d'utilisation et 
l’utilisabilité de la méthode et de son outil ont également été évaluées dans une expérience 
contrôlée. L'expérience a révélé que la méthode est bénéfique pour l’élucidation des 
exigences de sécurité spécifiques aux domaines, et l'outil convivial et facile à utiliser. 
Mots clés: éxigences de séccurité, ontologies, sécurité, étude cartographique, élucidation, 
ingénierie des exigences, domaine. 
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A knowledge reuse based approach for domain specific security 
requirements engineering 
Abstract  
In recent years, security in Information Systems (IS) has become an important issue that  
needs to be taken into account in all stages of IS development, including the early phase of 
Requirement Engineering (RE). Considering security during early stages of IS development 
allows IS developers to envisage threats, their consequences and countermeasures before a 
system is in place. Security requirements are known to be “the most difficult of requirements 
types”, and potentially the ones causing the greatest risk if they are not correct. Moreover, 
requirements engineers are not primarily interested in, or knowledgeable about, security. 
Their tacit knowledge about security and their primitive knowledge about the domain for 
which they elicit security requirements make the resulting security requirements poor and too 
generic. 
This thesis explores the approach of eliciting requirements based on the reuse of explicit 
knowledge. First, the thesis proposes an extensive systematic mapping study of the literature 
on the reuse of knowledge in security requirements engineering identifying the diferent 
knowledge forms. This is followed by a review and classification of security ontologies as the 
main reuse form.  
In the second part, AMAN-DA is presented. AMAN-DA is the method developed in this 
thesis. It allows the elicitation of domain-specific security requirements of an information 
system by reusing knowledge encapsulated in domain and security ontologies. Besides that, 
the thesis presents the different elements of AMANDA:  (i) a core security ontology, (ii) a 
multi-level domain ontology, (iii) security goals and requirements’s syntactic models, (iv) a 
set of rules and mechanisms necessary to explore and reuse the encapsulated knowledge of 
the ontologies and produce security requirements specifications.     
The last part reports the evaluation of the method. AMAN-DA was implemented in a 
prototype tool. Its feasibility was evaluated and applied in case studies of three different 
domains (maritime, web applications, and sales). The ease of use and the usability of the 
method and its tool were also evaluated in a controlled experiment. The experiment revealed 
that the method is beneficial for the elicitation of domain specific security requirements, and 
that the tool is friendly and easy to use. 
Keywords: security requirements, ontologies, security, mapping study, elicitation, 
requirements engineering, domain.   
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 1 
Chapitre 1 en français   
 
Introduction 
 
1. SÉCURITÉ : LE CÔTÉ OBSCUR!  
 
Avec la numérisation grandissante des activités dans les différents secteurs (communication, 
santé, banque, assurance, etc.), les Systèmes d’Information (SI) sont de de plus en plus 
critiques. Ils doivent se conformer aux usages émergents et à des besoins variés, ils doivent 
intégrer les nouvelles technologies ce qui les expose en permanence à de nouvelles 
vulnérabilités. Il n’y a pas une seule semaine sans une annonce indiquant que le SI d'une 
certaine organisation privée ou publique a été attaqué. 
Le coût de la cybercriminalité en 2013 a atteint les 113 milliards de dollars dans le monde 
(Norton, 2013). Les attaques des SI ciblent des données stratégiques telles que les 
informations échangées par les directions des systèmes d’information (DSI), les données 
financières, les documents Recherche et développement (R&D), les informations des clients 
et des ressources humaines, etc. Les conséquences pour les organisations sont multiples : la 
détérioration de l'image de marque, la perturbation de l'activité, les pertes financières, ainsi 
que la menace sur l’éco-système socio-économique, politique et militaire. 
La motivation financière de la cybercriminalité est évidente : tandis que le marché annuel des 
données est estimé à 7 milliards d’euros, les recettes générées par l'exploitation de ces 
données est d'environ 230 milliards d’euros, avec une croissance annuelle de 40% (Frenkiel, 
2009). La plupart des cyber- attaques sont assez connues : dénis de service, virus, chevaux de 
Troie, hameçonnage, attaques sur les couches réseau inférieures, logiciels espions, etc.  
De plus, la presse rapporte régulièrement de mauvaises expériences. Par exemple, en France, 
en 2010, 150 ordinateurs de la Direction Générale du Trésor ont été attaqués dans le but de 
capturer des informations relatives à la présidence du G8 et du G20. Fin 2011, le Sénat 
français a été ciblé par une attaque peu de temps avant l'adoption de la loi sur la 
reconnaissance du génocide arménien. En juillet 2012, la société DropBox a reconnu que des 
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mots de passe volés sur un autre site ont permis aux pirates d'accéder aux documents stockés 
en ligne. En Septembre 2014, cinq millions de mots de passe Gmail et adresses ont été 
publiées sur un forum (Elyan, 2014). Dans son rapport annuel de 2013 (Symantec, 2013), 
Symantec signale que la violation de données sensibles a augmenté de 62% avec 253 
incidents observés et 552 millions de données d'identité volées. Au cours de l'année 2013, 
plus de 40 millions de personnes aux États-Unis ont eu leurs informations personnelles 
volées, ainsi que 54 millions en Turquie, 20 millions en Corée, 16 millions en Allemagne, et 
plus de 20 millions en Chine. 
Il serait simpliste de croire que les vulnérabilités des systèmes d’information sont toujours de 
nature technologique, ou seulement d’origine interne. En réalité, la sécurité est un problème à 
multiples facettes ; tout autant que le système d’information visé, la sécurité intègre aussi, 
dans sa définition, le domaine dans lequel ce système fonctionne.  
Tout en développant des techniques de sécurité telles que le cryptage, le contrôle d'identité, 
ou des architectures spécifiques, notre attention doit être attirée aussi par le contexte 
sociotechnique dans lequel les systèmes cibles vont fonctionner, dans lequel aussi les 
menaces et leur danger potentiel peuvent survenir, de manière à découvrir les exigences de 
sécurité. Dans la pratique, la sécurité est souvent traitée comme une variable d'ajustement 
(Gruselle, 2013). Comme le montre le rapport de 2014 du (Centre d'analyse stratégique, 
2014), les méthodes de gestion des risques sont toujours considérées comme «trop complexes 
pour être déployées dans les organisations, qui ne sont souvent pas matures en termes de 
sécurité des SI». Le CLUSIF indique qu’en France, seulement 63% des entreprises ayant plus 
de 200 employés et moins d'un tiers des collectivités territoriales ont formalisé une politique 
de sécurité. Même si ces dernières utilisent EBIOS (EBIOS, 2004) et la PSSI (Politique de 
Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information) de l’ANSSI (Agence Nationale de Sécurité des 
Systèmes d'Information) quatre fois plus en 2012 qu'en 2008, cela est encore seulement limité 
à 13% des organisations: 63% d'entre eux n’utilisent même pas une méthode référencée: 43% 
des entreprises de plus de 200 employés n’utilisent pas une méthode ou ne savent pas quelle 
méthode utiliser pour formaliser la politique de sécurité. Il est donc nécessaire de proposer 
des approches simples mais théoriquement et empiriquement fondées qui aident vraiment les 
organisations à améliorer leurs pratiques et à réduire leur niveau d'exposition aux attaques. 
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2. PROBLÉMATIQUE  
2.1. LA CONNNAISSANCE EST NÉCESSAIRE  
Des études récentes (Fenz et Ekelhart, 2009) ont montré que le manque de connaissances 
liées à la sécurité de l'information au niveau métier est l'une des raisons qui mènent à des 
stratégies de gestion de sécurité de l'information inadéquates ou inexistantes. De plus, l’effort 
de sensibilisation à la sécurité et le renforcement des niveaux de connaissance en sécurité 
conduit à des stratégies plus efficaces. En 2006, l'Agence européenne de la sécurité des 
réseaux et de l'information (ENISIA) a évalué que l'établissement de bases d'information 
unifiées pour la gestion des risques de sécurité de l'information, ainsi que la nécessité de 
méthodes de mesure de risque, étaient des enjeux de grande priorité. 
Haley montre que, parmi les principaux défis inhérents aux projets de sécurité, se trouve la 
difficulté d'expression des exigences de sécurité et de la production de spécifications 
exhaustives (Haley et al., 2008). En fait, la plupart des développeurs de logiciels ne sont pas 
intéressés ni informés sur la sécurité (Tondel, Jaatun et Meland, 2008) (Mouratidis, Giorgini, 
et Manson, 2005), Pendant des décennies, l'accent a été mis sur i) la mise en œuvre des 
fonctionnalités avant la date limite et ii) l’application de correctifs aux bugs inévitables 
(Meier, 2006). Cependant, la communauté du génie logiciel  et des systeèmes d’information 
commence à se rendre compte que la sécurité de l'information est également importante pour 
les logiciels et les systèmes dont la fonction principale n’est pas liée à la sécurité. Donald 
Firesmith affirme que la plupart des ingénieurs en charge de l’expression des exigences sont 
insuffisamment formés pour élucider, analyser et spécifier les exigences de sécurité 
(Firesmith, 2004). Par conséquent, ils confondent souvent des exigences de sécurité avec des 
mécanismes de sécurité architecturales qui sont traditionnellement utilisés pour satisfaire les 
exigences. Ils définissent plutôt des choix architecturaux et de conception au lieu de spécifier 
réellement des exigences. 
Zuccato et al. (Zuccato, Daniels et Jampathom, 2011) signalent que l'ingénierie des exigences 
de sécurité, dans la pratique, est souvent effectuée par des non-spécialistes en sécurité. 
L’expertise en sécurité est "rare". Les exigences de sécurité et leurs dépendances ne sont 
souvent pas directement connues par les spécialistes de l’ingénierie des exigences. 
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2.2. UNE CONNAISSANCE GENERIQUE DE LA SECURITE N’EST PAS SUFFISANTE, ELLE DOIT ETRE 
SPECIFIQUE AU DOMAINE 
Au-delà de la difficulté de maîtriser les exigences de sécurité, il faut prendre conscience du 
fait que ces dernières sont étroitement liées au domaine d’application. Une bibliothèque 
publique aura certainement une vision de la sécurité informatique différente de celle d’une 
chambre de compensation centrale pour les transactions interbancaires. Les exigences de 
sécurité spécifiques à une installation particulière ne peuvent être déterminées qu’après un 
examen attentif du contexte de l'entreprise, des préférences de l'utilisateur, et/ou de la posture 
de défense (Devanbu et Stubblebine, 2000). 
La connaissance du domaine, c’est-à-dire la connaissance spécifique au domaine pour lequel 
les exigences de sécurité sont définies, n’est souvent pas prise en considération, laissant la 
tâche à l’ingénieur qui définit les exigences ou l’analyste en sécurité d’«imaginer» ou de 
«capturer» les propriétés du domaine.  
Les ingénieurs en charge de la définition des exigences sont souvent considérés comme ayant 
une connaissance explicite sur la sécurité et sur le domaine pour lequel ils élucident des 
exigences de sécurité. Or, c’est loin d’être le cas : les domaines évoluent constamment, et leur 
connaissance est trop complexe à comprendre et à maîtriser. 
Certaines recherches précédentes ont pris en considération la connaissance pour l’élucidation 
des exigences, en particulier avec des ontologies (Daramola et al., 2012a), (Velasco et al., 
2009). L'expérience empirique avec RITA (Salinesi, Ivankina et Angole, 2008) a montré que 
«étant génériques, les menaces dans l'ontologie de RITA ne sont pas spécifiques au domaine 
cible [banque]» (l'étude de cas était dans le secteur bancaire). Les experts impliqués dans 
l'évaluation se sont plaints du «manque de spécificité des types de menaces et des exigences 
de sécurité pour le domaine concerné".   
2.3. FONDEES SUR DE LA CONNAISSANCE VERSUS FONDEES SUR DES MODELES  
Beaucoup de recherches ont été menées sur les méthodes d'ingénierie des exigences de 
sécurité fondées sur des modèles (Mouratidis et Giorgini, 2007) (Van Lamsweerde, 2004) 
(Dahl, Hogganvik et volé, 2007). Les approches fondées sur des modèles peuvent être utiles 
car elles fournissent une syntaxe formelle pour la spécification des concepts de sécurité. 
Cependant, nous pensons qu'une approche fondée sur la connaissance peut être une meilleure 
option car elle permet de représenter, de rendre accessibles et de réutiliser des connaissances 
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dans le but de développer des méthodes, des techniques et des outils pour l'analyse des 
exigences de sécurité. Malgré des efforts considérables dans le domaine, à notre 
connaissance, ces questions ne sont pas encore complètement traitées par les approches 
existantes. Nous pensons, en particulier, à la plupart des approches fondées sur les modèles 
(Mouratidis et Giorgini, 2007) (Van Lamsweerde, 2004) (Sindre et Opdahl, 2001a) et aux 
approches fondées sur l’analyse des risques (Mayer, 2012) (Morali et al., 2009). La même 
observation peut être faite concernant les approches « industrielles » (EBIOS, 2004) 
(CLUSIF, 2004) qui utilisent peu la connaissance. Certaines méthodes fondées sur les 
connaissances existent, notamment celles fondées sur des ontologies (Salinesi, Ivankina et 
Angole, 2008) (Velasco et al., 2009). Mais elles ne prennent pas en considération le domaine 
pour lequel les exigences sont définies. 
Le problème ciblé dans cette thèse est donc d'exploiter à la fois la connaissance liée à la 
sécurité et la connaissance spécifique du domaine afin de mieux guider l’élucidation des 
exigences de sécurité spécifiques à un domaine particulier. 
3. CADRE DU PROJET DE RECHERCHE DOCTORAL 
La contribution principale de cette thèse doctorale est une méthode pour « définir des 
exigences de sécurité spécifiques à un domaine pour un système d’information en 
réutilisant la connaissance enregistrée dans des ontologies de domaine de sécurité »  
Les concepts manipulés au cours de cette recherche appartiennent à différents domaines de 
recherche, notamment : (a) l'ingénierie des exigences, (b) l'ingénierie des connaissances, (c) 
la sécurité, (d) l’ingénierie des domaines et des ontologies, (e) l’ingénierie des systèmes 
d'information. Ces domaines de recherche peuvent fournir des définitions différentes pour des 
concepts similaires. 
Cette section définit chaque concept utilisé au cours de la préparation de cette thèse de 
doctorat. 
3.1. SYSTÈME D’INFORMATION 
Il n'y a pas de définition unique des systèmes d'information (Carvalho, 2000). Dans cette 
thèse doctorale, un système d'information (SI) pour lequel les exigences de sécurité sont 
élucidées et analysées est défini comme suit : « Un système, soit automatisé ou manuel, qui 
comprend des personnes, des machines, et/ou des méthodes organisées pour collecter, traiter, 
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transmettre et diffuser des données (qui représentent les informations de l'utilisateur) dans un 
environnement donné» (Longeon et Archimbaud, 1999). En adoptant cette définition, nous 
rejoignons Mayer (Mayer, 2012) lorsqu’il considère que la sécurité des systèmes 
d'information englobe non seulement la sécurité des systèmes logiciels ou des architectures 
informatiques, mais aussi celles des personnes et des installations qui jouent un rôle dans le 
SI, donc dans sa sécurité. L'exemple typique qui caractérise cette déclaration est celui du vol 
d'un mot de passe d'une base de données grâce à l'ingénierie sociale. Un autre exemple serait 
la destruction délibérée du serveur de base de données où les informations de l'organisation 
sont stockées par un attaquant qui déclenche un incendie dans la salle des serveurs. 
3.2. SÉCURITÉ  
La littérature indique que la sécurité peut avoir deux significations différentes (Firesmith 
2007) (Mayer, 2012) : en anglais on distingue security and safety.  En français le mot 
‘sécurité’ est utilisé pour désigner les deux sens (certain attribut sureté à safety). Selon 
l'Université norvégienne de Science et Technologies (NTNU) : la sécurité est la protection 
contre les incidents intentionnels. Les incidents intentionnels se produisent à cause d'un acte 
délibéré et planifié, tandis que la ‘safety’ est la protection contre des incidents aléatoires. Les 
incidents aléatoires sont des incidents indésirables qui surviennent à la suite d'une ou 
plusieurs coïncidences (Albrechtsen, 2002). Le dictionnaire d’anglais New Oxford (Pearsall 
et Hanks, 2001) décrit la ‘safety’ comme la condition d'être protégé contre ou de ne pas être 
en capacité de causer un danger, un risque ou un dommage. Il décrit la ‘sécurité’ comme l'état 
d'être libre de danger ou de menace. La différence entre la ‘sécurité’ et la ‘safety’ n’est pas 
remarquable ; les deux désignent des conditions dans lesquelles l'on est bien protégé. Pour 
autant que cette thèse soit concernée, le terme ‘sécurité’ couvre à la fois les dommages 
accidentels, ainsi que les dommages délibérés. L'idée de base est de protéger les actifs des 
risques / menaces et de créer des conditions de sécurité. Ceci est cohérent avec d'autres 
méthodes de la littérature (décrites dans l'état de l'art de la thèse) qui ne font pas de 
distinction entre la sécurité et la ‘safety’ et utilisent une définition générale de la sécurité 
comme cela se fait ici. La sécurité en tant que discipline couvre un ensemble de méthodes, 
techniques et outils, permettant la protection des ressources d'un système. Comme défini dans 
la norme ISO / IEC 13335 (ISO-b, 2004), dans le cadre des systèmes d'information, la 
sécurité couvre sept critères : la confidentialité, l'intégrité, la disponibilité, l'authenticité, la 
responsabilité, la non-répudiation et la fiabilité. Le concept de vulnérabilité est considéré 
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comme une propriété du système ou de son environnement qui, en conjonction avec une 
attaque, peut conduire à une défaillance de la sécurité (Anderson et Anderson, 2001). Les 
actifs sont un autre concept dans la littérature de sécurité définis comme quelque chose ayant 
de la valeur dans une organisation (ISO-b, 2004) qui pourrait être l'objet d'attaques (Schneier, 
2003). 
Dans cette thèse doctorale, nous sommes intéressés en particulier à la sécurité dans les phases 
initiales du développement des systèmes, en particulier la phase de définition des exigences 
de sécurité.   
3.3. INGÉNIERIE DES EXIGENCES 
Une exigence est définie comme "une condition ou une fonction nécessaire à un utilisateur 
pour résoudre un problème ou atteindre un objectif" (Pohl, 2010). L’Ingénierie des Exigences 
(IE) est considérée comme une seule phase du processus de développement de logiciels dont 
la tâche principale est de développer la spécification des exigences pour le système. L’IE est 
ainsi réalisée pour chaque projet au début du processus de développement. Les exigences 
élucidées sont écrites dans un cahier des charges spécifique au projet qui sert alors de 
document de référence pour les phases suivantes de développement (Pohl, 2010). Firesmith 
(Firesmith, 2007) définit l'ingénierie des exigences comme : «La discipline de l'ingénierie au 
sein de l'ingénierie des systèmes/logiciels concernés par l'identification, l'analyse, la 
réutilisation, la spécification, la gestion, la vérification et la validation des buts et des 
exigences (y compris les exigences liées à la sécurité)". 
Dans cette thèse doctorale, toutes ces définitions sont acceptées ; les exigences que nous 
avons l'intention de définir sont des conditions énoncées par des parties prenantes pour 
atteindre leurs buts. En outre, nous avons l'intention de développer des spécifications 
(textuelles et de modèles) qui serviront de références pour les phases ultérieures de 
développement. Cependant, dans notre travail de recherche, nous nous concentrons sur 
l’élucidation, l'analyse et la réutilisation des exigences. Nous ne nous attaquons pas à la 
vérification ou validation telle que décrite par Firesmith. Le travail de thèse se concentre 
exclusivement sur l’élucidation, l’analyse et la réutilisation des exigences. 
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3.4. L’INGENIERIE DES EXIGENCES DE SECURITE POUR UNE MEILLEURE GESTION DE LA SECURITE  
Au cours de la dernière décennie, la communauté scientifique a commencé à appeler à un 
examen précoce de la sécurité, au cours de la phase d'ingénierie des exigences. Considérant la 
sécurité durant les premiers stades du développement des SI permet aux développeurs 
d'envisager les menaces, leurs conséquences et les contre-mesures avant qu'un système soit 
en place, plutôt qu’une éventuelle réaction lorsque une attaque désastreuse se produit (Mayer, 
2012). Cette attention a donné naissance à un domaine croissant de recherche appelé 
l’Ingénierie des Exigences de Sécurité (IES).  
(Haley et al., 2008) définit les exigences de sécurité selon trois catégories : 1) comme des 
fonctions, 2) comme des exigences non-fonctionnelles, 3) selon d’autres interprétations. Les 
trois sections suivantes abordent la  litérature conformément à cette catégorisation :    
A. Les exigences de sécurité en tant que fonctions  
Les exigences de sécurité sont parfois exprimées sous la forme de mécanismes de sécurité à 
utiliser. Par exemple, la version ISO des Critères Communs (ISO-a, 1999) fournit des 
exemples de formulation générale, comme par exemple :  
"La [...] Fonction de Sécurité (LFS) doit refuser explicitement l'accès de sujets à des objets en fonction de la [règles ...] " 
Où [règles] fait réféence à un mécanisme. Le NIST Handbook Computer Security (Guttman 
et Aoback, 1995) stipule que «Ces exigences [de sécurité] peuvent être exprimées comme des 
caractéristiques techniques (par exemple, les contrôles d'accès), des assurances (par exemple, 
la vérification des antécédents pour les développeurs de systèmes), ou des pratiques 
opérationnelles (par exemple, sensibilisation et formation) ». En d’autres termes, les 
exigences sont spécifiées en termes de fonctions et de procédures. 
La définition des exigences en termes de fonctions laisse de côté des informations clés : quels 
objets doivent être protégés et, plus important encore, pourquoi les objets doivent être 
protégés. Les deux documents ISO et NIST apportent peu d'indications sur la manière de 
connecter les fonctionnalités (coté solution) avec les exigences de sécurité (coté problème). 
Au lieu de décrire quand et pourquoi les objets doivent être protégés, ils décrivent comment 
les objets doivent être protégés, ce qui est en désaccord avec la démarche de l’IE qui 
recommande de s’intérésser à l’espace du problème avant de plonger  dans l’espace de 
solution.  
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B. Les exigences de sécurité comme des exigences non fonctionnelles (ENFs) 
Devanbu et Stubblebine (Devanbu et Stubblebine, 2000) remarquent que les exigences de 
sécurité sont un type d'exigence non-fonctionnelle. Kotonya et Sommerville (Kotonya et 
Sommerville, 1998), lors de l'examen des exigences non-fonctionnelles, dans lesquelles sont 
incluses celles de sécurité, les définissent comme «des restrictions ou contraintes» sur les 
services du système. Rushby (Rushby, 2001) stipule que : «Les exigences de sécurité 
concernent essentiellement ce qui ne doit pas arriver. » En utilisant la méthode Tropos, 
Mouratidis et al (Mouratidis, Giorgini, et Manson, 2003a) mentionnent que : «les contraintes 
de sécurité définissent les exigences de sécurité du système". 
Le problème engendré par ces définitions est leur manque de spécificité : En IE, il ne suffit 
pas de dire ce que l'on ne veut pas. Les buts et leur mise en contexte doivent être explicites 
aussi. 
En d'autres termes, les exigences de sécurité devraient aussi indiquer comment les «services 
système» sont contraints, l'effet de la contrainte sur la fonctionnalité du système ; et comment 
on peut valider le système contre toute contrainte potentielle pour assurer qu'il reflète 
fidèlement la volonté des parties prenantes. 
C. D’autres interprétations des exigences de sécurité 
Plusieurs auteurs semblent supposer que les exigences de sécurité sont identiques aux buts de 
sécurité de haut niveau. Tettero et al. (Tettero et al., 1997) définissent les exigences de 
sécurité en termes de confidentialité, d’intégrité et de disponibilité de l'entité pour laquelle 
une protection est nécessaire. Bien que ce soit une définition claire, dans certains cas, elle 
peut ne pas aboutir à des exigences assez précises. 
Tout comme dans l’IE en général, les buts sont utiles pour élucider des exigences, les 
analyser, les justifier, et les tracer. Toutefois, les exigences sont des buts seulement lorsqu’il 
est mentionné si 'elles doivent être opérationnalisées sur le système et comment (Van 
Lamsweerde, 2009). 
Un autre terme utilisé pour les exigences de sécurité est "politique de sécurité". Par exemple, 
Devanbu et Stubblebine (Devanbu et Stubblebine, 2000) définissent une exigence de sécurité 
comme "une traduction d'une politique organisationnelle de haut niveau en exigences 
détaillées d'un système spécifique. (Anderson et Anderson, 2001) affirment que la politique 
de sécurité est "un document qui exprime [...] ce que [...] les mécanismes de protection ont à 
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atteindre» et que «le processus d'élaboration d'une politique de sécurité [...] est un processus 
de l'ingénierie des exigences ».  
Dans cette thèse doctorale, nous faisons la distinction entre critères de sécurité, buts de 
sécurité et exigences de sécurité.  
Les critères de sécurité définissent des propriétés de sécurité telles que la confidentialité, 
l'intégrité, la disponibilité et la traçabilité. Un but de sécurité définit ce que les parties 
prenantes espèrent atteindre à l'avenir en termes de sécurité. Ils sont à un haut niveau 
d’abstraction, mais ne sont pas toujours bien formalisées. Par exemple, une partie prenante 
pourrait exprimer le but de maintenir la confidentialité des renseignements personnels. 
Les exigences de sécurité sont des conditions définies sur l'environnement qui doivent être 
respectées afin d'atteindre un objectif de sécurité (ils matérialisent un but de sécurité) et 
permettent de diminuer le risque. 
En cohérence avec la définition de Glinz des ENF (Exigences Non Fonctionnelles) (Glinz, 
2007) les exigences de sécurité peuvent être des exigences non-fonctionnelles à un certain 
niveau d'abstraction et fonctionnel à un autre niveau d'abstraction. Cela dépend de ce que 
nous voulons protéger et du niveau de sécurité cible. Les exigences de sécurité peuvent être 
liées aux bases de données, aux applications, aux systèmes d’exploitation, aux organisations 
et à l’environnement extérieur. Cette thèse utilise aussi par fois le terme «exigence de 
sécurité», pour englober à la fois «politique de sécurité» et «exigence de sécurité». 
3.5. QU’EST-CE QUE LA CONNAISSANCE ?  
La connaissance peut être définie comme une croyance justifiée qui augmente la capacité 
d'une entité pour une action efficace (TM Kusuma, 2013). Selon Debenham, "La 
connaissance représente les associations fonctionnelles explicites entre les éléments 
d'information et/ou des données" (Debenham, 1989). 
La connaissance doit être différenciée de la donnée et de l'information. Les données (data est 
le pluriel de datum) sont des faits bruts (Long et Long, 1998). Par exemple ; "Signaux bruts" 
sont les données. L'information est le sens que nous donnons à des faits accumulés (données) 
(Long et Long, 1998). "Alerte SOS " est le sens attaché aux «signaux bruts». C’est une 
information. 
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La connaissance attache de la compétence et un but à l'information, et il est possible d’en 
générer une action. Ici : alerte d'urgence SOS → commencer l'opération de sauvetage (une 
alerte d'urgence génère l'action de démarrage d'une opération de sauvetage). 
La connaissance peut être perçue à partir de plusieurs points de vue (TM Kusuma, 2013) : 
• Un état d'esprit - la connaissance est l'état de connaitre et de comprendre. 
• Un objet - la connaissance est un objet qui peut être stocké et manipulé. 
• Un processus - la connaissance est un processus d'application de l’expertise. 
• Une condition - la connaissance est l'accès au contenu et son extraction. 
• Une capacité - la connaissance désigne le potentiel d'influencer l'action. 
La connaissance tacite est profondément enracinée dans les actions, l'expérience et 
l'implication dans un contexte spécifique. Elle consiste en éléments cognitifs (modèles 
mentaux) et éléments techniques (savoir-faire et compétences applicables au travail 
spécifique).  
Les connaissances explicites se réfèrent à la connaissance qui est transmissible dans un 
langage formel et systématique. 
 
L’ingénierie de connaissance est la discipline qui consiste à intégrer les connaissances dans 
les systèmes informatiques afin de résoudre des problèmes complexes exigeant normalement 
un niveau élevé d'expertise humaine (Feigenbaum et Pamela 1983). 
L’ingénierie de connaissance implique normalement quatre étapes distinctes dans le transfert 
des connaissances humaines au sein de systèmes à base de connaissances :  
(i) la validation des connaissances,  
(ii) la représentation des connaissances,  
(iii) la représentation d'inférences,  
(iv) l’explication et la justification. 
 
Un ingénieur de la connaissance est responsable d’obtenir des connaissances des experts 
humains, puis d’entrer cette connaissance dans un systèms à base de connaissances. 
C’est en 1982 que Newell a publié un article sur "Le niveau de connaissances" (Newell, 
1982) dans lequel il a fait valoir la nécessité d'une description de la connaissance à un niveau 
supérieur à celui des symboles dans les systèmes de représentation des connaissances. Le 
niveau de connaissance était sa proposition pour réaliser une description d'un système 
d'intelligence artificielle en fonction de son comportement rationnel : Pourquoi le système 
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(l'«agent») effectue cette "action", indépendamment de sa représentation symbolique dans les 
règles, cadres ou logiques (le niveau "symbole").  
Dans les années quatre-vingt-dix, les efforts en termes d’'ingénierie des connaissances se sont 
progressivement déplacés vers la connaissance de domaine, en particulier les représentations 
réutilisables sous la forme d'ontologies. Un article clé, qui a reçu une assez large attention 
même en dehors de la communauté de l'ingénierie des connaissances est l'article de Gruber 
sur les ontologies portables (Gruber, 1995). Une ontologie, étant une «représentation d'une 
conceptualisation" (Gruber, 1995), est une représentation formelle des entités et des relations 
qui existent dans certains domaines. Il représente une conceptualisation partagée afin de 
répondre à toutes fins utiles (Dobson et Sawyer, 2006). L’analyse ontologique clarifie la 
structure de la connaissance. Pour un domaine donné, son ontologie constitue le cœur de tout 
système de représentation des connaissances de ce domaine. Sans ontologies, et sans 
conceptualisations qui soient la base de la connaissance, il ne peut y avoir un vocabulaire de 
représentation et de la réutilisation des connaissances (Chandrasekaran et al, 1999). 
Dans cette thèse, nous nous intéressons à deux types de connaissances, les connaissances 
relatives à la sécurité nécessaires pour effectuer une élucidation et une analyse des exigences 
de sécurité, et les connaissances du domaine, à savoir le domaine pour lequel les exigences de 
sécurité sont élucidées (par exemple, banque, santé, maritime, etc.). Dans le cadre de nos 
travaux de recherche, nous nous sommes particulièrement intéressés à des ontologies comme 
forme principale de représentation et de réutilisation des connaissances. 
3.6. La connaissance du domaine et de la sécurité en ingénierie des exigences 
A. Qu’est-ce que ‘le domaine’? 
(Bjørner, 2010b) définit un domaine comme une «zone» d'activité humaine, naturelle, ou les 
deux, où la «zone» est «bien délimitée», comme, par exemple, pour la physique: la 
mécanique ou l'électricité ou la chimie ou de l'hydrodynamique; pour un composant de 
l'infrastructure: les banques, les chemins de fer, l’hôpital; ou pour un marché: les 
consommateurs, les détaillants, les grossistes, les producteurs et la chaîne logistique. 
Cette thèse rejoint Bjørner en considérant le domaine comme un univers de discours, petit ou 
grand, à savoir une structure (i) d’entités, de choses, d’individus, de renseignements dont 
certains peuvent avoir différents états; (ii) de fonctions, sur les entités qui, appliquées 
deviennent éventuellement des actions de changement d'état du domaine; (iii) d’événements, 
impliquant peut-être des entités, se produisant dans le temps et exprimables comme des 
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prédicats uniques ou paires de (avant/après) états; et (iv) de comportements, d’ensembles de 
séquences éventuellement interdépendantes d'actions et d'événements. 
B. Pourquoi la connaissance du domaine est importante pour l’ingénierie des exigences ?  
Est-il possible d'élaborer des exigences du système sans comprendre le domaine ? Alors que 
certains auteurs dans la littérature ont rapporté que cela est impossible (Kaiya et Saeki, 2006) 
(Bjørner, 2010b), d'autres affirment que l'ignorance est importante aussi (Berry, 1995). Cette 
thèse commence par l'observation que les analystes, les consultants, « designers », 
architectes, développeurs mettent en place des systèmes pour les hôpitaux (resp. chemins de 
fer, banques) avec peu de connaissance liées à la santé (resp. des transports, des marchés 
financiers). Cela n’est pas le cas dans toutes les autres disciplines de l'ingénierie où la 
connaissance professionnelle est très enracinée : un ingénieur aéronautique comprend le 
domaine de l’aérodynamique ; les architectes navals (c.-à-d, concepteurs de navires) 
comprennent le domaine de l’hydrodynamique ; les ingénieurs des télécommunications 
comprennent le domaine de la théorie des champs électromagnétiques ; et ainsi de suite. 
Selon (Kaiya et Saeki, 2006), la connaissance du domaine détenue par des experts de ce 
domaine joue un rôle important dans l’élucidation des exigences de haute qualité. Bien que 
les analystes en exigences ont beaucoup de connaissances sur la technologie des logiciels, 
leurs connaissances sur le domaine pour lequel le logiciel est à développer sont souvent 
tacites, pas clairement définies, ni formalisées. Le manque de connaissance du domaine peut 
entraîner une pauvre élucidation des exigences. 
Pour toutes ces raisons, nous suivons Bjørner dans ses déclarations : «avant que le logiciel 
soit conçu, nous devons comprendre les exigences. Avant que les exigences puissent être 
finalisées, nous devons avoir compris le domaine». Comme le montre la figure F.1.1, ceci 
impacte le cycle de vie du développement des systèmes puisque l'ingénierie de domaine 
précède l'ingénierie des exigences. Les résultats de l'ingénierie de domaine comprennent un 
modèle de domaine : une description qui peut être à la fois informelle, comme un récit en 
langue naturelle et formelle, comme des spécifications. L'ingénierie des exigences aboutit, 
entre autres, à un modèle d’exigences. Les résultats de la conception de logiciels incluent un 
code exécutable et toute la documentation qui l’accompagne. 
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C. Pourquoi la connaissance du domaine est-elle importante pour l’ingénierie des 
exigences de sécurité ?  
Les exigences de sécurité et l'ingénierie des exigences de sécurité n’échappent pas à 
l’observation faite ci-dessus. L’élucidation des exigences de sécurité des parties prenantes est 
en réalité l'une des étapes les plus difficiles dans le processus d'analyse des exigences, et 
plusieurs méthodes et outils informatiques ont été étudiés et développés afin de soutenir les 
activités humaines de l’élucidation des exigences de sécurité. Cependant, ces méthodes et 
outils sont trop générauxs ou bien la connaissance spécifique au domaine n’est pas exploitée. 
Puisque la sécurité n’est pas une question à part, au moment de définir les exigences de 
sécurité, l'ingénieur a besoin de savoir quel est le périmètre organisationnel de l'étude, quels 
sont les actifs qui ont besoin de protection et quelles sont les différentes personnes impliquées 
dans l'organisation. Toutes ces informations relèvent du domaine concerné. De plus, les 
contre-mesures pour remédier aux risques diffèrent selon que l'organisation appartient au 
domaine de la santé, de la banque, de l’aéronautique, etc. Connaitre les contre-mesures 
spécifiques à chaque domaine aide à élucider des exigences de sécurité de meilleure qualité. 
3.7. La réutilisation de la connaissance en ingénierie des exigences  
En 1993, le deuxième atelier international sur la réutilisation logicielle s’est tenu à Lucca, en 
Italie. La plupart des recherches présentées lors de cet événement étaient axées sur la 
réutilisation de code, de design ou d'architecture. En d'autres termes, l'idée était que 
principalement les artefacts « durs » – code, objet et ainsi de suite- pourraient être réutilisés. 
Très peu d’auteurs ont examiné l'idée de la réutilisation plus tôt dans le cycle de vie, à savoir 
la réutilisation des exigences elles-mêmes. Dans les vingt dernières années en revanche, sont 
apparus des bibliothèques de réutilisation, des méthodes d'ingénierie de domaine et des 
outils : pour le design de réutilisation, pour des architectures de logiciel spécifique, pour des 
Figure F.1.1. Le triptyque du développement logiciel selon Bjorner. 
Ingénierie de domaine Ingénierie des exigences Conception logicielle 
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modèles de conception de domaine, pour des générateurs, pour de la mesure et de 
l’expérimentation (Frakes et Kang, 2005). 
De nos jours, la pratique de la réutilisation se déplace en amont et la réutilisation concerne 
aussi les artefacts les plus abstraits. Les exigences sont souvent recyclées ; les modèles sont 
échangés sur Internet. La notion de réutilisation à l'étape des exigences est largement 
acceptée par beaucoup au sein de la communauté comme un objectif souhaitable (Lam, 
McDermid et Vickers, 1997). Par exemple, une conférence de travail sur les patrons (Pattern 
Languages of Programs) se tient deux fois par an et les résultats sont le partage des 
connaissances et la publication de nouveaux patrons (Robertson et Robertson, 2013) 
Contribuer à la réutilisation des exigences peut consister soit en la récupération d’exigences 
qui ont été écrites pour des projets précédents, puis en leur adaptation pour un nouveau 
projet, soit en l’écriture d’exigences à partir de zéro à un niveau raisonnable de généralité et 
d'abstraction afin de pouvoir les utiliser dans différents projets. Une distinction claire doit 
être faite entre l'ingénierie « pour » la réutilisation et l’ingénierie « par » la réutilisation 
(Maiden, 1993). 
Par exemple, il est possible de réutiliser différents types de données, allant des exigences 
métier et des exigences fonctionnelles à l'utilisation des cas, notamment des cas de test. 
Comme l'ingénierie des exigences est la première phase dans le processus de développement 
de logiciels, la réutilisation des exigences peut renforcer le cycle de vie du logiciel. Des 
recherches antérieures (López, Laguna et Peñalvo, 2002) ont souligné que la réutilisation des 
premiers produits et processus implémentés dans un projet de développement logiciel peut 
avoir un impact sur le cycle de vie de deux facons : (a) en permettant aux ressources du 
développement logiciel d’être plus profitables, et (b) en promouvant un développement basé 
sur la réutilisation dans le processus logiciel. 
De plus, à un haut niveau d'abstraction, chaque application a tendance à avoir les mêmes 
types de base d'actifs vulnérables (par exemple, les données, les communications, les 
services, les composants matériels et personnel). De même, ces actifs vulnérables ont 
tendance à être soumis aux mêmes types de base de menaces à la sécurité (par exemple, le 
vol, le vandalisme, la divulgation non autorisée, la destruction, la fraude, l'extorsion, 
l'espionnage, etc.) par des attaques des mêmes types de base d’attaquants (par exemple, 
hackers, crackers, employés mécontents, cyber-terroristes, espions industriels, etc.) qui 
peuvent être profilées avec des motivations et des niveaux typiques d'expertise et d’outils. 
Les exigences de sécurité ont tendance à être encore plus normalisées que leurs mécanismes 
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associés. Par exemple, pour répondre aux exigences d'identification et d'authentification, on 
peut avoir plusieurs choix de mécanismes d'architecture au-delà de l’identifiant et du mot de 
passe (Firesmith, 2004). Sur cette base, les exigences de réutilisation pourraient conduire à 
d'importantes économies de temps et de coûts de développement (Hermoye, van Lamsweerde 
et Perry, 2006). Structurer les connaissances de sécurité aide l’utilisateur de ces 
connaissances à en parcourir le contenu et à trouver les informations pertinentes de manière 
plus efficace. Différentes représentations des connaissances existent dans la littérature. Des 
« patterns » d'attaques récurrentes et vulnérabilités ont été identifiés par les praticiens de 
logiciels de sécurité (Mead et Stehney, 2005). Des modèles de sécurité d'un haut niveau 
d'abstraction ont également été introduits à des fins de réutilisation (Firesmith, 2004). 
Diverses autres approches pour la gestion des connaissances et leur réutilisation dans la 
sécurité existent dans la littérature, telles que des taxonomies, des ontologies, des normes et 
des lignes directrices. Au cours de la dernière décennie, les chercheurs ont accordé une 
certaine attention aux avantages de la réutilisation de la connaissance dans le processus de  
l’IES étant donné la nature commune des problèmes de sécurité dans les applications et dans 
les domaines  (Firesmith, 2004). La connaissance de la sécurité est difficile à acquérir. En 
plus de la sensibilisation sur les attaques potentielles, la conception de systèmes critiques 
pour la sécurité nécessite des connaissances et de l'expertise en matière de sécurité dans 
diverses techniques telles que les réseaux informatiques, les systèmes d'exploitation, les 
protocoles de communication, les algorithmes de cryptographie et les méthodes de contrôle 
d'accès. La réutilisation combinée à une connaissance structurée prédéfinie peut rendre le 
travail des ingénieurs, en charge de la spécification des exigences, beaucoup plus facile et 
plus rapide, car ils manquent généralement d’expertise et de compétences en sécurité. 
Cependant, il faut être prudent lors de la structuration des connaissances réutilisables - le 
résultat doit être d'une grande qualité. Sinon, cela pourrait générer de nouveaux problèmes de 
sécurité. 
Dans cette thèse doctorale, la connaissance en sécurité inclut des menaces et des attaques, des 
vulnérabilités, des exigences de sécurité. La connaissance du domaine inclut des entités 
comme des acteurs, des organisations, des actifs, des emplacements, etc.   
4. QUESTIONS DE RECHERCHE 
La thèse aborde les problèmes mentionnés ci-dessus en proposant une méthode qui guide les 
ingénieurs (ainsi que les analystes de sécurité) dans l’élucidation des exigences de sécurité 
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pour des domaines spécifiques. La méthode est générique dans le sens oùelle peut être 
appliquée à divers domaines, mais, lors de son application, elle devient spécifique à un 
domaine. 
Ainsi, l’objectif principal de cette thèse est de répondre aux questions de recherche 
suivantes :  
 
Principale question de recherche : Comment élucider des exigences de sécurité qui sont 
spécifiques à un domaine avec une stratégie de réutilisation ?  
 
Pour répondre cette question de recherche principale, quatre sous-questions doivent être 
considérées : 
 
RQ1. Comment structurer la connaissance sur la sécurité à la fois au niveau générique et en 
relation avec les domaines spécifiques ?  
RQ2. Comment structurer la connaissance relative aux domaines à la lumière des 
préoccupations de sécurité ?   
RQ3. Quelle est la meilleure façon de capturer les buts et exigences des parties prenantes en 
termes de sécurité ?  
RQ4. Comment exploiter les deux connaissances, celle liée à la sécurité et celle liée au 
domaine, pour produire des exigences spécifiques aux domaines et construire des modèles 
d’exigences ?     
5. HYPOTHÈSES DE RECHERCHE  
Le but principal des travaux de recherche décrits dans cette thèse est l’élucidation des 
exigences de sécurité spécifiques aux domaines grâce à une stratégie de réutilisation. 
Différentes approches peuvent être adoptées pour atteindre cet objectif. Une approche 
possible pourrait consister à dériver, à partir de la connaissance de sécurité générique, une 
connaissance de la sécurité spécifique au domaine, et ensuite utiliser cette connaissance de 
sécurité spécifique au domaine pour l’élucidation des exigences de sécurité. Une autre 
approche pourrait être d'utiliser les connaissances de la sécurité et du domaine pour obtenir 
des exigences de sécurité spécifiques au domaine. Dans cette thèse, la seconde approche est 
développée. Toutefois, avec cette approche, des questions se posent concernant la meilleure 
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structure de la connaissance, et la façon d'utiliser ces connaissances pour construire des 
modèles d'exigences de sécurité. 
Pour résumer, le travail de cette thèse teste les principales hypothèses suivantes :  
a. Il est possible de fournir la connaissance de sécurité nécessaire en choisissant des 
structures adéquates. 
b. Il est possible de construire des modèles d’exigences de sécurité en s’appuyant sur la 
connaissance de sécurité et de domaine.  
c. S’appuyer sur la connaissance du domaine en plus de la connaissance de sécurité va 
apporter une valeur ajoutée dans la production d’exigences de sécurité spécifiques au 
domaine en s’appuyant sur des connaissances de sécurité génériques. 
d. L’ approche décrite en 3 est efficace.  
e. Une bonne implémentation de cette approche est possible et utile pour les utilisateurs 
finaux.     
6. MÉTHODE DE RECHERCHE  
Le travail de recherche décrit dans cette thèse a été réalisé en utilisant une méthode de 
science de la conception (design science). (Hevner et Chatterjee, 2010) définissent la « design 
science » comme étant la conception et la validation de propositions de solutions à des 
problèmes pratiques. Hevner et al. (Hevner et Chatterjee, 2010) suggèrent que la « design 
science » diffère sur deux aspects d'autres branches de la science : (a) elle s’intéresse à des 
objets (artéfacts) plutôt qu’à des faits de structure de la nature ou sociale, et (b) elle cible la 
recherche de règles prescriptives pour la conception, plutôt que la recherche de descriptions, 
d’explications et de prévisions, comme c’est le cas dans les autres branches de la science. 
Etant orientée vers la conception, la méthode de recherche utilisée dans cette thèse consiste à 
valider les hypothèses de recherche présentés ci-dessus au moyen d'études de cas et 
d’expériences contrôlées. 
Pour répondre à la question de recherche principale et pour tester les hypothèses de recherche 
de cette thèse, nous avons mené une stratégie de recherche basée sur le modèle de processus 
de « design science » proposé par (Peffers et al., 2007). Ce processus comporte six étapes 
principales : identification et motivation du problème, définition desobjectifs d'une solution, 
conception et développement, démonstration, évaluation, communication). La figure F.1.2 
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Figure F.1.2. Application du modèle de processus de design science pour la recherche en système d’information (Peffers et al. 2007) 
à cette thèse. 
présente le modèle de processus de « design science » pour la recherche en système 
d'information, et l'application de ce processus à la recherche menée dans cette thèse. 
 
Plus précisément, la stratégie suivante a été mise en œuvre : 
A. Une étude de cartographie systématique sur la réutilisation des connaissances dans 
l'ingénierie des exigences de sécurité a été menée pour (i) mettre à jour les synthèses 
de la littérature liées à l’IES avec les recherches plus récentes, (ii) identifier la 
connaissance (ré) utilisée dans l’IES, (iii) distinguer les différents types de structures 
permettant la réutilisation des connaissances dans l’IES, (iv) comprendre leur 
utilisation, et (v) faire une synthèse des définitions des exigences de sécurité 
spécifiques aux domaines par les méthodes de l’IES. 
B. Une revue de littérature sur les ontologies de sécurité a été effectuée. L'objectif 
principal était d'examiner, d'analyser, de sélectionner et de classer les ontologies de 
sécurité, comme une étude de portée générale, mais avec un intérêt particulier dans le 
domaine de l'ingénierie des exigences de sécurité. 
C. Une synthèse des lacunes et des inconvénients présents dans les approches existantes 
a été effectuée. 
D. Une méthode fondée sur les ontologies a été proposée pour analyser et élucider des 
exigences de sécurité spécifiques aux domaines. Dans la méthode proposée, trois 
sous-propositions ont été développées: l'ontologie de sécurité noyau, la spécification 
des buts de sécurité et des exigences de sécurité, et une technique à base de règles 
pour explorer l’ontologie de domaine et de sécurité au cours du processus 
délucidation des exigences. 
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E. La faisabilité de la méthode proposée a été évaluée par une étude de cas réelle. La 
facilité d'utilisation et l'utilité de la méthode proposée ont été évaluées avec des 
utilisateurs finaux. Les résultats de ces évaluations permettent d’appuyer ou de réfuter 
les hypothèses proposées dans cette thèse. 
F. De nouvelles directions de recherche ont été identifiées. Les résultats de l'étude de cas 
et de l'expérience contrôlée ainsi que le retour de la communauté des systèmes 
d'information ont été prises en compte pour améliorer la méthode initiale. 
7. CONTRIBUTIONS 
Cette thèse produit quelques contributions originales : 
 Un cadre d’étude pour analyser et comparer la réutilisation des connaissances dans 
l’IES. Le cadre d’étude a été proposé après une étude cartographique systématique de 
la réutilisation des connaissances dans l'ingénierie des exigences de sécurité. L'étude 
cartographique systématique a analysé plus de 150 publications au cours des vingt 
dernières années. Les différentes formes de réutilisation dans l'ingénierie des 
exigences de sécurité (ontologies, taxonomies, patterns, modèles génériques, ..) ont 
été identifiées, les techniques de réutilisation, ainsi que la connaissance réutilisée. Ce 
travail a été publié dans la revue internationale d'ingénierie des exigences 
(Requirements Engineering Journal). 
 Un cadre d’étude pour classer les ontologies de sécurité. Ainsi, huit familles 
d’ontologies de sécurité ont été identifiées après une lecture profonde d'environ 50 
publications. Les huit familles sont les suivantes : ontologies initiales de sécurité, 
taxonomies de sécurité, ontologies générales de sécurité, ontologies de sécurité 
spécifiques, orientées Web, basées sur le risque, de modélisation, et pour les 
exigences. Chacune des ontologies de sécurité de l'étude a été analysée du point de 
vue de sa couverture des aspects de sécurité. Cette contribution a été présentée lors du 
troisième atelier international sur l’ingénierie de sécurité des systèmes d’information 
(WISSE'12). 
 Une ontologie noyau et une méthode à base de règles pour l’élucidation des exigences 
de sécurité spécifiques aux domaines. La méthode prend en entrée l’ontologie de 
sécurité noyau et toute ontologie de domaine pour produire des exigences de sécurité 
spécifiques textuelles ainsi que des modèles de sécurité. Cette méthode se base sur 
quatre sous-contributions principales: 
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o Une ontologie de sécurité noyau. Il s’agit d’une nouvelle méta-ontologie pour 
l'ingénierie des exigences de sécurité. Elle combine des éléments d'ontologies 
existantes pour créer une ontologie de sécurité de base. Une description de 
l'ontologie de sécurité noyau est proposée ainsi que le processus de 
construction. Plusieurs éléments de l'ontologie sont définis et leurs relations 
sont présentées. Une évaluation est présentée dans le but de prouver 
l'exhaustivité, la validité et l’utilisabilité de l'ontologie. Cette contribution a 
été présentée au Symposium international sur l'ingénierie de logiciels et 
systèmes sûre en Mars 2015. 
o Une ontologie multi-niveau de domaine pour structurer la connaissance du 
domaine. Cette structure multi-niveaux permet d'éviter à la méthode d’être 
restreinte à un seul domaine. L'avantage est d'offrir la possibilité de passer 
d'un domaine à un autre avec la même méthode. 
o Des « templates » linguistiques pour spécifier les buts de sécurité et les 
exigences de sécurité. Ici, les différences entre les buts et les exigences de 
sécurité sont clarifiées.  
o Un mécanisme fondé sur des règles pour extraire des connaissances 
pertinentes à partir des ontologies de domaine et de sécurité et produire des 
modèles d'exigences de sécurité et des spécifications textuelles. 
La méthode a été évaluée. Sa faisabilité a été évaluée au moyen d’une étude de cas réelle. 
Son utilité et son utilisabilité ont été évaluées par le biais d'une expérience contrôlée. 
Différentes parties de la méthode ont été publiées et présentées dans divers événements et 
éditions. Une des publications a obtenu le prix du meilleur article. Ci-dessous la liste des 
publications : 
- Vers une nouvelle génération de définition des Exigences de sécurité fondée sur 
l'utilisation des ontologies. Prix du meilleur article du séminaire doctoral 
(Informatique des Organisations et des Systèmes d'Information et de Décision - 
INFORSID 2012, Montpellier, France). 
- Une méthode de définition des Exigences de sécurité Fondée sur l'utilisation des 
ontologies. (Séminaire de doctorat du Forum Académie -.Industrie de l'AFIS, 2012, Paris, 
France) 
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- Towards a new generation of security requirements definition methodology using 
ontologies (Conférence sur l’ingénierie des systèmes d’information avancés, CAiSE 2012 
consortium doctoral, Gdansk, Pologne) 
- Using Security and Domain ontologies for Security Requirements Analysis. (Computer 
Software and Applications Conference Workshops (Atelier de la conférence sur les 
applications logiciel et informatiques - COMPSACW 2013, Kyoto, Japon). 
- Security requirements analysis based on security and domain ontologies.  (Ingénierie des 
exigences - Fondation pour la qualité logicielle - REFSQ 2013, Essen, Allemagne). 
- A Methodology for Defining Security Requirements using Security and Domain 
Ontologies (Insight Journal, INCOSE - Conseil international sur l'ingénierie des 
systèmes, 2013). 
La liste complète des publications produites par cette thèse peut être consultée à l'annexe 
G. 
8. L’ORGANISATION DE LA THÈSE 
Cette thèse est organisée en trois parties et dix chapitres comme suit :  
Partie 1 : Etat de l’art  
La première partie présente l’état de l’art et contient 2 chapitres :  
Le Chapitre 2 recense les travaux liés présentés dans la littérature concernant l'ingénierie des 
exigences de sécurité et la réutilisation des connaissances. Ce chapitre définit sept questions 
de recherche concernant l'état de l'art sur la réutilisation des connaissances dans l’IES, sa 
forme de représentation, la connaissance réutilisable, la technique de réutilisation de la 
connaissance, la dépendance à la connaissance de domaine, les lacunes et les défis trouvés 
dans la littérature. Ces questions ont été traitées au moyen d’une étude cartographique 
systématique présentée dans le chapitre.  
Le Chapitre 3 synthétise les travaux présentés dans la littérature liés aux ontologies de 
sécurité. Le chapitre soulève trois questions principales sur les différentes ontologies de 
sécurité existantes de nos jours, sur leur couverture des aspects de sécurité, sur ‘la meilleure’ 
ontologie de sécurité qui peut être choisie pour la définition des exigences SI.  
Partie 2 : La contribution principale  
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La deuxième partie de cette thèse présente le corps principal de la contribution. Elle contient 
cinq chapitres principaux :  
Le Chapitre 4 fournit un aperçu sur la méthode d’élucidation des exigences de sécurité 
spécifiques au domaine. Elle présente brièvement les principaux éléments sur lesquels la 
méthode se base. Le chapitre introduit un exemple motivant qui va être utilisé dans le reste de 
la thèse pour illustrer la méthode.  
Le Chapitre 5 présente la première contribution de cette thèse doctorale : une ontologie de 
sécurité noyau pour l’élucidation des exigences de sécurité. L’ontologie est présentée, ses 
concepts et relations sont décrits. La complétude de l’ontologie est validée par rapport aux 
autres ontologies. L’ontologie est validée à l’aide de quelques requêtes indicatives.    
Le Chapitre 6 décrit les buts et les exigences de sécurité. Elle présente le modèle de but de 
sécurité et le pattern syntaxique proposés pour manipuler les exigences de sécurité dans la 
méthode.  
Le Chapitre 7 décrit l’ontologie de domaine multi-niveaux proposée pour englober la 
connaissance du domaine. L’ontologie de haut niveau (upper) permet de passer d’un domaine 
un autre.  
Le Chapitre 8 présente comment les artéfacts précédents (ontologie de sécurité, buts et 
exigences de sécurité, ontologie de domaine multi-niveaux) ont été mis en place dans la 
méthode pour produire des buts de sécurité et des spécifications textuelles. Le chapitre 
présente un algorithme et les règles nécessaires (règles de cartographie et de production) pour 
extraire les connaissances pertinentes des ontologies. Dans le chapitre, le processus est 
présenté étape par étape à l’aide d’un exemple d'exécution. 
Partie 3 : Évaluation 
La troisième partie de la thèse de doctorat décrit l'évaluation de la proposition. Il contient 
deux chapitres : 
Le Chapitre 9 présente l'évaluation de la faisabilité et la généricité de la méthode. Il décrit 
l'application de la méthode à une étude de cas réelle liée au domaine maritime. Le chapitre 
examine la généricité de la méthode à travers deux autres applications. 
Le Chapitre 10 présente l'évaluation de la facilité d'utilisation et de l'utilité de la méthode. 
Cela se fait grâce à une expérience contrôlée avec des utilisateurs finaux. Le chapitre présente 
les résultats obtenus et discute les retours recueillis. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1. SECURITY: THE DARK SIDE!  
 
With ever-growing digitization of activities in various sectors (communication, health, 
banking, insurance, etc.), Information Systems (IS) are getting more and more critical. They 
must comply with emerging usages and varied needs and integrate new technologies, while, 
at the same time, they are permanently exposed to new vulnerabilities. Not a single week 
goes by without an announcement indicating that the IS of some private or public 
organization was attacked.  
The cost of cybercrime in 2013 is up to 113B$ worldwide (Norton, 2013). IS attacks target 
strategic data such as information exchanged by CIOs, financial data, R&D documents, 
customers and human resources information, etc. The consequences for organizations are 
manifold: deterioration of the image and brand, perturbation of the activity, financial losses, 
and even threatening the socio-economic, political and military ecosystems.  
The financial motivation of cybercrime is obvious: whereas the annual market of data is 
estimated at 7B€, the revenue generated from exploiting these data is about 230B€, with an  
annual growth of 40% (Frenkiel, 2009). Most cyber-attacks are quite well known: denials of 
service, viruses, worms, Trojans, phishing, attacks on lower network layers, spywares, etc.  
However, the press regularly reports unfortunate experiences. For example, in France in 
2010, 150 computers of the Direction Générale du Trésor were attacked in order to capture 
information related to the presidency of the G8 and G20. End of 2011, the French Senate was 
targeted by an attack shortly before the adoption of the law on the recognition of the 
Armenian genocide. In July 2012, the DropBox Company acknowledged that passwords 
stolen on other website allowed hackers to access online stored documents.  In September 
2014, five million Gmail addresses and passwords were posted on a forum (Elyan, 2014).  
In its annual report of 2013 (Symantec, 2013), Symantec reports that the violation of sensitive 
data increased by 62% with 253 incidents observed and 552 millions of identity data stolen. 
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During the year 2013, more than 40 million people in the U.S. had their personal information 
stolen, along with 54 million in Turkey, 20 million in Korea, 16 million in Germany, and 
more than 20 million in China. 
It would be simplistic to believe that IS weaknesses are always technological, or only have an 
internal origin. In fact, security is a multi-faceted problem; it is as much about understanding 
the domain in which systems operate as it is about the systems themselves. While developing 
security facilities such as encryption, identity control, or specific architectures is important, 
our attention should be drawn at looking into the sociotechnical context in which target 
systems will operate and threats that may arise and their potential harm, so as to uncover 
security requirements. 
In practice, security is still often considered as an adjustment variable (Gruselle, 2013). As 
the 2014 report of the (Centre d’analyse stratégique, 2014) shows it, risk management 
methods are still considered «too complex to be deployed in organizations, which are often 
not mature in terms of IS security».  CLUSIF indicates that, in France, only 63% of 
enterprises with more than 200 employees and less than a third of Collectivités Territoriales 
have formalized a security policy; even though these last use EBIOS (EBIOS, 2004) and 
ANSSI’s (Agence Nationale de Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information) PSSI (Politiques de 
Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information) four times more in 2012 than in 2008, this is still only 
limited to 13% of organizations: 63% of them do not even use a referenced method at all. The 
poor usage of methods is widespread: 43% of companies with more than 200 employees do 
not use a method or do not know which method is used to formalize the security policy. It is 
therefore necessary to propose simple but theoretically and empirically grounded approaches 
that really help organizations improve their practices, and reduce their exposure level to 
attacks. 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
2.1. KNOWLEDGE IS NEEDED  
Recent studies (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) have shown that the lack of information security 
knowledge at the management level is one reason for inadequate or non-existing information 
security management strategies, and that raising management information security awareness 
and knowledge levels leads to more effective strategies. In 2006, the European Network and 
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Information Security Agency (ENISIA) rated the establishment of unified information bases 
for information security risk management and the need for risk measurement methods as high 
priority issues. 
Haley shows that among the main challenges for security projects, there is the difficulty of 
expressing security requirements and producing exhaustive specifications (Haley et al. 2008). 
In fact, most software developers are not primarily interested in, or knowledgeable about, 
security (Tondel, Jaatun, and Meland, 2008) (Mouratidis, Giorgini, and Manson, 2005), For 
decades, the focus has been on implementing functionalities before deadline, and patching the 
inevitable bugs when it’s time for the next release or hot fix (Meier, 2006). However, the 
software engineering community is slowly beginning to realize that information security is 
also important for software which primary function is not related to security. Donald 
Firesmith claims that most requirements engineers are poorly trained to elicit, analyze, and 
specify security requirements (Firesmith, 2004). Consequently, they often confuse security 
requirements with architectural security mechanisms that are traditionally used to fulfill 
requirements, and end up making architecture and design decisions.  
Zuccato et al. (Zuccato, Daniels, and Jampathom, 2011) report that security requirement 
engineering is in practice frequently performed by security non-experts. Security expertise is 
“scarce”. Security requirements and their dependencies are often not directly known by 
requirements engineers.  
2.2. GENERIC SECURITY KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ENOUGH, IT MUST BE DOMAIN SPECIFIC  
A public library will clearly have a different view of computer security than will a central 
clearing house for interbank transactions. The specific security requirements of a particular 
installation can only be determined after careful consideration of the business context, user 
preferences, and/or defense posture (Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000).  
Domain knowledge, i.e the knowledge specific to the domain for which security requirements 
are defined, is often not taken into consideration, leaving the task to “guess” or “capture” 
from stakeholders domain properties to the requirements engineer or security analyst. 
Requirements engineers are often expected to have explicit knowledge about security and 
about the domain for which they elicit security requirements. However, this is unlikely to be 
the case; the domains are always changing, and the knowledge is too huge to understand and 
to master.   
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Some previous researches have considered knowledge-based requirements elicitation, 
especially with ontologies (Daramola  et al.,  2012a), (Velasco et al., 2009). Empirical 
experience with RITA (Salinesi, Ivankina, and Angole, 2008) was that “being generic, the 
threats in the RITA ontology are not specific to the target [bank] industry” (the case study 
was in the banking sector). Experts involved in the evaluation complained about the “lack of 
specificity of the types of threats and security requirements to the industry sector and the 
problem domain at hand”. 
2.3. KNOWLEDGE-BASED VERSUS MODEL-BASED SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING   
A lot of research has been conducted on model-based security requirements engineering 
methods (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) (Van Lamsweerde, 2004) (Dahl, Hogganvik, and 
Stølen, 2007). Model-based approaches can be useful since they provide a formal syntax for 
specifying security concepts. However, we believe that a knowledge-based approach can be a 
better option since it allows representing, accessing and re-using knowledge in order to 
develop methods, techniques, and tools for security requirements analysis. 
Despite a considerable effort in the field (to the best of our knowledge), these issues are still 
not completely handled by existing approaches – in other words, most model based 
approaches (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) (Van Lamsweerde, 2004) (Sindre and Opdahl, 
2001a) and risk based approaches (Mayer, 2012) (Morali et al., 2009). The same observation 
can be made regarding industrial approaches’ (EBIOS, 2004) (CLUSIF, 2004) lack of use of 
knowledge. Some knowledge based methods exist, notably the ontology-based ones (Salinesi, 
Ivankina, and Angole, 2008) (Velasco et al., 2009). But they do not consider the domain.  
The open problem addressed in this thesis is therefore to exploit both security knowledge and 
domain knowledge to better guide the elicitation of domain-specific security requirements.  
3. SCOPE OF THE DOCTORAL RESEARCH PROJECT 
The main contribution aimed at in this PhD work is a method to “Define domain specific 
security requirements of an information system by reusing knowledge encapsulated in 
domain and security ontologies.”   
The concepts manipulated during the project belong to different research areas, notably: (a) 
Requirements Engineering, (b) Knowledge Engineering, (c) Security, (d) Domain 
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Engineering and Ontologies, (e) Information Systems. These areas of research may provide 
different definitions for similar concepts.  
This section defines each concept as used during the PhD research project.   
3.1. INFORMATION SYSTEM  
There is no single definition for information systems (Carvalho, 2000). In the current PhD 
thesis an information system for which security requirements are elicited and analyzed is 
defined as follows:  “A system, whether automated or manual, that comprises people, 
machines, and/or methods organized to collect, process, transmit, and disseminate data (that 
represent user information) in a given environment” (Longeon and Archimbaud, 1999). 
Regarding this definition, we join Mayer et al. (Mayer, 2012) in the fact that security of 
information systems encompasses not only the security of  software systems or IT 
architecture, but also of people and facilities playing a role in the IS, so in its security. The 
typical example that characterizes this statement is the theft of a password of a data base 
through social engineering. Another example is the deliberate destruction of the data base 
server where the organization’s information is stored by an attacker who triggers fire in the 
server room. 
3.2. SECURITY  
Literature indicates that security can have two different meanings (Firesmith, 2007)(Mayer, 
2012): security and safety 1 . According to the Norwegian University of Technology and 
Science (NTNU): security is the protection against intended incidents. Wanted incidents 
happen due to a result of deliberate and planned act, while safety is the protection against 
random incidents. Random incidents are unwanted incidents that happen as a result of one or 
more coincidences (Albrechtsen, 2002). The New Oxford dictionary of English (Pearsall and 
Hanks, 2001) describes safety as the condition of being protected from or unlikely to cause 
danger, risk and injury. Security as the state of being free from danger or threat. The 
differences between security and safety are not remarkable; both are conditions where one is 
well protected. As far as this PhD is concerned, the term deals with accidental as well as 
deliberate harm. The basic idea is protecting assets from hazards/threats creating safe/secure 
conditions. This is consistent with other methods in the literature (reported in the state of the 
                                                          
1 The French word “Sécurité” translates both security and safety; it is confusing for a French speaking person to 
distinguish between them. 
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art of the thesis) which don’t make the distinction between security and safety and use a 
general definition of security as done here. Security as a discipline covers a set of methods, 
techniques and tools, responsible for protecting the resources of a system. As defined in 
ISO/IEC 13335 standard (ISO-b,  2004), in the scope of information systems, security covers 
seven criteria: confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability, non-
repudiation, and reliability. The concept of vulnerability is considered as a property of the 
system or its environment that, in conjunction with an attack, can lead to a security failure 
(Anderson and Anderson, 2001). Assets are another concept in security literature defined as 
anything valuable in an organization (ISO-b, 2004) that might be subject to attacks (Schneier, 
2003). 
 In this PhD thesis, we are particularly interested in security at early stages of system 
development, during the requirements engineering phase.  
3.3. REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING  
A requirement is defined as “a condition or a capability needed by a user to solve a problem 
or achieve an objective” (Pohl, 2010).  Requirements Engineering (RE) is regarded as a 
single phase of the software development process which main task is to develop the 
requirements specification for the system. RE is thus performed for each project at the 
beginning of the development process. The elicited requirements are documented in a 
project-specific requirements specification that then serves as a reference document for the 
following development phases (Pohl, 2010). Firesmith (Firesmith, 2007) defines 
requirements engineering as: “The engineering discipline within systems/software 
engineering concerned with identifying, analyzing, reusing, specifying, managing, verifying, 
and validating goals and requirements (including security-related requirements)”.   
     In this PhD thesis, all these definitions are accepted: the requirements we intend to define 
are conditions stated by stakeholders to achieve their goals. Moreover, we intend to develop 
specifications (textual and modeling ones) that will serve as reference for later development 
phases. However, in our research work, we concentrate on identifying, analyzing, and reusing 
requirements. We do not tackle verification or validation as depicted by Firesmith. The PhD 
work concentrates exclusively on requirements elicitation.   
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3.4. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING TO BETTER HANDLE SECURITY  
During the last decade the research community started calling for early consideration of 
security, throughout the requirements engineering phase. Considering security during early 
stages of IS development allows IS developers to envisage threats, their consequences and 
countermeasures before a system is in place rather than when a destruction of possibly 
disastrous attack occurs (Mayer, 2012). This attention gave birth to a growing research field 
called Security Requirements Engineering (SRE). SRE’s main concern is protecting assets 
from harm (Giorgini et al., 2005a).  
 According to (Haley et al., 2008) security requirements in the literature are defined under 
three categories: as functions, as non-functional requirements, as other interpretations:  
A. Security requirements as functions  
Security requirements are sometimes expressed by describing the security mechanisms to be 
used. For example, the ISO version of the Common Criteria (ISO-a, 2009), provides 
examples of security requirements of the general form “The [...] Security Function (TSF) 
shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [rules ...]”, where “rules” 
appear to be a mechanism. The NIST Computer Security Handbook (Guttman and Aoback, 
1995) states that “These [security] requirements can be expressed as technical features (e.g., 
access controls), assurances (e.g., background checks for system developers), or operational 
practices (e.g., awareness and training)”, in effect defining security requirements in terms of 
functions and practices.  
Defining requirements in terms of function leaves out key information: what objects need 
protecting and, more importantly, why the objects need protecting. Both the ISO and NIST 
documents provide little guidance on how to connect the functionality to the security needs. 
Instead of describing when and why objects are to be protected, they describe how the objects 
are to be protected. 
B. Security requirements as Non Functional Requirements (NFRs)  
Devanbu and Stubblebine (Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000) remark that security 
requirements are a kind of non-functional requirement. Kotonya and Sommerville (Kotonya 
and Sommerville, 1998), when discussing non-functional requirements, in which they include 
security, define them as "restrictions or constraints" on system services. Rushby (Rushby, 
2001) states that: "Security requirements mostly concern what must not happen". Using the 
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Tropos methodology, Mouratidis et al (Mouratidis, Giorgini, and Manson, 2003a) mention 
that: "security constraints define the system’s security requirements".  
The problem with these definitions is their lack of specificity: In RE, it is not enough to say 
what one doesn’t want. Goals and their operationalization in the context must be explicit too.   
In other words security requirements should also state how “system services” are being 
constrained; what effect the constraint will have on the functionality of the system; and how 
one can validate the system against any potential constraint to ensure that it accurately 
reflects the stakeholders’ wishes. 
C. Other interpretations of Security Requirements 
Several authors seem to assume that security requirements are identical to high-level security 
goals. Tettero et al. (Tettero et al., 1997) define security requirements as the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the entity for which protection is needed. While this is a clear 
definition, in some cases it may not result in precise enough requirements. 
Just like in RE in general, goals are useful to elicit requirements, analyze them, justify them, 
and trace them. However, requirements are goals only when it is stated that they shall be 
operationalized on the system and how (Van Lamsweerde, 2009) 
Another term used for security requirements is “security policy”. For example, Devanbu and 
Stubblebine (Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000) define a security requirement as "a 
manifestation of a high-level organizational policy into the detailed requirements of a specific 
system. (Anderson and Anderson, 2001) state that a security policy is "a document that 
expresses [...] what [...] protection mechanisms are to achieve" and that "the process of 
developing a security policy [...] is the process of requirements engineering". 
In this PhD thesis we make the distinction between security criteria, security goals, and 
security requirements.  
Security criteria define security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
traceability. Security goal defines what stakeholders hope to achieve in the future in terms of 
security. They are at a high-level of abstraction, not always well formalized. For example a 
stakeholder might express the goal of maintaining the confidentiality of personal information. 
Security requirements are conditions defined on the environment that needs to be fulfilled in 
order to achieve a security goal (they materialize a security goal) and mitigate a risk.  
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Consistently with Glinz’s definition of NFR’s (Glinz, 2007) security requirements can be 
non-functional requirements at a certain level of abstraction and functional at another level of 
abstraction. This depends on what we want to protect and on the target security level. 
Security requirements can be related to databases, applications, systems, organizations, and 
external environments. This PhD thesis also loosely uses the term 'security requirement', to 
refer both to 'security policy' and 'security requirement’.  
3.5. WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?  
Knowledge can be defined as a justified belief that increases an entity’s capacity for effective 
action (Kusuma T.M., 2013). According to Debenham, “Knowledge is the explicit functional 
associations between items of information and/or data” (Debenham, 1989). 
Knowledge should be differentiated from data and information. Data (the plural of datum) are 
raw facts (Long and Long, 1998). For example; “raw signals”---- is the data. Information is 
the meaning we give to accumulated facts (data) (Long and Long, 1998). “SOS alert” is the 
meaning attached to the data ‘raw signals’ and it is the information.  
The knowledge attaches purpose and competence to information, and it is potential to 
generate an action. Here: emergency SOS alert → start rescue operation (an emergency alert 
generates the action of starting a rescue operation) 
Knowledge may be viewed from several perspectives (Kusuma T.M., 2013): 
 A state of mind – knowledge is the state of knowing and understanding. 
 An object – knowledge is an object to be stored and manipulated. 
 A process – knowledge is a process of applying expertise. 
 A condition – knowledge is organized access to and retrieval of content. 
 A capability – knowledge is the potential to influence action.  
Tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in actions, experience, and involvement in a specific 
context. It consists of cognitive element (mental models) and technical element (know-how 
and skills applicable to specific work). Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that is 
transmittable in formal, systematic language.   
Knowledge engineering is the discipline that involves integrating knowledge into computer 
systems in order to solve complex problems normally requiring a high level of human 
expertise (Feigenbaum and Pamela, 1983).  
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Knowledge egnineering normally involves five distinct steps in transferring human 
knowledge into some form of knowledge based systems: (i) Knowledge validation, (ii) 
Knowledge representation (iii) Inferencing (vi) Explanation and justification.  
A knowledge engineer is responsible for obtaining knowledge from human experts and then 
entering this knowledge into some form of knowledge-based systems. 
It is in 1982 that Newell published a paper on “The Knowledge Level” (Newell, 1982) in 
which he argued the need for a description of knowledge at a level higher than the level of 
symbols in knowledge representation systems. The knowledge-level was his proposal for 
realizing a description of an artificial intelligent system in terms of its rational behavior: why 
does the system (the “agent”) perform this “action”, independent of its symbolic 
representation in rules, frames or logic (the “symbol” level).  
In the nineties the attention of the knowledge-engineering shifted gradually to domain 
knowledge, in particular reusable representations in the form of ontologies. A key paper, 
which also quite wide attention outside the knowledge-engineering community was Gruber’s 
paper on portable ontologies (Gruber, 1995). An ontology, being a “representation of a 
conceptualization” (Gruber, 1995), is a formal representation of the entities and relationships 
that exist in some domain. It represents a shared conceptualization in order to meet any useful 
purpose (Dobson and Sawyer, 2006). Ontological analysis clarifies the structure of 
knowledge. Given a domain, its ontology forms the heart of any system of knowledge 
representation for that domain. Without ontologies, or the conceptualizations that underlie 
knowledge, there cannot be a vocabulary for representing and reusing knowledge 
(Chandrasekaran et al, 1999).  
In this PhD thesis, we are interested in two kinds of knowledge, the security related 
knowledge that is necessary to perform a security requirements elicitation and analysis, and 
the domain knowledge, i.e. the domain for which security requirements are elicited (e.g. 
bank, health, maritime, etc.). In the context of the research work, we are particularly 
interested in ontologies as the maine form of knowledge representation and reuse. 
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3.6. DOMAIN AND SECURITY KNOWLEDGE IN REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING  
A. What is meant by ‘Domain’? 
(Bjørner, 2010b) defines a domain as an “area” of natural or human activity, or both, where 
the ‘area’ is “well-delineated” such as, for example, for physics: mechanics or electricity or 
chemistry or hydrodynamics; for an infrastructure component: banking, railways, hospital 
health-care; or for a market: consumers, retailers, wholesalers, producers and the logistic 
chain. 
This PhD thesis joins Bjørner  in considering the domain as a universe of discourse, small or 
large, i.e. a structure (i) of entities, things, individuals, particulars some of which are 
designated as state components; (ii) of functions, over entities, which when applied become 
possibly state-changing actions of the domain; (iii) of events, possibly involving entities, 
occurring in time and expressible as predicates over single or pairs of (before/after) states; 
and (iv) of behaviors, sets of possibly interrelated sequences of actions and events. 
B. Why is domain knowledge important for requirements engineering?  
Is it possible to develop system requirements without understanding the domain?  While 
some authors claim that this is not possible (Kaiya and Saeki, 2006) (Bjørner, 2010b), others 
claim that ignorance is important too (Berry, 1995). This PhD starts with the observation that 
analysts, consultants, designers, architects, and developers develop systems for hospitals, 
railways or banks with little understanding of health-care, transportation or the financial 
markets. This is not true in all engineering disciplines where professionalism is often 
ingrained: Aeronautics engineers understand the domain of aerodynamics; naval architects 
(i.e., ship designers) understand the domain of hydrodynamics; telecommunications engineers 
understand the domain of electromagnetic field theory; and so forth. 
According to (Kaiya and Saeki, 2006) domain knowledge held by experts in a problem 
domain plays an important role on eliciting requirements of high quality. Although 
requirements analysts are knowledgeable on software technology, their knowledge about the 
problem domain where software to be developed will be operated is often tacit, not clearly 
defined nor formalized. Deficiency in domain knowledge may result in poor requirements 
elicitation. 
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For all these reasons, we support Bjørner in his statements:  “before software can be designed 
we must understand the requirements. Before requirements can be finalized we must have 
understood the domain”. As shown in Figure 1.1, this impacts the systems development 
lifecycle where domain engineering precedes requirements engineering. The results of 
domain engineering include a domain model: a description, both informal, as a precise 
narrative, and formal, as a specification. Requirements engineering include results, among 
others a requirements model; both informal, as a precise narrative, and formal, as a 
specification. The results of software design include executable code and all documentation 
that goes with it. 
 
C. Why is domain knowledge important for security requirements engineering?  
Security requirements and security requirements engineering do not escape the observation 
made above. Security requirements elicitation from stakeholders is actually one of the most 
difficult steps in requirements analysis processes, and several methods and computerized 
tools have been studied and developed in order to support human activities of security 
requirement elicitation. However, these methods and tools are too general where problem-
specific domain knowledge is not used, and did not support the utilization of domain 
knowledge.  
Since security is not a separate issue, when it comes to define security requirements, the 
requirements engineer needs to know what are the organizations in the scope of the study, the 
assets that need protection, the different persons involved in the organization. All these 
information falls within the domain at hand. Moroer,   the countermeasure to overcome the 
risks, differ weather the organization belongs to the health domain, banking, aeronotics, etc. 
Figure 1.1. The Triptych of Software Development according to Bjorner. 
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knowing what are thr countermeasures specific to each domain will help elicitating security 
requrements of a better quality.  
3.7. KNOWLEDGE REUSE IN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING  
Back in 1993, the second International Workshop on Software Reusability was held in Lucca, 
Italy. Most of the papers presented at this event focused on reusing code, design or 
architecture. In other words, the thinking was that mainly the hard artifacts—code, object, 
and so on—could be reused. Very few papers looked at the idea of reuse earlier in the IS life 
cycle, namely reusing requirements themselves. Active areas of reuse research in the past 
twenty years include reuse libraries, domain engineering methods and tools; reuse design, 
design patterns domain specific software architecture, software componentry, generators, 
measurement and experimentation (Frakes and Kang, 2005). 
Nowadays, the practice of reuse is moving upstream and reuse is also concerned with more 
abstract artifacts. Requirements are commonly recycled; patterns are exchanged on the 
Internet. The notion of reuse at the requirements stage is largely accepted by many within the 
community as a desirable aim (Lam, McDermid, and Vickers, 1997). For instance, a working 
conference on patterns (Pattern Languages of Programs) is held twice a year and results in the 
sharing of knowledge and publication of new patterns (Robertson and Robertson, 2013).  
Requirement reuse can be defined as either taking requirements that have been written for 
previous projects and then using them for a new project, or writing requirements from scratch 
at a reasonable level of generality and abstraction in order to use them over different projects. 
A clear distinction must be made between engineering “for” reuse and engineering “by” reuse 
(Maiden, 1993).  
For instance, it is possible to reuse different types of data, ranging from business 
requirements and functional requirements to use cases and test cases. Since requirements 
engineering is the first phase in the software development process, requirements reuse can 
empower the software life cycle. Previous research (López, Laguna, and Peñalvo, 2002) has 
pointed out that reusing the first software products and processes implemented in a 
development project can have an impact on the life cycle from two basic points of view: (a) 
allowing the software development resources to be more proﬁtable, and (b) promoting reuse-
based development across the entire software process. 
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Moreover, at a high level of abstraction, every application tends to have the same basic kinds 
of vulnerable assets (e.g., data, communications, services, hardware components, and 
personnel). Similarly, these vulnerable assets tend to be subject to the same basic kinds of 
security threats (e.g., theft, vandalism, unauthorized disclosure, destruction, fraud, extortion, 
espionage, etc.) from attacks by the same basic kinds of attackers (e.g., hackers, crackers, 
disgruntled employees, international cyber terrorists, industrial spies, etc.) who can be 
profiled with motivations and their typical levels of expertise and tools. Security 
requirements tend to be even more standardized than their associated mechanisms. For 
example, to address the identification and authentication requirements, one may have several 
choices of architectural mechanisms beyond user ID and passwords (Firesmith, 2004). Based 
on this, requirements reuse could lead to significant savings in development time and cost 
(Hermoye, van Lamsweerde, and Perry, 2006).  
Structuring security knowledge helps the knowledge consumer to browse the content and to 
find the relevant information more efficiently. Different knowledge representations exist in 
the literature. Patterns of recurring attacks and vulnerabilities have been identified by 
longtime software security practitioners (Mead and Stehney, 2005). Security templates of a 
high level of abstraction were also introduced for reuse purposes (Firesmith, 2004). Various 
other approaches for managing security knowledge and reuse exist in the literature, such as 
taxonomies, ontologies, standards, and guidelines. 
During the last decade, researchers paid some attention to the benefits of reuse in SRE 
process given the common nature of security problems across applications and application 
domains (Firesmith, 2004). Security knowledge is hard to acquire. In addition to awareness 
about potential attacks, designing security-critical systems requires knowledge and security 
expertise in various fields such as computer networks, operating systems, communication 
protocols, cryptography algorithms, and access control methods. Reuse combined with 
predefined structured knowledge can make the job of requirements engineers much easier and 
faster, since they usually lack security expertise and skills. However, one should be careful 
when structuring reusable knowledge – it has to be of a high quality. Otherwise it might end 
up introducing new security problems.  
In this PhD thesis, security knowledge includes security threats and attacks, vulnerabilities, 
security requirements. Domain knowledge includes domain entities such as actors, 
organizations, assets, locations, etc.  
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4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS   
The thesis addresses the aforementioned problems by proposing a method that guides 
requirements engineers (but also security analysts) in the elicitation of security requirements 
for specific domains. The method is generic in the sense that it can be applied to various 
domains but it is domain specific at its application.  
Thus, the main objective of this thesis is to reply to the following research question: 
 Main research question: How to elicit security requirements that are domain specific with a 
reuse strategy? 
To answer this main research question, several sub-issues must be considered too. Addressing 
each of the following four research questions is necessary to solve the main research question 
of the thesis: 
RQ1. How to structure security knowledge both on a generic level and in relationship with 
specific domains?  
RQ2. How to structure the knowledge related to domains in the light of security concerns?  
RQ3. What is the best way to capture stakeholders’ security goals and requirements?  
RQ4. How to exploit both security knowledge and domain knowledge to produce domain 
specific security requirements and build security requirements models?  
5. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
The main purpose of the research work in this PhD is the elicitation of domain specific 
security requirements through a reuse strategy. Different approaches can be adopted to 
accomplish this objective. One possible approach could be to derive from generic security 
knowledge, domain specific security knowledge, and then use this domain specific security 
knowledge for domain specific security requirements elicitation. Another approach could be 
to use both security knowledge and domain knowledge to elicit domain specific security 
requirements. In this PhD thesis, the second approach is developed. However, within this 
approach, questions arise concerning the best structure of the security and domain 
knowledge, and how to use this knowledge to build security requirements models.   
To summarize, the PhD work tests the main hypotheses: 
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a. It is possible to provide the necessary security knowledge by choosing adequate 
structures for it; 
b. It is possible to build security requirements models by relying on security and domain 
knowledge;  
c. Relying on domain knowledge in addition to security knowledge will make a 
difference in the production of domain specific security requirements with regards to 
relying only on generic security knowledge;  
d. The latter approach will be efficient and easy to use for end users;  
e. A good implementation of the last approach is possible and useful for end users.    
6. RESEARCH METHOD 
The research work reported in this thesis was conducted using a design science method. 
(Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010) define design science as being about design and validation of 
solution proposals to practical problems. Hevner et al. (Hevner et Chatterjee, 2010) suggest 
that design science differs in two aspects from other branches of science: (a) it is concerned 
with artifacts rather than facts of nature or social structure, and (b) it is concerned with a 
search for prescriptive rules for design, rather than a search for descriptions, explanations and 
predictions, as other branches of science are. Being design oriented, the research method used 
in this PhD thesis intends to validate the research hypotheses presented above by means of 
case studies and controlled experiments. 
To reply to the main research question and to test the research hypotheses of this thesis, we 
carried out a research strategy based on the design science process model proposed by  
(Peffers et al., 2007). This process contains six main steps: (identify problem and motivate, 
define objective of a solution, design and development, demonstration, evaluation, 
communication). Figure 1.2 presents the design science process model for information 
system research, and the application of this process to the research carried out in this PhD 
thesis. 
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Figure 1.2.  Application of the design science process model for information system research (Peffers et al. 2007) to the research 
carried out in this thesis. 
More precisely, the following strategy was implemented: 
A. A systematic mapping study on the reuse of knowledge in security requirements 
engineering was conducted to (i) update existing literature surveys related to SRE 
with recent researches, (ii) to identify the (re)used knowledge in SRE, (iii) to 
distinguish between the different types of knowledge reuse structures in SRE, and (iv) 
to understand their use, and (v) to investigate and report the definition of domain 
specific security requirements by SRE methods. 
B. A survey of security ontologies was conducted. The main objective was to review, 
analyze, select, and classify security ontologies, as a scope study but with a particular 
interest in the field of security requirements engineering.   
C. A collection of gaps and drawbacks in the existing approaches were identified with 
regards to the research question of this PhD thesis.  
D. An ontology-based method was proposed to analyze and elicit domain specific 
security requirements. Within the proposed method, three sub-propositions were 
developed: core security ontology, specification of security goals and security 
requirements, and a rule-based technique to explore domain and security ontology 
during the requirements elicitation process.  
E. The feasibility of the proposed method was evaluated through a real-world case study. 
The ease of use and usefulness of the proposed method were evaluated with end-
users.  The results of these evaluations were intended to support or refute the 
hypothesis proposed in this thesis.  
F. New research directions were identified. The results of the case study and the 
controlled experiment and the feedback from the information system and computer 
science community were taken into account to improve the initial method. 
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7. CONTRIBUTIONS  
This PhD thesis makes some original contributions:  
 A framework for analyzing and comparing knowledge reuse in SRE. The framework 
was proposed after a systematic mapping study of knowledge reuse in security 
requirements engineering. The systematic mapping study analyzed more than 150 
publications over the past twenty years. The different reuse forms in security 
requirements engineering (ontologies, patterns, taxonomies, generic models,..) were 
identified, the reuse techniques, as well as the reused knowledge. This work published 
in the requirements engineering journal (REJ).  
 A framework to classify security ontologies. In this contribution, 8 families of 
security ontologies were identified after a deep reading of about 50 publications. The 
8 families are beginning security ontologies, security taxonomies, general security 
ontologies, specific security ontologies, web oriented, risk based, modeling, and for 
requirements. Each of the security ontologies of the study was analyzed in terms of its 
overage of security aspects. This contribution has been presented in the third 
International Workshop on Information Systems Security Engineering WISSE’12.  
 An ontology based and a rule based method for domain specific security requirements 
elicitations. The method takes as an input a core security ontology and any domain 
ontology to produce domain specific textual security requirements as well as security 
models. This method is based on four main sub-contributions:    
o A core security ontology. This contribution proposes a novel meta-ontology 
for security requirements engineering. It combines elements of existing 
ontologies to create a core security ontology. A description of the core security 
ontology itself is proposed and the process for constructing it. Several 
elements of the ontology are defined and their relations are shown. An 
evaluation is presented in order to prove the completeness, the validity and the 
usability of the ontology. This contribution was presented in the International 
Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems in March 2015. 
o A multi-level domain ontology to structure domain knowledge. This multi-
level structure allows the method to avoid being stacked to a single domain. 
The advantage is to give the possibility to switch from a domain to another 
while using the method.  
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o Linguistic templates to specify security goals and security requirements. Here, 
the differences between security goals and security requirements are clarified. 
Linguistic templates are proposed to specify them.     
o A rule-based mechanism to extract relevant knowledge from domain and 
security ontologies and produce security requirements models and textual SRE 
specifications.  
The method has been evaluated. Its feasibility was evaluated through a real world case study. 
Its usage and usability were evaluated through a controlled experiment.  Different parts of the 
method have been published and presented in various events and editions. One of the 
publications got a best paper award.  Here follows the list of publications:    
- Vers une nouvelle génération de définition des exigences de sécurité fondée sur 
l'utilisation des ontologies. Best paper award (INformatique des Organisations et des 
Systèmes d’Information et de Décision - INFORSID 2012, Montpelier, France).  
- Une méthode de définition des exigences de sécurité fondée sur l'utilisation des 
ontologies. (Séminaire Doctoral du Forum Académie - Industrie de l'AFIS., 2012, 
Paris, France.)  
- Towards a new generation of security requirements definition methodology using 
ontologies (Conference on Advanced information Systems Engineering, CAiSE 2012 
Doctoral Consortium, Gdansk, Poland)    
- Using Security and Domain ontologies for Security Requirements Analysis. 
(Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops – COMPSACW 2013, 
Kyoto, Japan).  
- Security requirements analysis based on security and domain ontologies.  
(Requirements Engineering Foundation for Software Quality – REFSQ 2013, Essen, 
Germany).  
- A Methodology for Defining Security Requirements using Security and Domain 
Ontologies (Insight Journal, INCOSE - The International Council on Systems 
Engineering, 2013).  
The full list of publications produced by this PhD can be consulted in the appendix G.   
 
 43 
 
8. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
This thesis is organized in three parts and ten chapters as follows:   
Part 1: State of the art 
The first part presents the state of the art and contains 2 chapters:  
Chapter 2 reviews related work presented in literature regarding security 
requirements engineering and knowledge reuse. This chapter tackles seven research 
questions about the state of the art on the reuse of knowledge in SRE about the 
knowledge reliance, its form of representation, the reusable knowledge, the technique 
for reusing the knowledge, the domain knowledge reliance, gaps and challenges found 
in the literature. These questions were answered through a systematic mapping study 
presented in the chapter.   
Chapter 3 reviews related work presented in the literature related to security 
ontologies. The chapter raises three main questions about the different security 
ontologies that exist nowadays, about their coverage of security aspects, about the 
‘best’ security ontology that one can choose for the definition of IS requirements.  
Part 2: Main contribution  
The second part of the PhD thesis presents the main body of the contribution. It contains five 
main chapters:  
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the domain specific security requirements 
elicitation method. It presents briefly the main elements on which the method relies. 
The chapter introduces a motivating example that will be used in the rest of the thesis 
to illustrate our method.     
Chapter 5 presents the first contribution of this PhD thesis: a core security ontology 
for security requirements elicitation. The ontology is presented. Its concepts and 
relations are described.  The completeness of the ontology is validated with regards to 
other security ontologies. The validity of the ontology is validated through some 
indicative queries.  
Chapter 6 describes security goals and security requirements. It presents the security 
goal model and the syntactic security requirement pattern proposed to handle security 
goals and requirements in the method.  
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Chapter 7 describes the multi-level domain ontology that was proposed to encompass 
the domain knowledge. The ontology allows switching from a domain to another 
through its upper domain ontology.  
Chapter 8 presents how the previous elements (security ontology, security goals and 
requirements, multi-level domain ontology) were put together in the method to 
produce security goals and textual specifications. The chapter presents an algorithm 
and the necessary proposed rules (mapping rules and production) to extract the 
relevant knowledge from the ontologies. In the chapter the process is presented step 
by step through the running example.    
Part 3: Evaluation  
The third part of the PhD thesis reports the evaluation of the proposition. It contains two 
chapters:  
Chapter 9 presents the evaluation of the feasibility and genericity of the method. It 
reports the application of the method on a real world case study related to the 
maritime domain.  The case study demonstrates the capacity of the method to handle 
security requirements engineering in a specific domain of application.  The chapter 
examines the genericity of the method through two other applications.  
Chapter 10 presents the evaluation of the ease of use and usefulness of the method. 
This is done thanks to a controlled experiment with end-users. The chapter reports the 
obtained results and discusses the feedback gathered from participants with regards to 
the hypothesis set in the beginning.  
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State of the art 
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Chapter 2 
Security requirements engineering and 
knowledge reuse 
 
 
An increasing number of publications, conference tracks, and workshops in recent years point 
out the growing interest of researchers and practitioners in providing SRE processes with 
various frameworks and methods. Some of them are extensions of goal-oriented approaches, 
like Secure i* (Liu, Yu, and Mylopoulos, 2002), Secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2006), KAOS 
and anti-models (Van Lamsweerde, 2004). Others are built on the object paradigm, mainly 
UML-based, such as misuse cases (Sindre and Opdahl, 2005), security use cases (Firesmith, 
2003), Secure UML (Lodderstedt, Basin, and Doser, 2002) and UMLSec (Jürjens, 
2002)(Jürjens, 2005)(Jürjens and Shabalin, 2004).  
Nowadays, the research community in SRE as well as practitioners has a vague idea of 
existing literature for handling knowledge reuse among existing SRE approaches. Despite 
some existing surveys about security requirements engineering, there is not yet any reference 
for researchers and practitioners that presents in a systematic way the existing proposals, 
techniques, and tools related to security knowledge reuse in security requirements 
engineering. The definition of security requirements for specific domains is still an issue 
(Salinesi, Ivankina, and Angole, 2008)(Souag, 2012), and no reference reports in a systematic 
way the situation of domain consideration in SRE. 
For instance, a quick research indicates that some approaches propose a catalog of attacks 
(Jensen, Tøndel, and Meland, 2010), while others rely on patterns (Hatebur, Heisel, and 
Schmidt, 2007). However, a systematic mapping study and analysis of existing security 
requirements engineering methods that make (re)use of knowledge is still lacking. 
This chapter presents a structured and systematic mapping study (Petersen et al., 2008) of 
several articles related to knowledge reuse and security requirements engineering from the 
last two decades.  
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This mapping study must find answers to the following questions: Does the security 
requirements engineering method rely on reusability of knowledge? What are the reusable 
elements? How are they represented, modeled? How are they (re)used? Are the knowledge 
based approaches tool-supported? Are the security requirements defined for specific 
domains? Which domains? How is the domain knowledge represented?  
A framework was defined to understand the different proposals and classify new 
contributions in the future. Over 100 papers were analyzed from which the chapter reports the 
knowledge reuse situation of 30 methods.   
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of our research method. 
Section 3 presents the process and results of the conducted systematic mapping study to get 
an overview of existing knowledge reuse based security requirements approaches. Section 4 
summarizes the results and answers the research questions. Section 5 reports the related 
works. Section 6 discusses threats to validity of our mapping study. Finally, Section 7 
concludes this chapter.  
1 RESEARCH METHOD 
A fair amount of publications, conference tracks and workshops in SRE appeared during the 
last decade, revealing a steady interest of both researchers and practitioners in that domain. 
Unfortunately, it remains difficult to have more than a vague idea about what is available in 
terms of reuse of security requirements, and to position research with respect to available 
practices in order to choose appropriate practice.  One difficulty is due to the fact that these 
issues are addressed by several communities: the requirements engineering community, the 
software engineering community, the information systems community, and the computer 
security community. 
Our research method aimed at analyzing and identifying the available literature on security 
requirements research, and categorizing it in a systematic way. The Systematic MAPping 
study (SMAP) was conducted between August 2013 and December 2013. We applied the 
mapping studies guidelines proposed by Petersen et al. (Petersen et al., 2008), which compare 
the methods used in mapping studies and systematic literature reviews. The SMAP reported 
in this chapter was performed based on these guidelines (cf. Figure 2.1), to identify questions 
and answers rose by the research community on knowledge (re)use in SRE.  
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Figure 2.1. The systematic mapping process carried out in this paper, applied from (Petersen et al. 2008) 
Reviewing existing research in a fully objective way is not possible. A systematic study, such 
as the one outlined in Figure 2.1, however makes the process less subjective by using pre-
defined data forms and criteria that narrow the scope for personal interpretation. 
Mapping studies must be distinguished from systematic literature reviews in several ways. 
Systematic Literature Reviews (SLR) have been defined as “a means of identifying, 
evaluating and interpreting all available research relevant to a particular research question, or 
topic area, or phenomenon of interest” (Kitchenham and Charters, 2007). Mapping studies 
are a special kind of SLR that use the same basic methodology as SLRs but aim to identify 
and classify all research related to a broad software engineering topic rather than answering 
questions about the relative merits of competing technologies as addressed by conventional 
SLRs (Kitchenham, Budgen, and Brereton, 2011) (Budgen et al., 2008). SMAPs are intended 
to provide an overview of a topic area and identify whether there are sub-topics with 
sufficient primary studies to conduct conventional SLRs and also to identify sub-topics where 
more primary studies are needed. 
Overall, the main phases of our systematic mapping study were: the definition of research 
questions, conducting the search for relevant papers, screening of papers, key wording of 
abstracts and data extraction and mapping planning, conducting, and reporting. Figure 2.1 
presents the process structure of our SMAP.   
A key element in the guidelines proposed by Petersen et al. (Petersen et al., 2008), is the 
definition of the research questions (research scope). Research questions should reflect and 
reply to the main goals of a SMAP in providing an overview of a research area, identify the 
quantity and type of research and results available within it. The search for primary studies 
(all papers) is conducted by using search strings on scientific databases or browsing 
manually through relevant conference proceedings or journal publications. Screening papers 
for inclusion and exclusion (relevant papers). In this step, restriction and quality criteria are 
used to exclude studies that are not relevant to answer the research questions. Key wording 
 49 
 
using abstracts is a way to reduce the time needed for developing the classification scheme 
and ensuring that the scheme takes the existing studies into account. The process ends up 
with the data extraction and mapping of studies; here the classification scheme evolves by 
adding new categories or mapping and splitting existing categories. More practical details on 
how we addressed these issues in our SMAP are given in the next section. 
2 MAPPING STUDY:  REUSABLE SECURITY KNOWLEDGE 
The review includes publications reporting on existing approaches and tools as well as 
publications discussing research issues for security requirements and knowledge reuse in 
SRE. The SMAP was conducted in 24 relevant sources (The detailed list of the sources can 
be consulted in the cell “Digital library/resource” in Table A.1 in the appendix A). The total 
retrieved number of publications is 158 using well-defined search criteria (which will be 
presented later). From these 158 publications, 95 papers were chosen for further analyses 
based on our set of selection criteria. The complete list of all 95 retrieved publications and 
details about the retrieved searches can be found in the Appendix A. 
2.1. CONDUCTING THE SYSTEMATIC MAPPING STUDY  
The main goal for conducting the systematic mapping study was i) to get an extensive 
overview of existing knowledge based approaches and tools for security requirements 
engineering and ii) to understand key issues for security requirements elicitation and analysis 
considering the (re)use of knowledge in these practices. This systematic mapping study was 
developed using the following elements (definition of research questions, search for primary 
studies, screening of papers, data classification):  
A. Definition of research questions 
 
Security requirements engineering process needs to be reinforced with knowledge on 
security. This knowledge is necessary to take into account security requirements early and 
consistently. Hence, we wanted to understand the current state-of-the-art in this field. More 
specifically, we wanted to evaluate if the security knowledge can be reused (RQ1). A deep 
analysis of this question requires that we elicit how this knowledge is represented (RQ2) and 
reused (RQ3). Moreover, can the whole knowledge be reused (RQ4)? Can it be reused 
automatically (RQ5)? We were also interested if domain knowledge was used and if the 
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produced security requirements are domain specific (RQ6). Finally, what can be improved in 
current approaches (RQ7)? RQ2, RQ3, RQ4, RQ5 and RQ6 only make sense if RQ1 is 
answerable and if the answer is yes. RQ2, RQ3, RQ4, RQ5 and RQ6 are necessary to 
understand which knowledge is currently reused and RQ7 sketches avenues for future 
research. Thus, the systematic mapping study was guided by the following research 
questions, for each SRE method, and for SRE methods overall: 
RQ1. Does the security requirements engineering method rely on reusable security 
knowledge? How many papers handled knowledge reuse in SRE? (Knowledge 
reliance)  
RQ2. How is the reused knowledge represented? What are the proportions of each 
knowledge representation form?  (Form of representation) 
RQ3. What are the techniques for (re) using the knowledge and their proportion? 
(Technique) 
RQ4. What are the main reused elements and their proportion? (Reusable 
knowledge) 
RQ5. Is it tool-supported? Are there many tools for SRE overall? (Automation) 
RQ6. Are the security requirements specified for a specific domain? If yes, for which 
domain? And how are they represented?  (Domain)   
RQ7. What are the new challenges regarding security knowledge (re) use in SRE?   
Research Question RQ1 checks, among the different existing proposals, whether the security 
engineering method at hand relies on the (re)use of knowledge. It also looks for the number 
of papers that rely on the (re)use of knowledge. RQ2 finds how (and how much) the (re)used 
knowledge is represented (modeling language, representation of requirements, etc.). RQ3 
identifies how the security knowledge is (re)used. RQ4 reports what the main reusable 
elements found in proposals identified in RQ1 are: for instance, security requirements, threat 
models, or common vulnerabilities.  RQ5 checks whether the SRE method offers automated 
support for the reuse of knowledge. It also examines the number of papers that propose tools 
for reuse in SRE. RQ6 checks if the security requirements analysis addresses specific 
domains, Finally, RQ7 extracts from the papers some new challenges that the SRE 
community should face in the future.  
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B. Search for primary studies 
 
   To search for primary studies (all papers), the sources (presented in the Appendix A) were 
selected based on an analysis of security requirements literature. Our sources were extracted 
from digital libraries such as ACM Digital Library, Science Direct, IEEE Xplore, IEEE 
Computer Society, SpringerLink and DBLP, those digital libraries were chosen because the 
institution (Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne) had a subscription to them. Also journals, 
conferences, and workshops of the domain such as RE, REFSQ, ARES, Requirements 
Engineering Journal were considered. These sources were chosen based on a pre-search on 
Google Scholar in addition to consulting the citations of existing SLRs and other SMAPs.   
Relevant books and reports were explored further. For all primary studies found in these 
sources we also followed their relevant cited references to find additional contributions 
outside the above-mentioned subset. All searches have been conducted on publications 
appeared between 2000 and 2013, thus covering over 13 years of SRE research. 
Depending on the source, different search terms were used. For the more general 
conferences and for journals we used the search terms “reuse security requirements”, 
“knowledge security requirements”, “reusability in security requirements” or “knowledge 
reusability security requirements” appearing in the full-text of the publications (excluding 
references). In conferences and journals related to SRE, the search term was iteratively 
refined, for example leading to the search terms “ontologies for security requirements”, 
“pattern security requirements”, “reuse misuse cases”, “knowledge security use cases” or 
“reuse secure Tropos”. 
C. Screening of papers  
 
Search for primary studies lead to 158 articles, many of which were irrelevant. Screening 
for papers based on the title and succinct review of the abstract, in addition to the reliance on 
our inclusion and exclusion criteria, reduced the number of relevant papers.  The screening 
process was performed by me and validated by my supervisors. 
The following restrictions and quality criteria for including/excluding publications were 
defined: 
 (Restriction R1) The study only includes papers available in electronic form. Books 
were analyzed based on information available online and using the hard copy 
versions. 
 (Restriction R2) Only publications written in English were included.  
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 (Quality criterion Q1) Each publication was checked for completeness. Publications 
containing several unsupported claims or frequently referring to existing work without 
providing citations were excluded. 
 (Quality criterion Q2) Articles related to the topic of this paper published between 1st 
January 2000 and 31st August 2013 were included: i) papers proposing any method 
for SRE; ii) papers proposing knowledge reuse based methods for SRE; iii) papers 
proposing automation of any (knowledge reuse based) SRE.  
 (Quality criterion Q3) Works of the same authors with very similar content were 
included and grouped under the same category (method).  
 (Quality criterion Q4) Some articles were intentionally excluded to keep the level of 
the SMAP manageable, in particular when the proposition was not relevant enough to 
the topic of our research. 
Ninety-five searches in 24 sources were carried out using the search terms described above. 
In total 158 publications were retrieved, out of which 21 were found not directly in the 24 
sources but by following relevant cited references. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of 
research results related to security requirements engineering and reuse between 2000 and 
2013. The figure also shows that, between 2004 and 2007, a great number of publications 
were published; thus, the well-known approaches for security requirements engineering 
appeared during this period. Table A.1 (in the Appendix A) presents the retrieved and 
selected publications for each source. 
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Figure 2.2. Number of selected publications on (knowledge-based) security 
requirements engineering (2000–2013). 
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D. Data classification  
The retrieved publications were first analyzed regarding the restrictions R1–R2. The 
remaining publications were carefully assessed regarding quality criterion Q1. For each 
retrieved publication the following standard information was collected in a data extraction 
form: 
 Date of search, source, and used search term. 
 Authors, title, and publication year. 
 Type of publication (conference, workshop, journal, report, or book). 
 Short summary (main claims, presented approach/tool). 
 Restrictions R1, R2 (yes or no)? 
 Quality criteria Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 fulfilled (yes or no)? 
 Addressed research question(s). 
 Selected (yes or no)? Based on restrictions and quality criteria.  
 Comments/rationale regarding selection. 
 Need for tools. Does the publication stress the need for support (yes or no)? 
 
For each selected publication the following additional information was captured in a 
second form to increase confidence regarding their relevance for security requirements 
engineering elicitation and analysis: the main focus of the publication is on security 
requirements (yes) vs. security requirements are only addressed as part of a broader approach 
(no)? 
Searching the security requirements approaches and (re)usable knowledge based security 
requirements approaches conferences led to 158 papers, out of which 95 (60%) were related 
specifically to security requirements approaches. Among these 95 papers, 29 papers (31%) 
addressed reuse of knowledge for security requirements. Searching conferences led to the 
largest set of results: 39 papers (41%) out of 70 papers found. Note that the highest number of 
papers presented in conferences was found in two main conferences: The international 
conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) with 13 papers found out of 
which 8 were selected; and the international conference on Requirements Engineering (RE) 
with 24 conference papers found and 7 selected.  
The number of selected journal papers was 20 (21%) out of 31 papers found. The total 
number of workshop papers found was 21, out of which 11 (12%) were selected. 15 (16%) 
 54 
 
relevant technical reports were also considered in our search. Books and book chapters were 
taken in consideration too: out of 18 retrieved sources, 10 (10%) were selected.  
Table A.1 in the appendix A gives all the details about the retrieved publications, their types 
and the ones selected.  Figure 2.3 summarizes the statistical results of all selected papers by 
categories (books, conferences, workshops, reports).  
 
Figure 2.3. Relative share of the various paper types in the selected set 
For the selected papers, we were also interested in the type of the research. As 
recommended by (Petersen et al., 2008), we adapted the classification system developed by 
(Wieringa et al., 2006) for requirements engineering paper classification. The papers were 
thereby classified into:  
 Solution proposal: papers that discuss new or revised techniques,  
 Philosophical: papers that sketch a new way of looking at things, a new conceptual 
framework, etc. 
 Evaluation research: papers that investigate a practice or an implementation in 
practice and report the lessons learned.  
 Validation research: papers that investigate the properties of a solution proposal that 
has not yet been deployed in practice.  
 Opinion papers: papers that contain the author’s opinion about a research or practice 
subject.  
 Experience: papers that are often from industry practitioners or researchers who have 
used their tools in practice. They report how something was done in practice.  
Along our classification, some papers covered two categories.  For example, a paper may be 
at the same time a “Solution proposal” and “Validation research”. In such cases, we labeled 
Reports
16%
Books
10%
Journals
21%Conferences
41%
Workshops
12%
Selected papers 
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them (Solution proposal + Validation). Conversely, some papers could not be linked to any 
category since they were exclusively describing tools. Such papers are of interest for us 
practically and address one of our research questions. Thus, we decided to use the label 
“Tool”.   
Table 2.1 summarizes the results of the classification. Most of the papers are solution 
proposals (41%), few of which are validated (22.1%). Evaluation researches that investigated 
the practices in industry are only (10.5%). Eight papers were exclusively presenting tools.    
Table 2.1. Type and number of selected papers 
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Book 
(chapter) 
5 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 
Journal 10 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 5 
Conference 15 2 4 0 1 0 5 0 10 
Workshop 4 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 
Report 5 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Total 39  
(41%)  
8   
(8.4%) 
10 
(10.5%) 
2 
(2.1%) 
2 
(2.1%) 
0 
(0%) 
8 
(8.4%) 
5 
(5.26) 
21 
(22.1%) 
 
3 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING AND COMPARING KNOWLEDGE REUSE IN 
SRE (DATA EXTRACTION AND MAPPING OF STUDIES) 
 
Extracting the data, while surveying in depth the different approaches for SRE with regards 
to knowledge reuse, allows us to define the different categories covered by the study and 
construct the map (i.e. a framework for analyzing and comparing knowledge reuse in SRE). 
The framework shown in Figure 2.4 is structured around facets that capture individual 
dimensions related to knowledge reuse in SRE. This framework makes it possible to organize 
the different methods, techniques and tools for knowledge reuse in SRE around different axes 
that were identified through the SMAP and appeared relevant to us. 
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Figure 2.4.Framework for knowledge reuse in SRE. 
3.1. KNOWLEDGE 
The knowledge facet identifies the different knowledge (re)used in SRE. This facet was 
organized under three main sub-dimensions (by analogy to the classification framework 
proposed by Dubois et al. (Dubois et al., 2010)):  
- Organization & Assets: all the knowledge related to the organization, its assets, its 
actors can be (re)used over different projects.  
- Risk: knowledge related to risk addresses different threats that might threaten the assets 
of an organization, the vulnerabilities that might be explored, the attackers and their 
attack methods.  
- Risk treatment: knowledge related to mitigating the risk, such as security requirements, 
countermeasures, security policies, etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
3. 2. FORM OF REPRESENTATION    
The “form of representation” facet indicates the different types of knowledge forms that were 
identified and how they are organized: patterns, taxonomies and ontologies, templates and 
profiles, catalogs and generic models, mixed. 
3.3. TECHNIQUE  
The technique facet is about the knowledge (re)use techniques. These can be automated (e.g. 
queries), semi-automated (e.g. process), or totally manual (e.g. guidelines).  
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3.4. AUTOMATED SUPPORT 
The “automated support” facet checks the existence of an automated support for knowledge 
(re) use in SRE, and its technology features.   
The next section details the publications retrieved, and replies to the research questions 
relying on the presented framework.  
4 DETAILS OF THE SYSTEMATIC MAPPING STUDY   
Table 2.2 presents an overview of the security knowledge reuse in SRE methods. Columns 
contain the main concepts characterizing the conceptual space of security. Lines cover the 
different reuse forms by SRE methods. Cells contain a colored area when there exist SRE 
publications proposing a reuse based approach of a given reuse form, for a given security 
concept.  The colors of the cells get darker according to the number of publications covering 
it. It is white when there is no publication describing such a link. 
This presentation should help the reader to understand the security reusable knowledge in the 
body of literature. It also helps to retrieve for each concept of security (e.g. security 
requirement) how (through ontologies, templates) and how much it is reused. As an 
illustration, the security concept ‘threat’ is covered by a lot of publications proposing to reuse 
it through ontologies or taxonomies. 
Table 2.2. Security knowledge reuse in SRE 
 
Organization Asset Threat Vulnerability Security goal 
Security 
requirement 
Counter-
measure 
Ontologies/ 
taxonomies 
       
Catalog/ 
generic models 
 
 
      
Patterns 
       
Templates 
        
Mixed 
       
 
The following paragraphs go into the details. They present a brief description of the SRE 
method, followed by answers to the research questions (method, form of representation, 
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technique, and automation). The paragraphs report the different types of reusable elements 
and how they are modeled and described, and how they are used. 
In fact, there are different ways for presenting and classifying SRE methods, depending on 
the angle from which we study and analyze them.  For instance, Fabian et al. (Fabian et al., 
2010) organize SRE methods into 6 main categories (multilateral, UML-based, goal-oriented 
approaches, problem frames-based, risk analysis-based, common criteria-based). Elahi (Elahi 
et al., 2011) organizes SRE methods into two main categories depending on whether the 
method focuses on the threats and vulnerabilities (the dark side of security) or on security 
requirements and countermeasures (the white side of security).   
As the main goal of this chapter is to focus on knowledge (re) use in SRE, the different 
methods will be presented using the result of RQ2, i.e. according to the knowledge (re)use 
form used. Thus, we distinguish: methods that reuse patterns, taxonomies and ontologies, 
catalogs or generic models, mixed forms of reuse. We also distinguish methods that do not 
reuse any kind of security knowledge. 
4.1. METHODS THAT (RE) USE SECURITY PATTERNS  
A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in specific 
contexts and presents a well-proven generic scheme for its solution (Mouratidis et al., 2003). 
The SMAP found that some SRE methods (re) use patterns during the SRE process in the 
form of models or in other forms. 
A. Patterns of models   
The identified SRE that (re) use patterns of models are presented below:   
- KAOS and Anti-Models:   
(Description) Lamsweerde (Van Lamsweerde, 2007)(Van Lamsweerde, 2004) extended 
the KAOS method to support security issues at the requirements level. KAOS is a 
requirements engineering method dealing with the elaboration of the objectives to be 
achieved by the system-to-be, the operationalization of such objectives into requirements 
and assumptions, the assignment of responsibilities for those specifications to agents such 
as humans, devices or software, and the evolution of such requirements over time and 
across system families. 
(Knowledge reliance) Hermoye et al. (Hermoye, van Lamsweerde, and Perry, 2006) 
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enriched the KAOS framework with an attack pattern library and reusable 
countermeasures built after analyzing commonalities in goal-oriented specifications from 
some case studies. (Reusable Knowledge) In this approach, a reusable attack pattern 
captures common objectives of malicious agents for known attacks (e.g., replay, denial of 
service, password attacks). Reusable countermeasures are reusable anti-goal resolutions. 
For example, countermeasures against replay attacks may include freshness mechanisms. 
(Form of representation) Hermoye et al. use a library of attack patterns; an attack 
pattern is a fragment of an anti-model defined on an abstract domain. Attack patterns are 
built with abstract anti-goals and abstract domain properties. Abstract anti-goals, domain 
properties and predicates are reusable concepts defined on abstract domains that should 
be specialized in concrete domains at reuse time. (Technique) Hermoye et al. provide a 
formal reuse-based technique to reuse this library for threat analysis. They propose three 
main functions: Retrieve to get initial anti-goals, Specialize and Adapt to specialize each 
abstract variable (e.g., objects, agents, relations) of the attack pattern. (Automation) The 
KAOS method is supported by the Objectiver2 tool. Even though we do not have details 
about technical aspects, the tool offers some functionalities such as modeling 
requirements and related concepts (goals, obstacles, expectations, hypotheses, etc.), 
querying the model to retrieve some model elements, exporting in XML format, and data 
exchanges in XMI format. Note that the tool does not handle the reuse of knowledge for 
SRE.  
(Domain) The KAOS method considers the domain properties and expectations, which 
correspond to facts and assumptions in the conceptual framework. (Semmak, Gnaho, and 
Laleau, 2008) propose some extensions to the KAOS metamodel in order to express 
variability inherent to the Cycab transportation domain. The extensions consist mainly of 
the concept facet. Authors define the facet as a viewpoint or a dimension having an 
interest for domain (for example: the Cycab transportation domain is characterized by 
several facets like: "the localization mode", "the Road type"). Facets allow the 
structuration and organization of domain knowledge for reusability. Unfortunately, this 
extension was concerned with requirements elicitation in the Cycab transportation 
domain, but did not address security requirements elicitation. 
- Secure Tropos:  
(Description) Secure Tropos method is derived from Tropos. The latter is a software 
                                                          
2 http://www.objectiver.com/ 
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development method based on the paradigm of agent-oriented software development 
(Bresciani et al., 2004)(Susi et al., 2005). Tropos deals with analysis, design, and 
implementation activities in a software development process, with a strong focus on the 
early phases of software development.  
Mouratidis et al. (Mouratidis, 2006)(Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) extend Tropos with 
new concepts to cover security modeling (security constraints, secure dependencies, 
secure entities) and more. Secure Tropos distinguishes four main development phases: 
early requirements, late requirements, architectural design, detailed design, and 
architectural design. Recently, Secure Tropos was extended to be used in the field of 
cloud computing (Pavlidis et al., 2013)(Mouratidis et al., 2013)(Paja et al., 2012). 
(Knowledge reliance) In a previous work, Tropos method was extended with security 
patterns (Mouratidis, Weiss, and Giorgini, 2006). (Form of representation) Authors 
describe a pattern language, based on agent-oriented concepts. They used the Alexandrian 
format (Alexander, Ishikawa, and Silverstein, 1977) for organizing each pattern. In this 
format, the sections of a pattern are context, problem and forces, solution, and rationale.  
(Reusable knowledge) Authors proposed four main patterns: “Agency Guard” concerned 
with ensuring that there is only a single point of access to the agency to protect it from 
malicious agents. “Agent Authenticator” related to authentication of agency’s agents. 
“Sandbox” related to mechanisms for separating running activities. “Access Controller” 
suggests intercepting all requests for the agency’s resources.  (Technique) Mouratidis et 
al. provide some guidelines and show how these patterns can be integrated within the 
architectural design stage of the Tropos agent-oriented methodology. (Automation) ST-
Tool is one of the main tools known for Secure Tropos. Formal analysis is based on logic 
programming. ST-Tool (Giorgini et al., 2005b) provides a graphical user interface (GUI) 
that allows designers editing Secure Tropos models as graphs where nodes are actors and 
services, and arcs are relationships. To the best of our knowledge, ST-Tool does not 
handle the development using patterns for elicitation.   
(Domain) Secure Tropos is not a method to define security requirements for a particular 
domain. 
Another variant of Secure Tropos is presented in section (4.4).   
B. Patterns not models  
The identified SRE that (re) use patterns are presented below: 
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- Okubo et al.  
(Description) (Okubo, Kaiya, and Yoshioka, 2011) propose a method for security impact 
and security requirements analyzes. There are two types of security impact described with 
more details in the paper: horizontal impact on artifacts in the same stage and vertical 
impact on artifacts in different stages. (Knowledge reliance) The method proposed by 
Okubo et al. consists of two techniques: an analysis method of horizontal impacts using 
an extended misuse case; a combination of new security patterns and a traditional 
traceability technique to analyze security vertical impacts. The security patterns bridge 
the gap between security requirements and the design, so as to know impacts on code 
when security requirements change. (Form of representation) Okubo et al. constructed 
Security Requirements Patterns (SRPs) and Security Design Patterns (SDPs). A security 
requirement pattern is formed around a “context”, a “problem”, a “solution”, and a 
“structure”. In addition, a security design pattern has: “consequences”, “implementation” 
and “sample code”. (Reusable knowledge) In terms of knowledge, SRPs provide assets, 
threats. SDPs provide countermeasures. (Technique) The authors propose a process for 
security impact analysis that starts with selecting the SRP, identifying new assets, 
identifying new threats, identifying countermeasures, and finally, selecting the SDP, and 
estimate the impact for each countermeasure. (Automation) The method is not tool 
supported. 
(Domain) The method proposed by (Okubo, Kaiya, and Yoshioka, 2011) does not 
produce domain specific security requirements.  
4. 2. METHODS THAT (RE) USE TAXONOMIES OR ONTOLOGIES   
An ontology is a formal representation of the entities and relationships which exist in some 
domain. A taxonomy is an ontology in the form of a hierarchy. Whereas ontologies can have 
any type of relationship between categories, in a taxonomy there can only be generalization 
hierarchies. The SMAP revealed a variety of SRE methods that suggest the use of ontologies 
or taxonomies during a SRE process: 
- GBRAM:  
(Description) The objective of the Goal-based Requirements Analysis Method (GBRAM) 
(Antón and Earp, 2000) is to use goal and scenario-driven requirements engineering methods 
to formulate privacy and security policies, as well as requirements for e-commerce systems. 
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Furthermore, the method targets change management in organizational privacy and security 
policies, and system requirements (Figure 2.5). Lastly, the method is used to assure 
compliance of these system requirements to the privacy and security policies. In a later work 
built upon GBRAM, He and Antón (He and Antón, 2003) introduce a role-engineering 
framework called “Framework for Modeling Privacy Requirements in Role Engineering”. In 
this framework, goals and scenarios are adopted in order to analyze permissions and establish 
role hierarchies, which then can be used to define a role-based access control model (RBAC). 
Further, the authors suggest a context-free grammar for formalizing privacy goals articulated 
in natural language (Breaux and Antón, 2005). The formalized goals are used to analyze and 
compare the system goals stated through them. GBRAM is useful for analyzing and 
elaborating organizational goals—which are already integrated into policies—to elicit system 
requirements. By emphasizing and integrating the management of changes in the technology 
and the business environment to their method, the authors manage to include important 
aspects that many other methods ignore.  Antón et al. (Antón and Earp, 2000) suggest using 
GBRAM at the beginning of the design phase in order to achieve the security of sensitive 
data. The heuristics are used to identify new, as well as previously overlooked, goals based 
on the results of risk assessment activities. The method is asset-centered and builds on the 
PFIRES approach for assessing risk in e-commerce systems (Antón and Earp, 2000).  
(Knowledge reliance & Form of representation) Antón et al. (Antón and Earp, 2004) 
propose a requirements taxonomy for reducing Web site privacy vulnerabilities. They 
evaluated 25 Internet privacy policies from 8 non-regulated e-commerce industries. The 
evaluation permitted us to identify main goals and vulnerabilities. (Reusable knowledge) 
The security knowledge in the taxonomy was categorized into Privacy Protection Goals 
Figure 2.5. The GBRAM for Policy Formulation, taken from (Antón & Earp, 2000) 
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and Privacy Vulnerabilities.  
o Privacy protection goals express the desired protection of consumer privacy 
rights. They were categorized into five categories: notice/awareness, 
choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/security and enforcement/redress. 
For instance, notice/awareness goals assert that consumers should be notified or 
made aware of an organization’s information practices before any information is 
actually collected from them. More details about the other goals can be found in 
Antón et al.’s publication (Antón and Earp, 2004).  
o Privacy vulnerabilities reflect ways in which a Web site may violate consumer 
privacy. The seven main categories of privacy vulnerabilities are: information 
monitoring, information aggregation, information storage, information transfer, 
information collection, information personalization, and contact.  
(Technique) The authors mentioned that Web site designers can use this taxonomy to 
ensure that their stated and actual policies are consistent with each other and it can be 
used by customers to evaluate and understand policies and their limitations. However, 
there were no precise procedures or techniques for the use. (Automation) As far as we 
could determine, the GBRAM method is not tool supported.  
(Domain) GBRAM was designed for building secure e-commerce systems; the domain 
was described briefly and informally (Antón and Earp, 2000). 
- Secure Tropos:  
Another extension of the Tropos methodology was the one proposed by Massacci et al. 
(Mouratidis, Giorgini, and Manson 2003a)(Giorgini et al., 2006)(Giorgini et al., 2005a) 
(Massacci, Prest, and Zannone, 2004)(Massacci and Zannone, 2008). The authors use the 
Secure i* (Si*) language. In addition to the notions originally supported by the i* 
modeling framework, Si* introduces the notions of delegation and trust. Delegation is 
defined as a relation between two actors (the delegator and the delegatee — the one to 
whom something is delegated) and a goal, task, or resource (the delegatum). The notion 
of trust is used to separate delegation between trusted and untrusted actors. Similarly to 
delegation, trust is defined as a relation between two actors (the trustor and the trustee) 
and a goal, task, or resource (the trustum). A third extension to Tropos was proposed by 
Asnar et al. (Asnar et al., 2007)(Asnar, Giorgini, and Mylopoulos, 2006) for risk 
modeling; the Tropos Goal-Risk Framework, to assess risk based on trust relations among 
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actors. (Knowledge reliance) Massacci et al. (Massacci, Mylopoulos and  Zannone, 
2007) propose a formal ontology for socio-technical systems. (Form of representation) 
Authors formalized the concepts of Si* into an ontology. (Reusable knowledge) The 
concepts are organized into extensional and intentional predicates. Extensional predicates 
correspond to the edges and circles drawn by the requirements engineer (e.g., service, 
goal, task, resource, etc.) during the modeling phase. These predicates are used to 
formalize the intuitive description of the system. Intentional predicates are determined 
with the help of rules by the reasoning system; examples of these predicates are: 
aim(Actor:x,Service:s) and has_perm(Actor:x,Service:s). (Technique) The authors 
provide some axioms that define the semantics underlying Si*. They are used to complete 
the extensional description of the system. All these primitives were used to deal with the 
security organizational requirements. 
The proposition (Pro) in the example below verifies whether an actor (X) who delegates 
the permission (perm) to another actor (Y) to deliver a service (S) is entitled to do it. With 
other prepositions, one can verify the authorization security requirement.  
For example,  
Authorization: Pro ← delegate(perm,X,Y,S) ∧ not has_perm(X,S) 
(Automation) As far as we know, there was no automation support for this Secure 
Tropos extension. (Domain) This extension of Secure Tropos was not developed for a 
specific domain. 
- RITA :  
(Description) Ivankina et al. (Ivankina et al., 2005), (Salinesi, Ivankina, and Angole, 
2008) (Knowledge reliance) present a requirements elicitation method called RITA 
(Requirements Identification Threat Analysis) that makes use of a threat ontology. 
(Form of representation) Security requirements in RITA are expressed in forms of 
treatment that prevent threats. Treatments are formalized as goals. A goal is defined 
as "something that some stakeholder hopes to achieve in the future" (Rolland et al., 
1998). A goal is expressed as a clause with a main verb and several parameters, where 
each parameter plays a different role with respect to the verb. Example of a security 
requirement in RITA (treatment): “Provide (connection help) object (to users) destination 
(when the connection fails) time”. 
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(Reusable knowledge) The threats ontology in RITA organizes types of threats into 
classes and subclasses at several levels. Five classes are defined on the highest level: 
“User”, “Design”, “Environment”, “Hardware” and “Engineering”. Classes and 
subclasses are characterized by distinctive variables that help identify threats in the 
ontology, and define each class distinctively from the others. RITA also uses a second 
ontology that proposes a series of generic treatments for the generic threats identified 
in the threats ontology.  
(Domain) To our knowledge, during the experimentations for evaluating RITA 
(Salinesi, Ivankina, and Angole, 2008), participants expressed the lack of domain 
specificity of requirements and threats. 
- Daramola et al.  
(Description) (Daramola et al, 2012a) (Daramola et al., 2012b) present an approach 
that leverages ontologies and requirements boilerplates in order to alleviate the effects 
of the lack of inexperienced personnel for Security Requirements Specification (SRS).  
(Knowledge reliance) Daramola et al.’s approach makes use of ontologies and 
requirements boilerplates. (Form of representation) A requirement boilerplate (Hull, 
2011) is a pre-defined structural template for writing requirement statements. The 
fixed parts of requirement boilerplate are reused when writing requirements, while the 
requirement engineer can manually fill in the parameter parts with information from 
its application.  
              An example of a boilerplate: 
“BP2: The <system> shall be able to <action> <entity>” 
The ontologies provide the necessary background knowledge required to identify 
security threats, and recommend appropriate countermeasures, while the requirements 
boilerplates provide a reusable template for writing Security Requirements in a 
consistent way in order to eliminate ambiguity. (Reusable knowledge) The Basic 
Threat Ontology (BTO) used in the approach contains a mapping of some kinds of 
security threats to specific defense actions based on information that was gathered 
from the literature and existing security ontologies. (Technique) The knowledge 
contained in the BTO is used for automatic recommendation of appropriate defense 
actions. This is made through ontology reasoning and other semantic capabilities.  
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(Automation) The proposed approach is tool-supported by the prototype ReqSec tool. 
ReqSec is an Eclipse-based tool that provides automated support for ontology-based 
security requirements specification by enabling the specification of security 
requirements from textual misuse case descriptions.  
(Domain) To our knowledge, both the threats encapsulated in the BTO and the 
requirements boilerplates are generic and not domain specific.  
- Velasco et al.  
(Description) (Velasco et al., 2009) propose an ontological representation for 
reusable requirements, which allows incompleteness and inconsistency in 
requirements to be detected and semantic processing in requirements analysis to be 
achieved. Note that the framework seems to be at an early stage, in the sense that it 
does not permit security requirements elicitation and analysis. To date, its 
contribution is limited to the proposed ontologies. (Automation) The framework is 
not supported with any tool (Knowledge reliance & form of representation) 
Velasco et al. defined some reusable knowledge encapsulated in ontologies. 
(Reusable knowledge) Authors defined two kinds of ontologies: a risk analysis 
ontology and a requirement ontology.  
 The risk analysis ontology is based on MAGERIT (MAGERIT, 2012), the 
information systems risk analysis and management method of the Spanish 
public administration. The ontology identifies five types of risk elements 
(Asset, Threat, Safeguard, Valuation dimension, Valuation criteria).  
 The concepts, meta-information and relationships included in the requirements 
ontology have been mostly taken from the authors’ experience of requirements 
reuse-based method SIREN (Toval et al., 2001). The ontology organizes 
requirements into (software requirements and system requirements).  
- Salini et al.  
(Description & Knowledge reliance) (Salini and Kanmani, 2012a) introduce a 
knowledge-oriented approach addressing the security requirements engineering phase 
for developing an E-Voting System. (Form of representation) For the knowledge 
part, the authors provided a security requirements ontology for e-voting systems. 
(Reusable knowledge) The terms used as ontology classes are the following: 
Stakeholder, Security Objective, Threat, Security Requirement, Asset, Vulnerability, 
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Security Requirements Pattern, Impact, Severity and Web application. The relations 
between the ontology classes and the properties used to represent the relations are 
uses, has, requires, is vulnerable to, implemented in, protects, mitigated by, provides, 
damages, affects, exploited by, addresses, assessed and part-of.  Salini et al. explained 
that in practice, each security requirements pattern is matched with a set of Security 
Requirements during the ontology instantiation. A Security Requirements Pattern is 
defined as a set of Asset, Vulnerability, Threats and Impacts. In this way, one can 
start from the security objectives, find the Security Requirements Pattern that matches 
them and, thus, choose specific Security Requirements. Although the approach seems 
to be interesting and useful for defining security requirements, there was no validation 
reported for it, nor for the proposed security ontology. The ontology is still under 
development (not all identified security requirements have been mapped to the 
security objectives). (Automation) The approach is not supported with any tool.  
(Domain) The approach was specifically proposed for security requirements 
engineering of e-voting applications. 
- Chikh et al.: 
(Description & Knowledge reliance)  (Chikh et al., 2011) present a framework for 
building security requirement specifications related to Information Security 
Requirements (ISRs) using ontologies. (Form of representation) The framework 
uses three kinds of generic ontologies as a solution to this problem – software 
requirement ontology, application domain ontology, information security ontology.  
However, despite the fact that the framework looks promising, it is difficult to know 
its usefulness, since no validation was presented; (Automation) the authors 
mentioned ongoing development of a prototype to evaluate their proposition.  
(Domain) The framework presented by Chikh et al. suggests the use of a domain 
application ontology. However, up to date, to the best of our knowledge no further 
publications describe this use in more details.  
4.3. METHODS THAT (RE) USE TEMPLATES OR PROFILES 
Some SRE methods rely on templates and profiles as another kind of reusable knowledge for 
SRE. The identified methods that (re) use this forms are:  
- Zuccato et al.:   
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(Description) (Zuccato, Daniels, and Jampathom, 2011) present an approach that 
organizes security requirements engineering around five activities. The first activity 
starts with a simplified risk analysis approach by means of questionnaires to identify 
areas in the business which can have security problems. Subsequently, the security 
requirements for the development project are selected (requirement profiles). These 
requirements are then forwarded to the suppliers. (Knowledge reliance & form of 
representation) The method proposed by Zuccato et al. is based essentially on the 
use of security requirements profiles that address a business domain, in a commercial 
organization, where activities have to serve a business purpose (not to be confused 
with security patterns which describe a security domain solution according to 
authors). (Reusable knowledge) Typical examples for this business orientation would 
be IP-TV Services (e.g. renting a movie, recording some programs, delayed viewing, 
...), VoIP (e.g. multiple numbers, location locking, answering machine, ...) or 
customer self-administration (e.g. myPages, myWorkingPages, MyFamily, Mobile 
Device Management (MDM)…) where a profile is created for the service category 
and then reused, with some adaptation, for the specific service. (Automation) The 
approach is not tool supported. 
(Domain) Zuccato et al. use the term “service security requirement” and deal with 
security problems when developing and operating telecommunication services. 
 
- Firesmith:  
(Description, Knowledge reliance & Form of representation) (Firesmith, 2004) 
suggests using textual security requirements templates (not to be confused with 
security use cases templates). An example of a reusable parameterized template for 
specifying an integrity security requirement:  
“The [application center/business unit] shall protect the data it transmits from 
corruption (e.g., unauthorized addition, modification, deletion or reply) due to 
[unsophisticated/ somewhat sophisticated/sophisticated] attack during execution of [a 
set of interactions/use cases] as indicated in [specified table].” 
Users of these templates can manually replace the brackets according to their different 
applications.  
(Reusable knowledge) More detailed templates in Firesmith’s research could not be 
found. The proposition of the author mainly concentrates on arguing the importance 
of specifying the knowledge into this kind of templates. (Technique) The author 
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provides an asset-centered and reuse-based procedure for requirements and security 
teams to analyze security requirements containing 13 steps, starting by identifying the 
valuable assets, identifying threats, and estimating vulnerabilities. The steps end by 
specifying requirement through the instantiation of templates based on the parameters 
from the previous steps. (Automation) This proposition was not tool supported. 
(Domain) The reusable templates proposed by the author are generic, not specific to a 
particular domain.  
4.4. METHODS THAT (RE) USE CATALOGS OR GENERIC MODELS  
Some SRE methods define generic models of common security problems and their solutions, 
in order to (re) use them. Some others rely on catalogs to encapsulate the reusable knowledge 
as presented below:   
- Misuse Cases:  
(Description) Sindre & Opdahl (Sindre and Opdahl, 2001a)(Alexander, 2002)(Sindre and 
Opdahl, 2001b)(Sindre and Opdahl, 2005) extend the traditional use case approach to also 
consider misuse cases, which represent behavior not wanted in the system to be 
developed. Misuse cases are initiated by misusers. They have have two representations: a 
graphical diagram and a textual specification.  
(Knowledge reliance) Misuse cases were initially developed without relying on any kind 
of knowledge repositories. However, Sindre et al. (Sindre, Firesmith, and Opdahl, 2003) 
defined an approach based on a repository of generic misuse cases (generic threats and 
generic security requirements). (Form of representation) Sindre et al. represent the 
reused knowledge using generic misuse cases. Each misuse case has a name, summary, 
preconditions, misuser interactions, systems interactions and post-conditions.   
(Reusable knowledge) Authors suggest two main reusable artifacts: generic threats (e.g., 
spoofing, i.e., a misuser gaining access to the system by pretending to be a regular user) 
and generic security requirements (e.g., access control) described independently of 
particular application domains. (Technique) Authors provide a way to use/reuse this 
repository through some guidelines. (Automation) As far as we know, misuse cases are 
still not tool supported. 
(Domain)  As far as we have been able to determine, misuse cases were not developed 
for special domains. 
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- Abuse frames.  
(Description) Lin et al. (Lin et al., 2003b)(Lin et al., 2003a)(Lin et al., 2004) define 
so-called anti-requirements and the corresponding abuse frames. Their proposition is 
comparable to problem frames introduced by Jackson (Jackson, 2001). An anti-
requirement specifies the undesirable phenomena in the system that must be 
prevented from happening; it expresses the intentions of malicious users. An abuse 
frame (Figure 2.6) represents a security threat. Authors incorporate anti-requirements 
into abuse frames to represent a security threat. The authors state that the purpose of 
anti-requirements and abuse frames is to analyze security threats and derive security 
requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Reusable knowledge) In problem frames, each frame describes a particular problem 
class (e.g., Information Display, Workpiece, and Required Behavior frames). 
Similarly, Lin et al. propose abuse frames that describe classes of security violation 
(interception, modification, and denial of access). Each one represents a threat that 
can violate a particular security goal. (Knowledge reliance & Form of 
representation) These security violations represented through abuse frames 
diagrams are meant to be reusable. Figure 2.6 shows a standard modification frame. 
Modification arises whenever there is an information asset in the physical world that 
an attacker wishes to change. The problem is to find a modification machine that 
allows an attacker to achieve it. Modification violates integrity. (Technique) The 
authors propose an iterative threat analysis method that essentially comprises four 
steps (scoping the problem and identify the sub-problems, identifying the threats and 
constructing abuse frames, identifying security vulnerabilities, addressing security 
vulnerabilities).  (Automation) As far as we know, abuse frames are not supported 
with a tool.  (Domain) Abuse frames were not designed for a particular domain. 
Figure 2.6. A standard modification abuse frame taken from (Lin et al, 2003) 
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- Security Use Cases:  
(Description) Nearly at the same period when misuse cases appeared to the community, 
Donald Firesmith presented security use cases (Firesmith, 2003). He pointed out that 
misuse cases are effective ways of analyzing security threats but are inappropriate for the 
analysis and specification of security requirements. Misuse cases concentrate on 
interactions between the application and its misusers who seek to violate its security.  
While security use cases are meant to specify requirements that the application shall 
protect itself from its relevant security threats.  
(Knowledge reliance) Firesmith tried to keep the security use cases templates (Firesmith, 
2003) at a reasonably high-level of abstraction for reusability purposes. (Form of 
representation) Security use cases have a name, a path, a security threat, preconditions, 
misuser interactions, system requirements and post-conditions. (Reusable knowledge) 
The author presented the reusable use cases: access control, integrity and privacy. 
(Technique) The author emphasizes that, when reused on real projects, each path 
template can be made more specific to the application by replacing the general words 
“system” and “user” with the specific application name and the specific type of user. 
(Automation) To our knowledge, security use cases are not tool supported.  
(Domain) Security use cases were not proposed for domain specific security 
requirements.  
- Saeki and Kaiya:  
(Description) (Saeki and Kaiya, 2009) propose a weaved security requirements 
elicitation method that uses (Knowledge reliance) Common Criteria (CC) (MD, 
2002) and related knowledge sources to identify security requirements from 
functional requirements through eliciting threats and security objectives (Figure 2.7). 
(Reusable knowledge) The authors think that CC can be considered as a kind of 
catalog to provide knowledge on threats, security objectives and security functions 
that have generally appeared. For example, by using Common Criteria, one can select 
the objective “data encryption” from the catalog, to mitigate the threat “disclosure of 
password data”. (Technique) The proposed technique is to weave through Common 
Criteria two types of requirements elicitation; one is any existing functional 
requirements elicitation, and the other is a typical method for eliciting security 
functional requirements. (Form of representation) The method relies on CC as a 
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source of knowledge to support activities of security requirements elicitation. The 
authors used CC Part 2 (CC, 2007), which has about 120 Security Functional (SF) 
components, as a catalog. In addition, they used ECMA- 271 E-COFC (ECMA, 
1999) (which can be considered as a profile of CC in a certain problem domain), as 
catalogs of threats and security objectives. As shown in the right hand side of Figure 
2.7, the method accumulates a threat catalog; a security objective catalog and a SF 
component catalog, and holds relationships between their catalog entries (i.e. security 
objective mitigates threat, SF component represents security objective). 
(Automation) As far as we know, the proposition of Saeki and Kaiya is not tool 
supported. (Domain) The proposed method is not devoted to a particular application 
domain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- SIREN for security requirements : 
(Description) Toval et al. (Toval et al., 2001) propose an approach for security 
requirements elicitation. (Knowledge reliance) The approach is a particularization of 
SIREN (SImple REuse of software requiremeNts), a general-purpose RE method 
based on requirements reuse. The particularization of SIREN to the security profile 
has been based on the risk analysis and management method MAGERIT (MAGERIT, 
2012). Security requirements specify the countermeasures prescribed by MAGERIT 
after the risk analysis. Therefore, it is the MAGERIT risk analysis and management 
that determines the security mechanism to be used in each circumstance. SIREN 
encompasses a process model and some guidelines. (Form of representation) The 
guidelines that SIREN provides consist of a hierarchy of requirements specification 
documents together with the templates for each document. These serve to structure a 
Figure 2.7. Using knowledge included in Common Criteria, taken from (Saeki and 
Kaiya, 2009) 
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reusable requirements repository. (Domain & Reusable knowledge) The repository 
defined in SIREN contains functional and non-functional requirements from specific 
domains and profiles. A SIREN profile consists of a homogeneous set of requirements 
that can be applied to a variety of domains, such as information systems security, and 
the personal data privacy law. There are two main types of requirements in the 
repository:  
o Parameterized: this kind of requirements contains some parts that have to be 
adapted to the application being developed at the time. If this requirement is 
chosen, the parameterized part will be instantiated, that is, the information in 
brackets will be replaced by a specific value according to the current project. 
For example: “SRS.3.5.3.1.S.301 The security manager shall check the user’s 
identifiers every [time in months] to detect which ones have not been used in 
the last [time in months].” 
o Non-parameterized: requirements that could be applied directly to any project 
concerning the profiles and/or domains in the repository. For example: 
“SRS.3.4.3.S.5. The firewall configuration will be screened host.” 
(Technique) Toval et al. adapted a spiral life cycle in SIREN to take requirements 
reuse explicitly into account in the RE process. Details about the process can be found 
in (Toval et al., 2001). (Automation) To our knowledge, SIREN is not tool 
supported. 
- Secure Tropos:  
(Knowledge reliance) In their recent work (Mouratidis et al., 2013)(Pavlidis et al., 
2013), Mouratidis et al. suggest considering the activity of cataloging during the 
elicitation and analysis process. The main aim of this activity is to develop a reference 
catalog model that can be employed not just for the project for which it was initially 
developed but can work as a reference model for any projects that demonstrate similar 
characteristics. (Form of representation) The reference catalog diagram takes the 
form of a reference model that contains graphical representation of different concepts 
needed for elicitation process. (Reusable knowledge) The reference catalog provides 
relationships between the concepts security and privacy goals, threats, security and 
privacy measures, and security and privacy mechanisms. For example, the security 
goal “availability” can be threatened by the threats “Data Location” and “Insecure 
Storage”. The measure to mitigate these threats can be “API Interoperability” which 
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uses the mechanisms “Middleware, Support Multiple Providers”.  For their case 
study, authors used existing information in the security document of the company to 
construct a cataloguing diagram. (Automation)  The framework is supported by a 
tool, which has been developed based on the Open Models Initiative ADOxx 
Platform. The tool provides an environment for developers to create a number of 
diagrams that support the process of the method. In particular, the tool permits 
development of the Security and Privacy Reference Catalog Diagram discussed 
before. 
4. 5. METHODS THAT (RE) USE MIXED FORMS OF SECURITY KNOWLEDGE 
There are a variety of SRE methods that (re) use different (mixed) forms of knowledge; our 
SMA identified the following ones: 
- SQUARE:   
(Description) SQUARE (Mead and Stehney, 2005)(Mead et al., 2008)(Mead and 
Hough, 2006) is a comprehensive methodology for security requirements engineering. 
Its aim is to integrate security requirements engineering into software development 
processes (Mead et al., 2008). SQUARE stresses applicability in real software 
development projects and thus provides an organizational framework for carrying out 
security requirements engineering activities. 
(Knowledge reliance) Travis et al. introduced a new variant of SQUARE; R-
SQUARE (Christian, 2010) which is defined using SQUARE Lite as a base model 
and incorporating reuse in some places of the process. (Reusable knowledge) 
However the introduced layer of reusable knowledge gives only some indications and 
no more. Throughout the selected publications, it was not possible to access to this 
reusable knowledge. For example, during the “agree on definitions” step, the authors 
suggest creating and maintaining a glossary of relevant terms and definitions so that 
the meanings of requirements do not become ambiguous over time as they are reused. 
During the identification of assets and goals step, the authors recall that organizations 
that develop product lines of secure software (Mellado, Fernandez-Medina, and 
Piattini, 2008) will likely have overarching business and security-related goals that are 
intended to apply to all affected projects. During the risk assessment phase, R-
SQUARE method suggests to use threat models, which are known to be abstract and 
highly reusable.  (Automation) SQUARE has been automated by means of the P-
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SQUARE tool; this tool is designed for use by stakeholders, requirements engineers, 
and administrators. It supports both the security and privacy aspects of SQUARE by 
recording definitions and searching and adding new terms, identifying the project 
business goals, assets, and security or privacy goals, adding or editing links to project 
artifacts performing risk assessment and identify threats. No technical details were 
provided concerning the tool. The tool P-SQUARE does not support R-SQUARE 
(Reusable SQUARE). (Domain) The SQUARE method is not intended to elucidate 
and analyze the security requirements of a particular domain.   
- SREP :  
(Description) Mellado et al. (Mellado, Fernández-Medina, and Piattini, 2006) ( 
Mellado, Fernández-Medina, and Piattini, 2007) present the Security Requirements 
Engineering Process (SREP). SREP is an iterative and incremental security 
requirements engineering process, which is based on the Unified Process (Jacobson, 
Booch, and Rumbaugh, 1999) software life-cycle model with multiple phases. 
(Knowledge reliance) SREP is asset based, risk driven, and, following the Common 
Criteria (CC) (Mellado, Fernández-Medina, and Piattini, 2007) supports the reuse of 
security requirements, as well as the reuse of knowledge on assets, threats, and 
countermeasures. (Form of representation) It relies on a Security Resources 
Repository (SRR), which stores some reusable security elements that are of different 
forms: plain text, security use cases, attack trees, misuse cases. (Reusable 
knowledge) The meta-model representing the organization of the SRR is exposed in 
Figure 2.8.  The most important aspects of it are:  
 Generic Threat and Generic Security Requirements are described independently of 
particular domains. 
 Security Requirement Cluster is a set of requirements that work together in 
satisfying the same security objective and mitigating the same threat. 
 The Req-Req relationship allows an inclusive or exclusive trace between 
requirements. An exclusive trace between requirements means that they are 
mutually alternative, as for example that they are in conflict or overlapping. 
Whereas an inclusive trace between requirements means that to satisfy one, 
another (others) is (are) needed to be satisfied.  
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(Automation) Tool support is critical for the practical application of the SREP in large-scale 
software systems due to the number of handled artifacts and the several iterations that have to 
be carried out. However the authors have not developed it so far.  
(Domain) The SREP is not designed to define security requirements of a specific domain. 
Although the authors mentioned briefly that SRE Process uses public-domain sources and 
threat lists during the assets/threat analysis phase.  
4.6. METHODS THAT DO NOT (RE) USE SECURITY KNOWLEDGE  
The SMAP found that there are a wide variety of SRE methods that do not consider 
knowledge reuse during the SRE process; we summarize them below. Note that for this 
category, we obviously skip answering the questions related to reusable knowledge, form of 
representation, and technique. Since there is no knowledge reliance, we cannot talk about the 
points related to the knowledge reused, its form of presentation, or the technique for reusing 
it. 
- Secure I*:  
(Description) Liu et al. (Liu, Yu, and Mylopoulos, 2002)(Yu and Liu, 2001)(Liu, Yu, and 
Mylopoulos, 2003) propose employing explicit modeling of relationships among strategic 
actors in order to elicit and analyze security requirements. Authors analyze attackers, 
vulnerabilities in actors’ dependency network, countermeasure, and access control. In this 
contribution, all actors are assumed potential attacker, which inherit capabilities, 
intentions, and social relationships of the corresponding legitimate actor. The basic idea 
of dependency analysis is that dependency relationships bring vulnerabilities to the 
Figure 2.8. Metamodel for security resources repository taken from 
(Mellado, Fernández-Medina, and Piattini, 2007) 
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system and the depending actor. The dependency vulnerability analysis aims to find 
which dependency relationship is vulnerable to attacks. In this regard, the actors, in the 
basic dependency model, are substituted with its corresponding attacker, and then the 
impact of the attack to the dependency relationship is traced to the network of actors. 
(Knowledge reliance) Authors mentioned that it would be useful to retrieve attacks and 
prototypical solutions from pre-defined taxonomies or knowledge repositories (Liu, Yu, 
and Mylopoulos, 2002), but the method, as it is, does not handle the use of this kind of 
knowledge so far. (Automation) Secure I* was not initially tool-supported (Liu, Yu, and 
Mylopoulos, 2002). Later, Giorgini et al. adapted Secure I* concepts within Secure 
Tropos and proposed ST-tool (Giorgini et al., 2005b) which is used today for secure I* 
diagrams. As far as we know, the tool does not support reuse of knowledge for SRE.  
(Domain) Secure I* was not designed to be used in a particular domain. 
- UMLSec and SecureUML:  
(Description) UMLSec and SecureUML are two main UML-based extensions for 
modeling security. SecureUML (Lodderstedt, Basin, and Doser, 2002)(Araujo and Gupta, 
2005) is a UML-based modeling language for the model-driven development of secure 
systems (Lodderstedt, Basin, and Doser, 2002). SecureUML takes advantage of Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) for specifying authorization constraints by defining a 
vocabulary for annotating UML-based models with information relevant to access 
control. Using UMLSec (Jürjens, 2002)(Jürjens, 2005)(Jürjens and Shabalin, 2004)(Best, 
Jurjens, and Nuseibeh, 2007), security requirements are defined by assigning security 
stereotypes, constraints, and tagged values, which are defined in a UML profile for the 
elements of the design models.  (Knowledge reliance) Neither UMLSec nor SecureUML 
considers the (re) use of security requirements knowledge.  
(Automation – SecureUML) Araujo et al. (Araujo and Gupta, 2005) presents a 
SecureUML template — a Microsoft Visio template built to model authorization systems. 
The tool allows architects to model their role-based access control systems. We could not 
find technical information about the SecureUML template. According to Araujo et al., the 
proposed template assists developers by identifying poor authorization design and 
implementations, helping to find contradictions/holes such as backdoors, or identifying 
authorization bypass opportunities.  
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Figure 2.9. Basic building blocks of the CORAS diagrams taken from (Dahl, 
Hogganvik, and Stølen, 2007) 
(Automation - UMLSec) Jürjens et al. (Jürjens and Shabalin, 2004) presents a 
framework for verification of UMLSec models for security requirements. The framework 
provides three input and output interfaces for the analysis plug-ins: a textual command-
line interface, a graphical user interface, and a web-interface. Inputs can be UML 
diagrams in the form of XMI files, as well as textual parameters. As output can be UML 
diagrams as XMI (or .zuml) files and text messages. Advanced users of the UMLSec 
approach can use the tool to implement verification routines for the constraints associated 
to self-defined stereotypes. A new UMLSec implementation variant called CARiSMA 
(Wenzel, Warzecha, and Jürjens, 2012) has been existing since 2012, and this time is 
based on the Eclipse Modeling Framework. CARiSMA enables users to perform 
compliance, risk, and security analyses. (Reusable knowledge) Neither the automation 
for UMLSec nor for SecureUML supports the reuse of knowledge. (Domain) Neither 
UMLSec nor SecureUML define security requirements for specific domains. 
- CORAS :  
(Description) Dahl et al.  (Dahl, Hogganvik, and Stølen, 2007)(Lund, Solhaug, and 
Stølen, 2011)(Vraalsen et al., 2005) (Hogganvik and Stølen, 2006) present an 
organizational model-based method that covers threat, vulnerability, and security risk 
analysis. It also covers the elicitation of security goals. The language consists of five 
different kinds of diagrams: asset diagrams, threat diagrams, risk diagrams, treatment 
diagrams, and treatment overview diagrams. Their basic building blocks are presented in 
Figure 2.9. 
 
 
 
(Knowledge reliance) We could not find any papers that present the CORAS method (re) 
using security knowledge. (Automation) The CORAS Tool (Vraalsen et al., 2005) 
follows a client-server model and is developed entirely in Java. The CORAS client 
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application permits the analyst to create new analysis projects and documents, to edit 
security analysis results, to generate analysis reports, and to manage and reuse 
experiences from previous analyses. The latest version (Lund, Solhaug, and Stølen, 2011) 
has in addition a user interface containing a pull down menu, a tool bar, and a palette that 
contains all model elements. The CORAS tool does not support the reuse of knowledge.  
(Domain) As far as we know, CORAS is not a domain specific SRE method. 
- ISSRM:  
(Description) Mayer et al. (Mayer, 2012) propose a risk-based security requirements 
engineering framework that focuses on integrating risk analysis with requirements 
engineering activities. The main idea is to align Information Technology (IT) security 
with business goals. For this aim, the impacts of risks on business assets are analyzed; 
threats and vulnerabilities in the architecture are identified, and security requirements are 
defined, to mitigate the risks. 
 (Knowledge reliance) ISSRM approach does not rely on any kind of knowledge 
repositories. (Automation) ISSRM approach is not tool supported. 
(Domain) ISSRM was not dedicated to a particular domain.  
- Morda:  
(Description) Evans et al. (Evans et al., 2004)(Buckshaw et al., 2005) propose Mission 
Oriented Risk and Design Analysis (Morda) as a methodology for analyzing security 
risks. Morda combines threats, attacks, and mission impact concepts for deriving an 
unbiased risk metric. (Knowledge reliance) Through this literature review, no 
publication addressing security knowledge (re) use by Morda was found. (Automation) 
Morda is not supported by a tool. 
(Domain) Through the literature, we did not find any use of security knowledge by 
Morda. The approach is not for a particular domain, and does not consider domain 
knowledge. 
- CRAC++:  
(Description) Morali and Wieringa present a method named CRAC++ (Morali and 
Wieringa, 2010), which is an extension of the older method CRAC (Morali et al., 2009) 
The Confidentiality Risk Assessment and Comparison (CRAC) is an architecture-based 
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method for confidentiality risk assessment in IT outsourcing. In CRAC++, the method is 
extended with a step to identify confidentiality requirements in outsourcing. In other 
words, the method specifies and identifies confidentiality requirements of the client that 
are not implied by the known confidentiality requirements of the provider, and which 
therefore are candidates for inclusion in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with that 
provider. Authors present a case study to evaluate the method. (Knowledge reliance) To 
the best of our knowledge, CRAC++ does not rely or use predefined reusable structured 
knowledge. (Automation) CRAC++ is not equipped with a tool. 
(Domain) To the best of our knowledge, CRAC++ does not define security requirements 
for specific domains.  
- SREF : 
(Description) Haley et al. (Haley et al., 2008)(Haley et al., 2006) present a 
framework for security requirements elicitation and analysis called SREF (Security 
Requirements Engineering Framework). The framework considers security in an 
application context; it represents security requirements as constraints, and develops 
satisfaction arguments for the security requirements.  The system context is described 
using a problem-oriented notation, then is validated against the security requirements 
through construction of satisfaction arguments. 
(Knowledge reliance) To the best of our knowledge, Haley et al. did not rely on 
knowledge reuse for their proposed SREF. (Automation) No tool is presented with 
this framework. 
(Domain) The SREF method was not designed for a particular domain, though it was 
applied in the aircraft domain for evaluation. The authors (Haley et al., 2008) report 
needing the help of the project’s domain experts at the step concerned with 
determining the assets, the harm that the assets can suffer from, and the security goals 
to avoid those harms. On the other hand, the SREF method leaves to the analyst the 
use of trust assumptions when deciding whether an element of a domain is relevant to 
consider during the security analysis. 
- MSRA:  
(Description) Multilateral Security Requirements Analysis method (MSRA) ( 
Gürses, Berendt, and Santen, 2006)(Gürses and Santen, 2006), aims to apply the 
principles of multilateral security (Rannenberg, 1993) during the requirements 
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engineering phase of systems development. This is done by i) analyzing security and 
privacy goals of all the stakeholders of the system-to-be, ii) identifying conflicts, and 
iii) consolidating the different stakeholders’ views. The method proposes analyzing 
conflicts carefully and solving them either during requirements analysis, through 
design, or using negotiation mechanisms at runtime. It borrows both from theories on 
multilateral security and viewpoint-oriented requirements engineering. Security 
requirements are then derived from the reconciliation of multilateral security goals.  
(Knowledge reliance) The method does not rely on reusable knowledge for security 
requirements elicitation. (Automation) No tool is presented with the method, to the 
best of our knowledge.  
(Domain) The authors give informal textual definitions of security and privacy 
related to ubiquitous technologies domain. They report some kinds of privacy threats 
possible through these new technologies. Then, they present the MSRA method that 
deals with the complexities of articulating privacy and security requirements for 
ubiquitous systems.  
5 SUMMARY  
The systematic mapping study recalls a great interest in security requirements engineering 
with a considerable attention to the (re) use of knowledge for defining security requirements. 
This section returns to the main research questions of this systematic mapping study and 
replies to them according to all the publications retrieved.  
The following summarizes the answers to the research questions. 
RQ1. Does the security requirements method rely on reusable knowledge?  
Our results indicate that reuse knowledge is addressed in 29 (31%) out of 95 papers. This 
allows us conclude that overall, the deployment of reusable knowledge in security methods is 
relatively unexploited and possibly immature. The rate of evaluation papers found (only 
10.5%) indicates that most of the propositions are not evaluated regarding their applicability 
and usability in large-scale case studies and with end users from practice. One might say that 
this is due to the fact that most of these methods were proposed in an academic context, 
mostly through PhD dissertations focusing on validating the proposition in a small-scale 
laboratory experiment rather than in large-scale case studies. Nevertheless, this indicates that 
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more attention should be given to the applicability and usability of the deployment of 
knowledge (re) use in SRE. 
RQ2. How is the reused knowledge represented?  
Surveying the different proposals allowed us to identify different forms of knowledge 
representation: Patterns constituted 9.4% of them, taxonomies and ontologies 13.6%, 
templates and profiles 2.1%, catalogs and generic models 10.5%. Few propositions (3.1%) 
used a mix of these different forms. The rest of the proportion concerns proposals that don’t 
reuse security knowledge. This gives us a picture about the different forms to represent and 
access knowledge proposed in the literature. The question remains of why some 
representations are more “popular” than others, and it would be interesting to find out more 
directly from academics and practitioners (through a survey) about why they may prefer 
some forms to others. For instance, one might suggest the hypothesis that ontologies are 
known to feature reasoning mechanisms, catalogs might be easy to access and generic models 
might be easy to visualize for re-use. 
In any case, the following summarizes the different forms of knowledge representation 
identified:    
- Security patterns:   
 Models:  Let us mention notably the work of Hermoye et al. (Hermoye, van 
Lamsweerde, and Perry, 2006) who propose an attack pattern library containing attack 
trees using the KAOS framework, and the proposition of Mouratidis et al. 
(Mouratidis, Weiss, and Giorgini, 2006) who enforce the Secure Tropos method with 
security patterns models.     
  Not models: The method proposed by Okubo et al. (Okubo, Kaiya, and Yoshioka, 
2011) makes use of security requirements patterns and security design patterns.  
- Generic models:  Some researches propose repositories of generic models for the purpose 
of reuse, such as generic misuse cases (Sindre, Firesmith, and Opdahl, 2003), security use 
cases (Firesmith, 2003), abuse frames diagrams (Lin et al., 2004).  
- Security requirements templates (plain text): Firesmith suggests reusable security 
requirements templates (Firesmith, 2004). SIREN relies on a repository of parameterized and 
non-parameterized security requirements (Toval et al., 2001). 
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- Ontologies:  Some approaches propose the use of ontologies for SRE (Daramola et al., 
2012a)(Salinesi, Ivankina, and Angole, 2008)(Dritsas et al., 2006)(Salini and Kanmani, 
2012a)(Velasco et al., 2009)(Chikh et al., 2011); most of them are in their early stages and 
not yet validated. In fact, none of them are used by existing categories of security 
requirements.   
- Taxonomies: As a continuity of the proposed method GBRAM, Antón and Erap propose a 
taxonomy for reducing web sites privacy vulnerabilities (Antón and Earp, 2004). 
- Catalogs: The recent work of (Mouratidis et al., 2013) suggested relying on a catalog of 
reusable models, but did not mention what these models contain exactly and how to use them. 
Saeki and Kaiya’s (Saeki and Kaiya, 2009) method makes use of Common Criteria catalogs 
that contain threats, security objectives and Security Functional (SF) components.   
- Profiles: Zuccato et al.’s method uses what the authors call security requirements profiles 
(Zuccato, Daniels, and Jampathom, 2011).  
- Mixed:  The method SREP (Mellado, Fernández-Medina, and Piattini, 2006) relies on a 
Security Resource Repository (SRR) which stores reusable security elements that can be 
represented in different forms (misuse cases, attack trees, security use cases, UMLSec, plain 
text). The method R-Square (Christian, 2010) also uses different kinds of reuse structures 
(definitions, glossaries, threat models).   
RQ3. What are the techniques for (re) using the knowledge?  
Most of the approaches (14.7%) provide manual guidelines for reuse; some of them add a 
process to follow. Few rely on semi-automated techniques (10.5%) such as formal rules. The 
ontology-based approaches take advantages of reasoning features of ontologies. These results 
indicate a high tendency to re-use through manual guidelines and a low trend to automatic 
techniques (only 5%), which can be seen as a weakness. By that, we mean that starting with a 
well-formalized knowledge source then re-using it through a human activity following some 
guidelines may lead to negative results if the process is not applied well.   
RQ4. What are the main reused elements? 
The main reused elements are often threats (26.3%) and security requirements (30.5%). The 
reused knowledge might differ slightly from one approach to another, but there is always 
knowledge related to the dark side of security (threats) and the treatment side (security 
requirements). Very few approaches reuse knowledge related to the organization and its 
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assets (5.2%). So what about the organizational side where threats appear and arise? (The 
assets to protect and their locations, the different persons involved in an organization, the 
organizational activities…) This knowledge can be reused too through different projects.  In 
addition to threats, there are the attackers, or categories of attackers, their attack methods and 
their attack tools, classes of vulnerabilities and common impacts of threats. Research on re-
use of knowledge in SRE should consider more elements of security and not just 
requirements and threats. 
RQ5. Are they tool supported?  
Among the 95 selected papers, only 13.6% propose tool support. However, most approaches 
do not provide tools that handle the reuse of knowledge, except one approach (Daramola, 
Sindre, and Stalhane 2012), where the authors present only a prototype. The tool mentioned 
by Mouratidis et al. (Mouratidis et al., 2013) provides a way to create the reference catalogue 
diagram and reuses it as discussed before. This indicates that most propositions are 
unfortunately not tool supported. A possible explanation can be, as stated for RQ1, namely 
that in the academic environment where these methods were proposed, tool implementation is 
not the main focus. 
RQ6. Are the security requirements specified for a specific domain? For which domain? How 
they are represented?  
Only 7 % of selected papers addressed security requirements for specific domains.  In all the 
other cases, the propositions remain generic; it is left to the requirements engineer and the 
security analysis to adapt these propositions to the domain at hand. The spotted domains were 
e-commerce systems, e-health applications, e-voting applications, and ubiquitous 
technologies. These are sensitive domains but securities of many other domains need to be 
considered. The other point noticed is, even when the domain is used, it is often described 
textually and informally, not necessarily with reusable elements. Table 2.3 (in page 90) 
summarizes the domain related questions in SRE.   
RQ7. What are the new challenges regarding security knowledge (re) use in SRE?  
Based on the SMAP presented in this chapter, the challenges in the following are part of the 
authors’ own view of open questions:   
(Challenge 1) It is interesting to note that the risk-based approaches found do not handle 
reuse of security knowledge. The challenge will be to reconsider knowledge reuse in these 
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methods. (Challenge 2) Many approaches for SRE relying on ontologies are emerging. They 
seem to be at their early stages and have not been validated yet. The challenge is to 
strengthen them and to apply them to large-scale case studies. (Challenge 3) Ontology-based 
approaches are not handled by the existing security requirements engineering categories 
(model based); it would be interesting to see how to merge these two directions. (Challenge 
4) The domains for which security requirements are defined need be taken in consideration 
during the SRE process (Challenge 5) There is a lack in automated support that handles 
knowledge reuse for the different SRE methods.  More tools to support that would be 
appreciated. (Challenge 6) It would be interesting to generalize and unify all these efforts 
(like in UML), so that they can more easily be exploited by industrials. 
Table 2.4 (in page 91) summarizes the results of the systematic mapping study. The columns 
contain the different SRE methods grouped into categories. The lines contain the main 
aspects of knowledge reuse (form of representation, reusable knowledge elements, reuse 
technique and automation). The code used to fill the cells of the matrix is also presented. 
Cells marked with “-” mean that the method does not take in consideration the corresponding 
aspect of knowledge reuse.  
6 RELATED WORKS  
To the best of our knowledge, no research exists in the literature to review in a systematic 
way the issue of knowledge reuse in security requirements engineering. One worth 
mentioning work though is that of Chernak (Chernak, 2012) who conducted an online survey 
on requirements reuse in 2010. His survey reports that 80% of participants find that reuse is 
important and brings benefits. Yoshioka et al. (Yoshioka, Washizaki, and Maruyama, 2008) 
presented a survey limited to security patterns. This is interesting, but the other forms of 
reuse are neglected, whereas they were taken in consideration in this chapter.  
Devanbu et al. (Devanbu and Stubblebine, 2000) is one of the older references that presented 
a “brief” survey on security models and requirements. Recently, some publications were 
dedicated to security requirements engineering (Fabian et al., 2010),(Mellado et al., 2010), 
(Salini and Kanmani, 2012b), (Tondel, Jaatun, and, Meland 2008). However, none of these 
existing reviews tackled the specific issue of “knowledge reuse”.  
 86 
 
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY 
Like with empirical researches, there are threats to the validity. In the following some threats 
that might compromise our results are cited:  
Search engines used in the SMAP (External validity)  
All retrieved results rely on the functionality and precision of the search engines of the used 
digital libraries. Unfortunately, many search engines of computer science digital libraries 
turned out to be unreliable. Moreover, the results were also based on digital libraries for 
which our institution has subscription to. Unfortunately, it was not possible to explore a 
system like SCOPUS, which is known to be particularly useful because it indexes 
publications from a large number of publishers. 
Selected sources (Construction validity) 
In this research, the SMAP was more focused on publications’ sources related to the security 
requirements engineering field than on those related to the knowledge engineering field.  This 
makes the results subject to discussion and comparison with other SMAPs’ results that might 
address the subject in the other way around, “security requirements in knowledge 
engineering” for example. Moreover, being researchers in the area of requirements 
engineering and information systems, there is a risk that we may have been biased by our 
experience and collaborations in the selection and the analysis despite our effort to avoid it. 
For example, some selected studies of the mapping were proposed by colleagues from the 
same lab colleagues. In particular, the papers presenting the method RITA (Salinesi, 
Ivankina, and Angole, 2008) were intentionally added to the selected papers.  
The primary search (screening) that was based mainly on title, keywords and a succinct read 
of the abstract might have missed relevant papers related to the topic. Some reuse forms like 
‘templates’ or ‘taxonomies’ that were discovered through the study were not initially 
considered in the list of keywords. Moreover, the decision to read or not to read much more 
than the abstract (for the purpose of selection) strongly depends on the subjective feeling.  
There is another threat related to the number of years that are mentioned here:  the main 
searches were based on a defined interval of years. The goal of covering a big interval (2000-
2013) turned to be ambitious and difficult to manage. There was a need to restrict the number 
of papers beyond the selected criteria just to make the process manageable and better 
reported; this might also induce some bias on the final results.  
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While executing the research protocol, selecting sources is not an easy and straightforward 
task. In particular, the choice of quality/selection criteria. For example Quality criterion Q1 
(publications containing several unsupported claims or frequently referring to existing work 
without providing a citation were excluded) may lead to controversial opinions. It depends on 
subjective judgments by the reviewer, which can only be reduced through feedback from 
peers. The categorization choices (the map) are another point of discussion. Within the 
application of the same research protocol, other researchers may decide on a different 
categorization of the findings.   
Results (Conclusion validity) 
The results of the SMAP are useful and interesting; however these conclusions are based on 
sources retrieved in conferences, journals, academic and some industrial reports. It would 
have been interesting to compare these results with others based on online surveys where real 
world practitioners are asked about their practices and opinions on security requirements 
reuse. In addition to that, although there was a careful analysis of the available literature 
resulting in the presented framework, researches may find that some criteria may have been 
neglected. Another threat to validity is related to searching exclusively in English writing 
sources, although it is the largely used language by researchers, but one should pay attention 
that there are many active communities in other countries who may propose interesting 
researches related to the topic.      
8 CONCLUSION  
Over 30 methods to support SRE engineering were presented in this chapter. One can safely 
say that we are now far away from the first generation of “checklist” based methods as 
presented by Baskerville (Baskerville, 1993) in the early nineties.  A significant number of 
publications in the requirements engineering community illustrate the steady interest in 
security requirements engineering during the last two decades. The area of security 
knowledge reuse is still emerging.  One single mapping study can never be able to cover all 
aspects of existing contributions. Each one can tackle a single aspect.  
The contributions of our SMAP can be summarized as follows: (i) a framework was defined 
for analyzing and comparing the different proposals as well as categorizing future 
contributions related to knowledge reuse and security requirements engineering; (ii) the 
different forms of knowledge representation and reuse were identified; and (iii) the situation 
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of considering domains in SRE process was clarified; (iv) previous surveys were updated. We 
conclude that most methods should introduce more reusable knowledge to manage security 
requirements and that the application domains should be considered. 
This chapter presented the proceeding and results of a systematic mapping study conducted to 
get an extensive overview of existing research on knowledge reuse within SRE.  The review 
provides an overview of important existing approaches and tools. More than 30 approaches 
covering 13 years of SRE practice were analyzed.  Our iterative refinement resulted in a final 
set of five main types of knowledge forms of representation that were (re) used by SRE 
approaches: (1) security patterns; (2) taxonomies and ontologies; (3) templates and profiles; 
(4) catalogs and generic models; (5) mixed. For each form of representation, more details 
were provided about the related SRE approach to it, its (re) use, and the tool support 
provided. A framework to compare and analyze knowledge reuse and domain consideration 
in SRE was also defined. 
The main goal of our SMAP was to provide a good reference to us in the context of this PhD 
thesis. This reference can also be useful to other researchers and PhD students to get a clear 
map on knowledge reuse across SRE and find answers to the different questions on this topic.  
This SMAP can also be useful to practitioners (requirements engineers, security officers, 
security engineers, etc.) who are interested to know what is going in research in terms of 
SRE. The results of the SMAP can be useful to security architects because they reuse 
knowledge at corporate level and their responsibilities include leveraging of knowledge 
reuse.  For any given set of requirements, an architect can and should typically identify and 
evaluate multiple different architectures and architectural mechanisms before selecting what 
he or she thinks will be the optimum way of fulfilling the requirements. Thus, there are often 
many ways for an architecture or security team to address a specific kind of security 
requirement. Therefore, knowing the different methods can make their job easier. These 
results will also be useful to requirements engineers who have had no training in identifying, 
analyzing, specifying, and managing security requirements, and requirements teams that do 
not include subject matter experts in security as it is often the case (Firesmith, 2004). 
The SMAP raises new questions that research and industrial communities may face:  
At the industrial level, given all these propositions that appeared during the last two decades, 
what is their maturity (scalability, efficiency) for use in real life industrial environments? The 
lack of automated support and the fact that many of the SRE methods rely on reusable 
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knowledge that is not standard remain as issues. The deficiency in automation support may 
suggest that companies (IT vendors and software editors) still have not invested enough in 
automation. This leads to the question about how the automation can be made part of existing 
security technologies that exist already in companies.  
On a research level, why do not risk based approaches handle knowledge reuse? Why is there 
a lack in automated support that handles knowledge reuse for the different SRE methods?  
One may claim that conceptual methods are often created as part of PhD researches where 
automation is not always required as part of the dissertation process. However, the research 
community should be aware of this and should re-focus from method creation to automation 
and then evaluations to a better assessment of the research contributions.    
And, even further in the future, can we imagine a collaborative work between researchers and 
practitioners for a generalization and unification of all these efforts (like in UML), so that 
their exploitation in practice and even in academic teaching institutions becomes easier? 
The next chapters of this PhD thesis will attempt to reply to part of these questions. The next 
chapter will concentrate on security ontologies by presenting a survey on the use of 
ontologies in SRE.  
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Table 2.3. Domain in SRE 
Method Applied to particular domain? Domain knowledge 
KAOS  Cycab transportation domain   
Facts & Assumptions – not domain 
security requirements  
Secure I* No No 
Secure Tropos No No 
GBRAM E-commerce systems Textual description 
Misuse Cases No No 
Security use cases No No 
Secure UML No No 
UMLSec No No 
Morda No No 
CORAS No Assumptions-not reusable 
ISSRM No Context-not reusable 
CRAC++ No No 
Abuse Frames No Causal, lexical, biddable  
SREF No Trust assumptions - not reusable  
Saeki & Kaiya No No 
SREP No Facts & Assumptions - not reusable  
MSRA Ubiquitous technologies Textual description  
SQUARE No No 
Firesmith No No 
SIREN Administration  No 
Daramola et al.  No No 
RITA No No 
Zuccato et al.  Telecommunication services Textual description 
Dritsas et al.  
 
e-health applications Security Ontology & patterns 
 Salini et al.  
 
e-voting applications Security Ontology  
Velasco et al.  No No 
Chikh et al.  No Domain ontology  
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Table 2.4. Summary of the systematic mapping study (Knowledge reuse) 
Form of representation: P=Pattern, Tax=Taxonomy, O=Ontology, C=Catalog, GM=Generic Model, T=Template, Pr= Profile, M=Mixed, - =Nul 
 Reusable knowledge: T=Threats, C=Countermeasures, A=Asset, O= Organization, G=Goal, V=Vulnerabilities, SR=Security Requirements, - =Nul 
Technique: FR=Formal Rules, G=Guidelines, P = Process, Q= Queries, - =Null 
Automation: N=No, Y=Yes, - =Null 
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Chapter 3 
 
Security Ontologies: A Literature Survey 
and Classification 
 
 
With the growing need to implement IT security measures in world-wide corporate 
environments and the growing application scope, a major obstacle that face ordinary analysts 
and developers using existing security requirements modeling and analyzing frameworks is 
the lack of formally and explicitly defined security knowledge and expertise.  It becomes also 
increasingly difficult for them to understand each other due to an imprecisely defined 
terminology. Problems occur if an Asian employee is drafting a corporate-wide security 
policy, while his colleague in Russia is misinterpreting the policy, since the terms that were 
used are not explicitly defined. Some kind of agreed ontology can be used to avoid such 
inefficiencies (Ekelhart et al., 2007). 
In 2003, Marc Donner urged the necessity of having good security ontologies.  He argued 
that too much security terminology is vaguely defined, thus it becomes difficult to 
communicate between colleagues and, worse, confusing to deal with the people we try to 
serve: “What the field needs is an ontology – a set of descriptions of the most important 
concepts and the relationships among them... A great ontology will help us report incidents 
more effectively, share data and information across organizations, and discuss issues among 
ourselves” (Donner, 2003).  The need for security ontologies has been also recognized by the 
research community in (Denker, 2002).  
Since the awareness about security knowledge has grown in the scientific community, many 
security ontologies have been proposed during the last decade.  But there are still many 
questions around these works: what are the different security ontologies available nowadays? 
Do they meet the requirements? Do they cover all or some security aspects? Which ontology 
can I choose as an analyst seeking for security knowledge for the definition of IS 
requirements?  These are the research questions that we attempt to reply to in this chapter.  
92 
 93 
 
Because interest in using security ontologies in different fields of research has grown, 
analysts and researchers may find in this chapter a road map, an overview of what exists in 
terms of security ontologies. The main objective in this literature survey is to review, analyze, 
select, and classify security ontologies, as a scope study but with a particular interest in the 
field of security requirements engineering.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 1, we explain the methodology 
used in the study, Section 2 includes the survey and classification, and Section 3 recalls 
related works. Finally, Section 4, the conclusion, raises future perspectives. 
1 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
To perform this literature review, we relied on information retrieval and survey 
methodologies presented in (Levy and Ellis, 2006) (Barnes, 2005) (Rainer and Miller, 2005) 
(Metcalfe, 2002). Thus, the search strategy undertaken is based on a three-step literature 
review process. The three steps are: 1) Inputs, 2) Processing, and 3) Outputs.  Figure 3.1 
provides an overall view of the process undertaken.  
1.1. INPUT  
In any systematic approach, if the system input is either incorrect, of low quality, or 
irrelevant, the resulted output is going to be ineffective regardless of the quality of the 
processing stage or, colloquially, garbage-in/garbage-out. In our case, for the input, we 
gathered, as far as possible, any publication related to the topic. The search was guided by the 
key words ‘ontologies’, ‘requirements’, ‘security’, ‘concepts’, ‘OWL’, ‘threats’, 
‘vulnerabilities’. The search was conducted inside the relevant and known sources of 
Figure 3.1. The three stages of effective literature review process adapted 
from  (Levy and Ellis 2006) 
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literature such as Google Scholar, ACM libraries, IEEE digital library etc.  About 50 papers 
were gathered.  
1.2. PROCESSING  
We performed a first read to get a general idea; 21 papers were discarded at this stage since 
they were found to be far away from our target objective. A second read was carried out for 
deeper understanding and analysis of concepts and relations between them.  Finally, a quality 
analysis led us to classify them into different families, and we defined a set of criteria 
allowing us to compare the researches. 
1.3. OUTPUT 
The result of the analysis and comparison of the different papers allowed us to define a 
classification framework of the different security ontologies (see Figure 3.2.). The other 
output was Table 3.1. The table presents how each retrieved ontology deals with security 
aspects and requirements.  
The next sections present in details the outputs of the literature review.  
2 SYNTHESIS AND CLASSIFICATION 
 
It appears that some researchers intend to cover all security aspects and propose general 
ontologies while others tackle a specific aspect of security; they sometimes refer to previous 
security taxonomies. In another context, given the increased importance of the World Wide 
Web in many fields, while security plays a vital role in the success of the Semantic Web, the 
web community proposed some security related ontologies helping them to define security 
aspects of web resources and communication. Back to security analysis, some authors 
proposed related security ontologies by adapting risk analysis: we grouped them in a specific 
category. Others tried to develop security ontologies for requirements engineering studies, 
and later with the advancement of security requirements agent models (Secure i* (Liu, Yu, 
and Mylopoulos, 2003), Secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2006) (Mouratidis, Giorgini, and 
Manson, 2003a)), related modeling ontologies were proposed describing the concepts and 
relationships used. In some cases the security ontologies belong simultaneously to two 
categories. For example, there are taxonomies for requirements, or web oriented and fairly 
generic (Vorobiev and Han, 2006). In these cases, we assigned the ontology to the more 
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dominant field of research. The result is composed of 8 families of security ontologies 
(Figure. 3.2.), described as follows:  
2.1. BEGINNING SECURITY ONTOLOGIES  
One of the earliest work (back in the nineties) about merging knowledge base and 
information system management at an early level of development was (Mylopoulos et al., 
1990)  who proposed a language called Telos for representing knowledge about information 
systems and illustrated how this language can be applied in developing knowledge bases 
about software. The knowledge base is divided into four sub-worlds (subject world, usage 
world, system world, development world). Mylopoulos et al. note that Telos users can 
develop models for the purpose of security specification.    
2.2. SECURITY TAXONOMIES 
A taxonomy is an ontology in the form of a hierarchy. Whereas ontologies can have any type 
of relationship between categories, in taxonomies there can only be generalization 
hierarchies.  Taxonomies of security concepts are a common method for sharing security 
knowledge. There are some interesting taxonomies, which were used later for developing 
security ontologies: 
Figure 3.2. Classification of Security Ontologies into 8 families. 
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- (Avizienis et al., 2004) provide a detailed taxonomy that contains classes of faults, fault 
modes, classification of fault tolerance techniques, and verification approaches. In this 
taxonomy, the main threats to dependability and security are defined as failures, errors, and 
faults. Avizienis et al. classify the main means to attain security and dependability attributes 
into fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal, and fault forecasting.  
- (Landwehr et al., 1994) were particularly interested in security flaws. Their taxonomy is 
based on three basic questions about each observed flaw: genesis (how did it enter the 
system?), time of introduction (when did it enter the system?), and location (where in the 
system did it manifest?).  
2.3. GENERAL SECURITY ONTOLOGIES    
By general ontologies we mean these ontologies which aim at covering all (or most) security 
aspects:  
- Herzog and colleagues (Herzog, Shahmehri, and Duma, 2007) have proposed an OWL-
based ontology of information security. They endeavored to deliver an extensible ontology 
for the information security domain that includes both general concepts and specific 
vocabulary of the domain, and supports machine reasoning and collaborative development. 
The proposed ontology is built around the following top-level concepts: assets, threats, 
vulnerabilities and countermeasures. These general concepts together with their relations 
form the core ontology which presents an overview of the information security domain in a 
context-independent and application neutral manner. In order to be practically useful, the core 
ontology is populated with domain-specific and technical vocabulary which constitute the 
core concepts and implement the core relations. The ontology contains 88 threat classes, 79 
asset classes, 133 countermeasure classes, and 34 relations between these classes. 
- In the same vein, Fenz and Ekelhart (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) have proposed an ontology 
(500 concepts) that has a similar goal but attempts to cover a broader spectrum: their 
ontology models a larger part of the information security domain, including non-core 
concepts such as the infrastructure of organizations. In the high level concepts of the 
ontology and their relations (cf. Figure 3.3) we find threat which gives rise to follow-up 
threats, represents a potential danger to organization's assets and affects specific security 
attributes (confidentiality, integrity, availability) as soon as it exploits a vulnerability in the 
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form of a physical, technical, or administrative weakness, and it causes damage to certain 
assets.  
2.4. SPECIFIC SECURITY ONTOLOGIES 
 This category gathers the specific domain security ontologies – the ones that describe 
specified aspects of security such as Session Initial Protocol vulnerabilities, Intrusion 
detection, etc. 
- In (Undercoffer, Joshi, and Pinkston, 2003), the authors propose a data model that 
characterizes the domain of computer attacks and intrusions as an ontology and implement 
that data model with an ontology representation language. At the topmost level of the 
ontology (Figure 3.4.), they define the class Host. The System Component class is comprised 
of the subclasses (Network, System, Process). The class Attack is described by the properties 
Directed to, Effected by, and Resulting in. Accordingly, the classes System Component, 
Input, and Consequence are the corresponding objects. The class Consequence is comprised 
of several subclasses which include Denial of Service, User Access and Probe. Finally, the 
class Input is characterized by the predicates Received from and Causing, where Causing 
defines the relationship between the Means of attack and some input. Received from links 
Input and Location. The class Location is an instance of System Component and is restricted 
to instances of the Network and Process classes. Means of attack contains the following 
subclasses: Input Validation Error, Logic Exploits. 
 
Figure 3.3. Security ontology proposed by (Fenz and Ekelhart 2009) 
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- (Viljanen, 2005) analyzed thirteen different computational trust models and derived a 
common vocabulary for describing facts that are considered for trust calculation in the 
reviewed trust models. The models can be classified as identity-aware, action-aware, 
business value aware, capability-aware, competence-aware, confidence-aware, context-
aware, history-aware and third-party-aware in their input factors. The trust ontology 
comprises many ontological structures; trust is a relationship between two principals, the 
subject, trustor, and the target, trustee. 
  - Voice over IP (VoIP) telephony services suffer from various types of attacks and 
vulnerabilities, mainly due to the utilization of an open environment, the Internet. 
(Geneiatakis and Lambrinoudakis, 2007) propose an ontology for SIP-VoIP based services. 
This ontology can be applied either to find a countermeasure against attacks on SIP based 
VoIP services or for testing the security robustness of SIP-VoIP (Session Initial Protocol-
VoIP) infrastructure. The ontology contains two main concepts SIP_attack and SIP_message. 
Specifically any SIP attack employs a SIP message that is forwarded to a target node trying to 
cause a specific consequence. The SIP_attack is directed by a target and causes a 
consequence.  It has two subclasses: malformed and flood. 
Figure 3.4.  Part of the ontology proposed by (Undercoffer, Joshi,  Pinkston, 2003) 
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2.5. WEB ORIENTED SECURITY ONTOLOGIES   
Some works addressed both the security community and the semantic web community.  
  - Denker et al in (Denker et al., 2003) (Denker, Nguyen, and Ton, 2004) (Denker, Kagal, 
and Finin 2005) develop several ontologies for security annotations of agents and web 
services, using DAML (DARPA Agent Markup Language) and later OWL (Web Ontology 
Language).  The defined ontology is composed of two sub-ontologies: “security mechanisms” 
which capture high-level security notations and “credential” which defines authentication 
methods. The goal of these ontologies is to enable high-level markup of Web resources, 
services, and agents while providing a layer of abstraction on top of various web service 
security standards.  These ontologies represent well-known security concepts and enable their 
users to interconnect security standards. 
  - The NRL Security Ontology proposed in (Kim, Luo, and Kang, 2005) is organised around 
seven separate ontologies (Main Security Ontology, Credential Ontology, Security 
Algorithms Ontology, Security Assurance Ontology, Service Security Ontology, Agent 
Security Ontology, Information Object Ontology).  Three of them are based on existing based 
ontologies in DAML: firstly, “Service security ontology”, which describes security annotation 
of semantic web services; secondly, “Agent security ontology”, which enables querying of 
security information; and finally “Information object ontology”, which describes security of 
input and output parameters of web services.  The four remaining ontologies are as follows: 
“Main security ontology”, describes security protocols, mechanisms and policies; 
“Credentials ontology”, specifies authentication credentials; “Security algorithms ontology”, 
describes various security algorithms; and “Security assurance ontology”, specifies different 
assurance standards. 
 - Artem Vorobiev and Jun Han proposed a security attack ontology for Web service 
(Vorobiev and Han, 2006). The ontology brings together a set of attacks (attacks on Web 
services, probing attacks, CDATA Field attacks, WS DoS attacks, WS DoS attacks, 
Application attacks, SOAP attacks, XML attacks, semantic WS attacks). 
2.6. RISK BASED SECURITY ONTOLOGIES  
Recent trends in security methodologies tend to consider that the best approach of security 
consists in starting from a risk analysis. It allows the experts to adapt the security solutions to 
the actual risk, leading to a more effective security plan.   
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 - (Ekelhart et al., 2007) proposed a security ontology framework based on four parts: the first 
part is the security and dependability taxonomy from (Avizienis et al., 2004), the second part 
presents the underlying risk analysis methodology, the third part describes concepts of the IT 
infrastructure domain and the fourth part provides a simulation enabling enterprises to 
analyze various policy scenarios. The ontology ‘knows’ which threats endanger which assets 
and which countermeasures could lower the probability of occurrence, the potential loss or 
the speed of propagation for cascading failures.  
  - (Assali, Lenne, and Debray, 2008) proposed to develop a knowledge base containing 
ontologies for the analysis of industrial risks describing concepts used for the achievement of 
a risk analysis. 
2.7. (SECURITY) ONTOLOGIES FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
Some papers refer to ontologies in order to cope with the definition of security requirements:  
  - (Dobson and Sawyer, 2006) propose an ontology of dependability by merging two 
conceptualisation models (IFIP model: proposed by the IFIP Working Group 10.4 on 
Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance & UMD model: Unified Model of 
Dependability).  Some of the IFIP attributes are themselves goals of security (Availability, 
Integrity, Maintainability, and Confidentiality).  The ontology covers some security aspects 
such as Failure, Dependability Threat (Error, Fault), Dependability Attributes (Availability, 
Integrity, Confidentiality…) 
  - (Tsoumas and Gritzalis, 2006) define a security ontology using OWL and propose the 
security framework of an arbitrary information system which provides security acquisition 
and  knowledge  management. Tsoumas et al. have used Asset, Stakeholder, Vulnerability, 
Countermeasure and Threat concepts in the construction of the security ontology. The 
security ontology acts as a container for the IS security requirements (“What” part). 
  - In (Karyda et al., 2006), the authors use OWL to propose a security ontology with which to 
develop secure applications. The proposed ontology is formed of “assets” (data asset, 
hardware data,...), “countermeasures” (identification and authentication, network 
management, auditing services, physical protection, etc.), “objectives”, “persons” (insider 
stakeholder, attacker,...) and “threats” (errors, attacks, technical failures, etc.). They validate 
the defined ontology using nRQL queries in order to demonstrate that their ontology can be 
used in various contexts. They apply it to e-government scenarios: e-tax and e-voting. 
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  - (Firesmith, 2005) presents a taxonomy of safety-related requirements: “Safety 
requirements” are requirements obtained from threats analysis. “Safety-significant 
requirements” include non-safety requirements that can cause hazards and safety incidents. 
“Safety constraints” are constraints that directly impact safety and are derived from laws, 
policies, standards, and industrial practices. “Safety system requirements” specify aspects of 
the primary system. 
2.8. SECURITY MODELLING ONTOLOGIES  
Even if authors present them as ontologies, they mainly describe meta-models. While the 
previous ontologies include security specific concepts such as threat, attack, vulnerability, 
these ontologies include security related concepts for modelling requirements and the 
dependencies between them such as relationship, proposition, and situation. 
  - In (Mouratidis, Giorgini, and Manson, 2003b), first, the concept of security constraint is 
introduced, as a separate concept, next to the existing concepts of Tropos. Secondly, existing 
concepts such as goals, tasks, resources, are defined with and without security in mind. For 
example a goal should be differentiated from a secure goal, the latter representing a goal that 
affects the security of the system. Thirdly, security-engineering concepts such as security 
features, protection objectives, security mechanisms and threats, which are widely used in 
security engineering, are introduced in the Tropos ontology, in order to make the 
methodology applicable by software engineers as well as security engineers.  
  - (Massacci et al., 2011) propose an extended ontology for security requirements.  The very 
top of the taxonomy is adapted from DOLCE, a foundational ontology intended to account 
for basic concepts that underlie natural language and human cognition. Lower levels of the 
taxonomy include concepts from i*, problem frames and argumentation frameworks, with 
security concepts occupying the lowest strata of the taxonomy. Let's list some of their 
proposed concepts: Objects (Proposition, Situation, Entity, Relationship) – Entities (Actor, 
Action, Process, Resources, Assets) – Relationships (do-dependency, can-dependency, trust-
dependency) from SI* – Propositions (Fact, Claim, Argument, Domain-Assumption, Quality 
Proposition, Goal).  
Thus many papers propose security ontologies composed of different but related concepts 
aiming at common or different objectives. The following section compares and evaluates 
them.  
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3 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION 
In this section, we compare security ontologies and try to evaluate to which extent they cover 
security requirements and thus can be used in requirement engineering.  
(Mylopoulos et al., 1990) did not literally propose a security ontology nor an ontology, but a 
basic taxonomy composed of four sub-worlds. The authors note that users of Telos (the 
proposed language for developing the knowledge base and the sub-worlds) have developed 
models for the purpose of security specification but did not detail the underlying models. 
In the family of security taxonomies, (Avizienis et al., 2004) proposed a detailed taxonomy of 
security and dependability. But this taxonomy fails to cover techniques for protecting 
confidentiality, establishing authenticity, analysing issues of trust and the allied topic of risk 
management.  Some important security elements are not addressed, such as vulnerabilities 
and assets. The taxonomy doesn't deal with any use for requirements.   
 The two main limit in the taxonomy of (Landwehr et al., 1994) is that it is too basic, focused 
on some flaws in operating systems only, far from many kinds of security flaws that might 
occur in application programs for database management, word processing, electronic mail, 
and so on. The study needs to be updated with recent work. Flaws in networks and 
applications are becoming increasingly important, and the distribution of flaws among the 
categories they have defined may not be stationary. The taxonomy of (Landwehr et al., 1994) 
focused on a special kind of threats and does not address any countermeasure or related 
vulnerability.  
The two general security ontologies (Herzog, Shahmehri, and Duma, 2007) and (Fenz and 
Ekelhart, 2009) are both interesting contributions but neither of them is complete. While the 
first one seems simple and clearer, the second is much richer but more complex. Fenz et al. 
better cover asset concepts, while Herzog et al. focus on threat concepts. Fenz's main 
contribution consists of the organisation concepts, clearly absent from Herzog. Herzog's 
countermeasures tend to be technical whereas Fenz's are both business and technical. The 
advantage of being generic and capturing most security aspects leads also to drawbacks since 
the ontologies lack in specificity that the specific security domain ontologies (Undercoffer, 
Joshi, and  Pinkston, 2003), (Viljanen, 2005), (Geneiatakis and Lambrinoudakis, 2007) 
provide, and vice-versa.  Neither (Herzog, Shahmehri, and Duma, 2007) nor (Fenz and 
Ekelhart, 2009) ontologies were used for requirements definition and analysis, but both, 
combined with the specific ontologies, can be a very good source of security knowledge for 
requirements. The general ontologies offer generic concepts of security objectives, assets, 
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vulnerabilities, countermeasures, threats, etc. while the rest offers more specific threats 
concepts (computer attacks and intrusions in (Undercoffer, Joshi, and Pinkston, 2003), for 
example). 
  The security ontologies developed in the semantic web area are not negligible.  The 
ontology of (Kim, Luo, and Kang, 2005)looks like a generic security ontology from a first 
sight with its seven sub-ontologies. However it does not cover some aspects like 
vulnerabilities and assets or organisation, or even threats. Nevertheless, in a web sharing 
community, where both resource requestors and providers have security requirements, (Kim, 
Luo, and Kang, 2005) proposed a matching algorithm that facilitates mapping of higher level 
(mission-level) security requirements to lower-level (resource level) capabilities using the 
ontology.  In a very similar previous work by Denker et al. (Denker et al., 2003) (Denker, 
Nguyen, and Ton, 2004) (Denker, Kagal, and Finin, 2005), the proposed ontology fails to 
consider vulnerabilities, assets and threats; but a reasoning engine matches between the 
request requirements and the capabilities of the potential web service whose requirements 
need to be satisfied by the capabilities specified in the request.      
  The risk based security ontologies we found in (Ekelhart et al., 2007) and (Assali, Lenne, 
and Debray, 2008) could be useful for a risk based requirement analysis like (Herrmann et al., 
2011) or (Mayer, Rifaut, and Dubois, 2005). However, to the best of our knowledge, there 
were no propositions combining both sides.    
  In the context of requirements engineering some ontologies were proposed, but 
unfortunately none of them is associated to a methodology describing how to use them for 
requirement definition. Dobson and Sawyer's ontology (Dobson and Sawyer, 2006) 
concentrates on few threat concepts, and neglects many other aspects of security. (Tsoumas 
and Gritzalis, 2006), in addition to their ontology, provided a framework, but don't indicate 
any detailed mechanism on how to use the ontology for requirement collection.  The main 
lack of (Karyda et al., 2006) is the absence of vulnerability related concepts, although they 
propose many examples of queries on the ontology, that provide answers to the developer in 
an e-government application.  
Finally, the security modelling ontologies, which are more security modelling oriented 
(relationship, entity...) than security concept oriented (assets, threats ...) might be useful for 
constructing security requirements models like Secure i* and Tropos.  A limitation common 
to all the ontologies we have been facing is that they are described in papers but are not 
available on the Internet, which makes their use difficult.   
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  We summarise this analysis and evaluation in the table 3.1. The rows are the families of 
security ontologies. The columns list the aspects related to security (objectives, assets, 
vulnerabilities, threats, countermeasures and organisation).  The last column in the table 
evaluates the link between the ontology and requirements definition. A black dot measures to 
which extent the security ontology covers this specific aspect of security, and how this 
particular security ontology deals with requirements. We used a dash for absence of use, as 
follows:  How does the ontology cover this concept of security? How does this security 
ontology proposal deal with requirements (last column)?       
-: absent  ●: very few  ●●: few  ●●●: much   ●●●●: very much 
 
To complete the study we drew up a graph that represents roughly, for each security 
ontology, how much it deals with requirements (x-axis) and how much it covers security 
concepts (y-axis). The graph in Figure 3.5 clearly reveals a gap between the two fields. There 
is not a perfect ontology that covers lots of security aspects and, at the same time that can be 
used in the definition for security requirements   
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Table 3.1. Summary of security ontologies of the study 
Family Security Ontology1 
Security 
Objective1 
Assets1 Vulnerabilities1 Threats1 Countermeasures1 Organization1 Requirements2 
Beginning (Mylopoulos et al., 1990) - - -  -   
Security 
taxonomies 
(Avizienis et al. 2004)  - -   - - 
(Landwehr et al. 1994) - - -  - - - 
General  
(Herzog, Shahmehri, et Duma 
2007) 
 
 
     - 
(Fenz and Ekelhart 2009) 
 
 
  
 
 
  - 
Specific 
(Undercoffer, Joshi, Pinkston 
2003) 
-    - - - 
(Viljanen 2005)  - - - - - - 
(Geneiatakis & Lambrinoudakis 
2007) 
 - -  - - - 
Risk based (Ekelhart et al. 2007)  - -    - 
Web 
oriented 
(Denker et al. 2003)  
(Denker, Nguyen,  Ton 2004) 
(Denker, Kagal, Finin 2005) 
 - - -  -  
(Kim, Luo, Kang 2005)  - - -  -  
(Vorobiev & Han 2006) - - -  - - - 
For security 
requirement 
(Dobson & Sawyer 2006)  - -  - - - 
(Tsoumas & Gritzalis 2006) -       
(Karyda et al. 2006)   -     
(Firesmith, 2005) -  -  - -  
Modelling  
(Mouratidis, Giorgini, Manson 
2003b) 
 - - - -   
(Massacci et al. 2011)   -  - -  
1 How does the ontology cover this concept of security?             2 How does this security ontology deal with requirements? (Last column)  
- : Absent,  : Very few, : Few, : Much, : Very much 
 1 
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4 SURVEYS ON SECURITY ONTOLOGIES  
While many security ontologies have been proposed, few surveys have been attempted. The 
only ones we can cite here are (Blanco et al., 2008), (Elahi et al., 2011) and recently 
(Nguyen, 2011). (Elahi et al., 2011) was not primarily about ontologies, but they mentioned 
some security ontologies and taxonomies in their state of art of security requirements. 
(Nguyen, 2011) proposed a survey of general ontologies for information systems 
encompassing some few security ontologies. Blanco et al. (Blanco et al, 2011) is an 
interesting review and comparison of security ontologies that helped us in our study. 
However, since 2009 other ontologies have been proposed, indicating a need for updating.  
Moreover, Blanco et al. organized the existing ontologies under four categories (general 
security ontologies, applied to a specific domain, theoretical works, semantic web-oriented). 
Our aim was to extend this classification to additional categories and to update their surveys 
with recent literature contributions. 
5 CONCLUSION  
Let us come back to our main question: which security ontology for my requirements?  This 
study has shown the existence of considerable work around security ontologies; several 
ontologies have been proposed. We classified them into eight families (theoretical basis, 
security taxonomies, general, specific, risk based, web oriented, requirements related, 
modelling). This classification extends the previous works, which were limited to two, three, 
or four families at best.    
 Our analysis has also shown that the existing security ontologies vary a lot in the way they 
cover security aspects; we tried to analyse how each ontology covers each aspect of security 
(objectives, assets, vulnerabilities, threats, countermeasures, and organisation). Moreover, we 
studied whether the proposed security ontology can be used for requirements definition and 
the degree of this use.  
The study revealed a gap between the fields of security requirement engineering and 
ontologies, and thus a new area of research to explore.  
  We believe that this work can be improved; the classification needs to be extended. We need 
sub-categories for each family of security ontologies.  The study revealed that there are still 
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important issues to be addressed in the adaptation of ontology-based requirements 
engineering techniques to security requirements engineering.   
This study allows us to assert that the challenges facing software security is the lack of an 
easily accessible large common body of security knowledge. Although much security 
ontologies are available, they all fall short in completeness and suitable granularity. It also 
remains difficult for designers to extract relevant pieces of knowledge to apply to their 
specific design or requirements related decision making situations. 
The objective in the next chapters of this PhD thesis is to unify the knowledge provided in the 
proposed security ontologies and explore the techniques and mechanisms for the best use of 
this knowledge for security requirement definition.  
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Chapter 4 
 
AMAN-DA  
A method for domain specific security 
requirements engineering  
 
This chapter provides the overview of the ontology-based security requirements elicitation 
method proposed in this PhD thesis: AMAN-DA3. The chapter presents the main elements 
that construct the method, the inputs and the expected outputs. AMAN-DA takes as an input 
security, domain ontologies and stakeholder’s security goals. It produces as an output security 
requirements models and textual security requirements specifications. This is done thanks to 
a set of ontology-based rules and mechanisms. In this chapter, a running example related to 
web applications domain is presented.         
1 PROPOSITION  
AMAN-DA proposes to use in combination two kinds of ontologies: a security ontology that 
embeds security specific knowledge, and a multi-level domain ontology that encompasses 
domain specific knowledge. The expected outcome is that the security requirements resulting 
from the combined use of both ontologies will be more domain-specific. Figure 4.1. gives an 
overview of the proposed method.  
AMAN-DA is generic in the sense that different domain ontologies can be used with it. 
However it is domain specific when it is applied in the sense that during its application only 
one domain ontology is used. The method relies on a collection of heuristic rules that extract 
relevant security and domain knowledge from ontologies (red arrows in Figure 4.1.). In 
addition to the two ontologies (security and domain), the inputs are security goals (such as the 
ones that are captured during interviews with stakeholders).  The output is a specification of 
                                                          
3 AMAN (نامأ) is the Arabic name for security. DA is for Domain of Application. The name was chosen to refer 
to security requirements engineering for domains of application. Ironically, the name AMANDA in Latin means 
“worthy of love”!   
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security requirements well-formalized with Secure Tropos model (SecTro) (Mouratidis and 
Giorgini, 2007) in addition to a specification of textual security requirements.  
 
 
 
The choice of Secure Tropos was motivated by the fact that it is one of the richer modeling 
frameworks in terms of security concepts (according to our literature review presented in 
Chapter 2).  
The originality of the method lies: (a) in the fact that the combination of the security ontology 
and domain ontologies is not achieved a priori, but at runtime, while the method is applied; 
(b) in the genericity of the method, in the sense that it is designed to be used with a generic 
security ontology and any domain ontologies, as long as they embed some expected 
knowledge;(c) the defined rules and presented algorithm allows the method to automatically 
exhibit an appropriate ontological semantics (security and domain specific) to the 
Chapter 6 
Figure 4.1. Overview of AMAN-DA 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 7 
Figure 4.1.  Overview of AMAN-DA 
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requirements engineer (agents, objects, threats, security requirements…);(d) the automatic 
generation of Secure Tropos models and textual security requirements.  
The null hypothesis H0 is that “Using domain ontologies in addition to a security ontology to 
guide security requirements elicitation does not make a difference with respect to discovering 
requirements with a security ontology only”. What we want to demonstrate is that such a 
method will be more efficient, and easy to use by requirements engineers (and security 
analysts) to produce security requirements (models and texts) that are more domain specific. 
The next chapters will present each element of the method in more details:  
 Chapter 5 presents the core security ontology.   
 Chapter 6 presents a specification of security goals and security requirements.  
 Chapter 7 presents the multi-level domain ontology. 
 Chapter 8 presents the mechanisms and rules that put everything together to produce 
Secure Tropos models and textual security requirements specifications. 
2 RUNNING EXAMPLE  
Let us consider a requirements engineer (Zach), who prepares specifications for different 
products. In these specifications, he usually focuses on functional requirements. The 
limitations of his tacit knowledge about security and of his primitive knowledge about the 
domain for which he elicits security requirements make his resulting security requirements 
poor and too generic. In addition, a short interview with stakeholders is not enough to know 
all the domain agents and objects that are present in the project. Sometimes, such engineers 
copy/paste the security requirements from other projects in an ad-hoc way, which is relatively 
time consuming and disorganized way of working.   
This time, Zach is asked to elicit security requirements of a web application of an online 
shopping company. The engineer wants to i) capture the stakeholders’ goals in a quick 
manner, ii) produce well-formed Secure Tropos model, iii) produce the corresponding well–
formed textual security requirements, and iv) throughout the elicitation process, he wants to 
get access to domain knowledge related to online shopping without having to refer to the 
stakeholder. 
The next chapters will present each element of the method, and the first one is the core 
security ontology.  
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Chapter 5 
A core security ontology for security 
requirements engineering   
 
The research community of information system security (Donner, 2003) urged the necessity 
of having a good security ontology to harmonize the vaguely defined terminology, leading to 
communication troubles between stakeholders. The benefits of such security ontology are 
manifold: it will help requirements engineers report incidents more effectively, reuse security 
requirements of a same domain and discuss issues together (Souag, 2012).  
AMAN-DA proposes a core security ontology that considers the descriptions of the most 
important concepts related to security requirements and the relationships among them. 
“Core” refers to the union of knowledge (high-level concepts, relationships, attributes) 
present in other security ontologies proposed in the literature. 
This proposition is not the first one intending to tackle these issues; however, its particular 
contribution is to offer an answer to the requirements engineering community. Indeed, some 
security requirements engineering methods use ontologies (as reported in chapter 2), such as 
RITA (Salinesi, Ivankina, and Angole, 2008), Daramola et al. (Daramola, et al., 2012a), 
Velasco et al. (Velasco et al., 2009) and Salini et al. (Salini and Kanmani, 2012a). The 
problem is that most of these studies are limited to a particular field of use, and the perimeter 
they cover remains relatively small compared to the scope of  "security" (Souag, Salinesi, and 
Comyn-Wattiau, 2012) (Blanco et al., 2008). As (Massacci, Mylopoulos, and Zannone,  
2007) claim “Although there have been several proposals for modeling security features, 
what is still missing are models that focus on high-level security concerns without forcing 
designers to immediately get down to security mechanisms”. Meta-models can be useful since 
they provide an abstract syntax of security concepts. However, we believe that ontologies can 
be a better option since they allow representing, accessing, using and infering about that 
knowledge in order to develop methods, techniques, and tools for security requirements 
analysis. 
According to (Blanco et al., 2011), a good security ontology should inter alia, include static 
knowledge (concepts, relationships and attributes), and dynamic knowledge (axioms). It must 
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be reusable (commented in natural language, and formalized in a standard language). 
The main objective of this chapter is to address the following research question: What are the 
concepts and relations that need to be present in a core security ontology?  
This ontology should make it possible to: 
 Consolidate and capitalize the knowledge of the research community, by creating an 
entry point for the various existing ontologies in the literature.  
 Create a generic platform of different security concepts (threats, risks, requirements, 
etc.). This ontology will harmonize the semantics of existing security ontologies.  
 Create a source of reusable knowledge for the elicitation of security requirements in 
various projects.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the construction of the 
ontology, its concepts and relationships. Section 2 reports the evaluation of the proposed 
ontology. Finally, Section 3 concludes the chapter and describes future work directions. 
1 A CORE SECURITY ONTOLOGY FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
ENGINEERING  
This section presents the main contribution of the chapter, a core security ontology to be used 
particularly for the security requirements elicitation process. The method for constructing the 
security ontology is adapted from ontology construction methods proposed by Fernandez et 
al. (Fernández-López, Gómez-Pérez, and Juristo, 1997), mixed with key principles of the 
ones proposed by Jones et al. (Jones, Bench-Capon, and Visser, 1998). 
The construction process contains six main steps: objective, scope, knowledge acquisition, 
conceptualization, implementation, and validation. The objective behind the ontology 
construction must be defined in the beginning, including its intended uses, scenarios of use, 
end-users, etc. The scope stipulates the field covered by the ontology. The knowledge 
acquisition step aims at gathering from different sources the knowledge needed for the 
ontology construction. In the step of conceptualization, the knowledge is structured in a 
conceptual model that contains concepts and relationships between them. Ontology 
implementation requires the use of a software environment such as Protégé4; this includes 
                                                          
4 http://protege.stanford.edu/ 
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codifying the ontology in a formal language (RDF5 or OWL6/XML7). Finally, the validation 
step guarantees that the resulting ontology corresponds to what it is supposed to represent. 
The details about how the first five steps were applied to construct our ontology are presented 
in the following sub-sections and the last step is detailed in Section 2. 
1.1. OBJECTIVE  
The main objective of the target ontology is to provide a generic platform containing 
knowledge about the core concepts related to security (threats, vulnerabilities, 
countermeasures, requirements, etc.). This ontology will be a support for the elicitation of 
security requirements and the development of SRE methods and tools; it will be in particular 
used in the context of our proposed method (AMAN-DA). The ontology will be a meta-view 
for the different security ontologies in the literature. It should harmonize the security 
terminology spread in these ontologies and help requirements engineers communicating 
together. 
1.2. SCOPE OF THE ONTOLOGY 
The ontology covers the security domain in its high level aspects (threats and treatments) as 
well as its organizational ones (security procedures, security management process, assets, and 
persons). The reader will find details on all security concepts covered by the ontology in 
section 1.4 below on. 
1.3. KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION  
The acquisition of the security knowledge started from standards (e.g. ISO270008). Other 
knowledge acquisition sources were the different security ontologies and security models that 
exist in the literature. We analyzed about 20 security ontologies, based on our previous 
literature survey (Souag, Salinesi, and Comyn-Wattiau, 2012). These ontologies are of 
various levels (general, specific, for a particular domain). Relevant concepts and relationships 
were extracted through a systematic analysis of the security ontologies. Table 1 in the 
appendix B presents part of them (13 ontologies). A brief descriptions of some of those 
ontologies are proposed in the following:  
                                                          
5 http://www.w3.org/RDF/ 
6 http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-features/ 
7 http://www.w3.org/XML/ 
8 http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/iso27001.htm 
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 Fenz et al. (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) have proposed an ontology to model the 
information security domain. We reused some concepts and relationships of that 
ontology, in particular the ones related to the infrastructure of organizations (assets, 
organization), the relationships between threats and assets, and between threats and 
vulnerabilities. Fens et al.’s ontology was a rich source of threats, vulnerabilities and 
standard controls that have been reused to define our security requirements.  
 The ISSRM model (Mayer, 2012) (top left in Figure 5.1.) was defined after a survey 
of the risk management standards, security related standards, and security 
management methods. The three groups of concepts proposed in the ISSRM model 
(asset related concepts, risk related concepts, and risk treatment related concepts) 
were used to define the three dimensions of the ontology (organization, risk, 
treatment). 
 Velasco et al.’s security requirements ontology (Velasco et al., 2009) was useful to 
define the security requirements in our ontology. 
Figure 5.1 schematizes the knowledge acquisition step and part of the conceptualization 
phase, starting with the knowledge sources (the different ontologies), the concept alignment, 
and the conceptualization with the help of experts and documents. The concepts of the 
resulting ontology were derived from the alignments of the different security ontologies in 
the knowledge acquisition step.  
Figure 5.1. Knowledge acquisition and conceptualization phases. 
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1.4. CONCEPTUALIZATION 
Based on the outcomes of the knowledge acquisition step, concepts were organized and 
structured in a glossary. Various relationships among these concepts were considered, and 
then were put together in a conceptual model of the ontology (Figure 5.2.), easy to 
understand, independently of any implementation language. The names of the concepts and 
the relationships of the security ontology proposed in this paper were chosen according to the 
number of occurrences of names in the source ontologies (Table 1 in the appendix B). If a 
concept has different names in the ontologies (e.g. impact or consequence, attack method or 
deliberate attack, or SessionIP attack); the most generic or easiest to understand name was 
chosen (here, impact, attack method). Some security experts were consulted through email 
exchanges, phone and direct discussions to validate our choices. The experts acknowledged 
most of the concepts and relationships between them. Some refinements in the ontology were 
performed after discussion with them. For example, the concept of “Attack” was removed; 
the experts consider it as an Intentional Threat. Discussions also clarified the difference 
between the concepts of “Security Goal”, “Security Criterion”, “Security requirement” and 
“Control”. These concepts are frequently mixed up in the security requirements elicitation 
phase and the difference between them is often not easy to capture. The concepts were 
organized around three main dimensions. The latter are: Risk dimension, Treatment 
dimension, and Organization dimension. The Risk dimension represents the “dark” face of 
security; it gathers concepts related to ‘threats’, ‘vulnerabilities’, ‘attacks’, and ‘attackers’. 
Treatment dimension is concerned with concepts related to the necessary treatments to 
overcome risks. The concepts are ‘security goals’, ‘requirements’, ‘controls’, and ‘security 
policies’. Finally, security is a multifaceted problem; it is not only about technical solutions 
or single assets, but also about the environment where threats appear and arise. That is why 
the Organization dimension is considered. This dimension relates to concepts such as 
‘person’, ‘location’, ‘assets’, and ‘organization’ that must be analyzed and on which 
assumptions must be made in a security requirements elicitation process. Some ontologies 
covered only the dimension treatment (Velasco et al., 2009). The security ontology proposed 
by (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) groups concepts into three sets (security, enterprise and 
location). The classification into these three dimensions that was inspired from the model 
proposed by Mayer et al. (Mayer, 2012) (organization, risk and treatment) helps in organizing 
the knowledge related to security. The concepts and relationships of the ontology are 
described in the following sub-section. 
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A. Concepts of the security ontology 
The following summarizes the different concepts identified for the ontology with their 
respective descriptions. These general concepts together with their relations constitute the 
ontology, which presents an overview of the information security in a context-independent 
manner. In the following, we describe the concepts dimension by dimension.  
a) Organization dimension  
This dimension includes the concepts related to the organization, its assets and its 
environment. The concepts are: 
- Organization: a structure including human, hardware, and software resources (assets). 
- Person: Represents human agents. A person may be internal in the organization (e.g., 
administrator) or external (e.g., customer, attacker).  
- Asset: a valuable resource, which can be a tangible asset (e.g., air-conditioning, fire 
extinguisher, computers) or an intangible asset. Intangible assets can be, for example, 
software, data, and industrial manufacturing processes. 
- Location: Defines the asset’s location. Location can be a brick and mortar physical 
location such as a classroom, data center or office. It can also consist of collaborative 
research materials on a file share or financial information stored in a database (Vogel, 
2013). 
b) Risk dimension 
The concepts of the risk dimension are: 
- Risk: a combination of a vulnerability and threat causing harm to one or more asset. 
- Severity: the level of risk, e.g. high, medium or low. 
- Threat: a violation of a security criterion. The threat may be natural, accidental, or 
intentional (attack). 
- Vulnerability: a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one 
or more threats (ISO-b, 2004) (e.g., weak password). 
- Impact: the impact may vary from a simple loss of availability to loss of the entire 
information system control. Impact can also be of other types such as harm to the 
image of the company. 
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- Attacker: the person (or program) who carries out the attack (intentional threat). 
- Attack method: Refers to the different methods used by attackers to accomplish their 
attacks, such as sniffing (which lets attackers capture and analyze traffic transmitted 
over a network); spoofing (where the attacker attempts to impersonate someone or 
something else); and social engineering (tricking people into giving sensitive 
information or performing actions on behalf of the attacker). 
- Attack tool: The tool used to perform the attack. e.g. sniffing tool (e.g., Wireshark9), 
spoofing tool (e.g. Subterfuge10), scan port tool (e.g., Nmap11) and others. 
c) Treatment dimension 
- Security goal: a security goal defines what a stakeholder hopes to achieve in the future 
in terms of security. 
- Security Requirement: a condition defined on the environment that needs to be 
fulfilled in order to achieve a security goal and mitigate a risk. Depending on what we 
want to protect and on the target security level, we define our requirements. They can 
be related to databases, applications, systems, organizations, and external 
environments. For example, “the system shall ensure that personal data can be 
accessed only by authorized users” and “the system shall deliver data in a manner that 
prevents further or second hand use by unauthorized people”. 
- Control: a means or a way to secure assets and enable a security requirement, e.g., 
alarm or password. 
- Security criterion: defines security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, and traceability. It can also be considered as a constraint on assets. 
- Requirements document: The document that states in writing the necessary security 
requirements to protect the assets. Two main documents generally contain security 
requirements: 
- Security policy: a security policy expresses the defense strategy or strategic directions 
of the information security board of an organization. 
- Specification document: it gathers the set of requirements to be satisfied by a material, 
                                                          
9 http://www.wireshark.org/ 
10 http://code.google.com/p/subterfuge/downloads/list 
11 http://nmap.org/ 
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design, product, or service. The document contains, inter-alia, security requirements. 
B. Relationships of the security ontology 
High-level relationships between those concepts were defined. They were categorized into 
four kinds: IsA, HasA, SubClassOf and AssociatedTo. The relationships between the concepts 
of the security ontology can be briefly described as follows: An organization has assets 
(Has_Asset). An asset may have a location (Has_Location). Tangible and intangible assets 
are subclasses of the concept asset (SubClassOf). An organization also includes persons that 
it deals with (Has_Person). The persons can be internal or external (SubClassOf). An asset is 
threatened by one or many threats (Threatens). These threats exploit vulnerabilities in the 
assets (Exploits). The threat-agent leads an attack (LeadBy) and uses attack methods 
(UseMethod) or attack tools (UseTool) to achieve an attack. A person (internal or external to 
the organization) can (TurnsInto) a threat agent. A threat implies an impact (Implies), for 
example: “A denial of service attack implies a server downtime”. The impact affects one or 
more assets (Affect). A threat can be natural, intentional, or accidental (SubClassOf). A threat 
generates a risk (Generate) with a certain level of severity (HasSeverity). Security 
requirements mitigate a risk (Mitigate) and satisfy (Satisfies) security goals expressed by 
stakeholders (ExpressedBy). Security requirements fulfill (Fulfills) one or more security 
criteria. For instance, the requirement “The application shall ensure that each user will be 
able to execute actions for which he/she has permission at any time/every week” satisfies the 
security criteria Confidentiality and Availability. Controls enable a security requirement 
(Enables). For example, the control “password” enables the requirement “The application 
shall ensure that each user will be able to execute actions for which he/she has permission”. 
Security policies and specifications incorporate (Includes) security requirements, that can be 
either security software requirements (SubClass), that relate to the security of applications, 
databases, or security organizational requirements (SubClass), that relate to assets, persons, 
buildings. 
C. Attributes and axioms of the security ontology 
In addition to concepts and relationships, ontologies contains axioms and attributes. Formal 
axioms are assertions, accepted as true about abstractions of a field. The axioms allow us to 
define the meaning of concepts, put restrictions on the values of attributes, examine 
conformity of specified information or derives new ones (Staab and Maedche, 2000) . As 
stated before, the ontology proposed in this chapter was not created from scratch. It was 
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constructed by reusing knowledge of existing security ontologies. In particular, some 
attributes (see Table 5.1) of the ontology proposed by (Lekhchine, 2009) were reused. For 
instance, a person has a phone number (its type is string), a requirements document has a 
version (its type is string). 
Table 5.1. Part of the table of attributes 
Concept Attribute Value type 
Person Phone number Integer 
Software Version String 
Requirement 
document 
Version String 
Password Minimum length Varshar 
 
The ontology proposed by (Fenz and Ekelhart, 2009) was a rich source of axioms. Table 5.2 
illustrates some axioms with their descriptions and the related concepts.  
Table 5.2. Part of table of axioms 
Concepts Description Expression 
Threat A threat can be either 
intentional or accidental 
∀ 𝑥: 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
⇒ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 (𝑥)  
∨ 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 (𝑥)
∨ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 (𝑥) 
Requirements document 
Security policy  
Specification 
A requirements 
document can be either a 
policy or a specification 
∀ 𝑥: 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝐷𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
⇒ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 (𝑥)
∨ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑥) 
Figure 5.2 presents the security ontology proposed in this chapter. It includes the three 
dimensions, including concepts and relationships. 
2 EVALUATION OF THE CORE SECURITY ONTOLOGY  
Given that our goal was to develop an ontology covering the high-level concepts of security, 
and make it (re)usable by the requirements engineering community, the following criteria 
were the focus: 
• Completeness: this criterion will be evaluated by mapping the target ontology and some 
other ontologies extracted from literature. The focus was mainly on security ontologies that 
have been used in security requirements engineering (Salinesi, Ivankina, and Angole, 2008) ( 
Daramola et al., 2012) (Velasco et al., 2009). 
• Validity: Through this criterion, the ability of the ontology to provide reliable answers to a 
set of questions using its terminology was checked. 
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Figure 5.2. The core security ontology 
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• Usability: This criterion refers to the degree to which a person believes in using a particular 
system. In our case, it demonstrates that the ontology can be used for security requirements 
elicitation, and reused through different projects.  
This chapter concentrates on the evaluation of completeness and validity of the security 
ontology. The evaluation of the usability criterion will be presented in chapter 10.     
2.1. COMPLETENESS 
The completeness criterion verifies that our ontology integrates the knowledge that exists in 
the other ontologies. An alignment table was drawn up, with on one side the concepts of our 
ontology. The other side contains concepts of security ontologies found in security 
requirements engineering literature (these particular ontologies were chosen, and not others, 
because they have been used in requirements engineering contexts). Table 5.3 presents the 
result of the alignment. . 
Table 5.3. The alignment table of the proposed security ontology with ontologies used for security requirements elicitation. 
Ontologies used for security requirements elicitation 
Concepts of the 
ontology 
(Daramola, 
Sindre, & Moser 
2012) 
(Salinesi, 
Ivankina, 
Angole 2008) 
(Velasco et al. 
2009) 
(Salini & 
Kanmani 
2012a) 
(Dritsas et al. 
2006) 
Asset Asset Asset Asset Asset Asset 
Location - - - - - 
Organization - - - - - 
Person - - - Stakeholder Stakeholder 
Threat 
Threat/ 
Active attack 
- Threat Threat 
Threat/ 
Deliberate 
attack 
Vulnerability 
- 
Threat 
causes 
- Vulnerability Vulnerability 
Risk - - Risk - - 
Severity 
- - 
Valuation 
criteria 
- - 
Impact 
- - - 
Impact 
severity 
- 
Attacker - - - - Attacker 
Attack tool - - - - - 
Attack method Code injection - - - - 
Security goal - - - - Objective 
Security criterion 
- - - 
Security 
objective 
Security 
requirement 
Security 
requirement 
- Treatment 
Security 
requirement 
Security 
requirement 
- 
Control 
- - Safe guard - Countermeasure 
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Most of the security ontologies used in SRE contain the concept of “Asset”. Given that 
security issues affect all the infrastructure of organizations, other concepts were introduced 
(with their corresponding sub-classes): Location, Organization and Person. While many of the 
other security ontologies take into consideration the concept Threat, most of them neglect the 
concept Risk generated by a threat, and its Severity. Only the ontology proposed by Dritsas et 
al. (Dritsas et al., 2006) uses the concept of “Attacker”. Only the ontology used by Daramola 
et al. (Daramola, Sindre, and Moser, 2012) includes the concept of “Attack Method”. Our 
proposed security ontology covers the concept “Objective” used by Dritsas et al. (Dritsas et 
al., 2006). The concept “Security Criterion”, missing in the security ontologies (Salinesi, 
Ivankina and Angole, 2008), (Daramola, Sindre, and Moser 2012) and (Velasco et al. 2009) 
was used in (Salini and Kanmani, 2012a) and (Dritsas et al. 2006). Note that (Dritsas et al., 
2006) considers as a ‘security requirement’ what other sources consider a ‘security criterion’ 
(availability, confidentiality...). The concept “Security Requirement” was used in (Salinesi, 
Ivankina and Angole, 2008), (Velasco et al., 2009) and (Dritsas et al., 2006). These results 
tend to demonstrate that the proposed security ontology is complete with respect to the union 
of all the other security ontologies used in security requirements studies, since it incorporates 
all their concepts. 
2.2. VALIDITY 
According to Uschold and Gruninger (Uschold et al., 1996), informal and formal questions 
are one way to evaluate an ontology. The latter must be able to provide reliable answers to 
these questions using its terminology. This section lists a number of questions that a 
requirements engineer is likely to encounter during the requirements elicitation phase of a 
development project. These questions should be regarded as indicative of what the ontology 
can deal with and reason about. Table 5.4 summarizes some of these questions. Each of the 
questions is expressed informally in natural language and formally using SQWRL12 (Semantic 
Query-Enhanced Web Rule Language) - an ontology query language. The answers to the 
questions are presented in the last column. These queries guide the requirements engineer 
during the security requirements elicitation process. The process includes: i) valuable assets 
identification (what are the assets of the organization?), ii) the risk analysis (what are the 
threats that threaten the asset? Who leads the attack? What is the attack method used?), and 
iii) security requirements elicitation (what are the security requirements to mitigate the risk? 
                                                          
12 http://protege.cim3.net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?SQWRL 
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What are the controls needed to implement those security requirements? What are the security 
criteria that those requirements fulfill?).  
Table 5.4. Informal and formal questions to the ontology 
 
Queries Part of result 
V
a
lu
a
b
le
 a
ss
et
 
id
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
 
What are the organizations in the scope of the 
project? 
Organization X, Organization Y, etc. 
Organization(?o)  sqwrl:select(?o) 
What are the assets to be protected in the 
organization X?  
IT systems, users’ ids, user’s password, 
keys, etc. 
Has_Asset(OrganizationX,?a)  sqwrl:select(?a) 
R
is
k
 a
n
a
ly
si
s 
What are threats that threaten the asset “IT systems”? Unauthorized use of IT systems 
threatens(?T,IT systems)  sqwrl:select(?T) 
Who is responsible of the threat “Unauthorized use 
of  IT systems”? 
Competitor 
LedBy(Unauthorized use of  IT 
systems,?A)sqwrl:select(?A) 
What is the method used by the attacker ‘competitor’ 
to attack the IT systems? 
Gain physical access 
Threat(Unauthorized use of IT systems)∧ 
Uses(competitor,?M)  sqwrl:select (?M) 
What are the impacts of such a threat on the 
Organization X? 
Theft of sensitive information 
Implies(Unauthorized use of IT systems,?I) 
sqwrl:select(?I) 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
re
q
u
ir
em
e
n
ts
 
el
ic
it
a
ti
o
n
 
What are the security requirements to consider to 
mitigate the risk? 
Req1. The organization should control 
access to its buildings and sensitive areas 
by using adequate control access 
procedures. 
Req2. After a defined period, inactive 
user account should be locked.  
 
Exploits (Unauthorized use of IT systems, V?) ∧ 
mitigated_by(?V, ?R) sqwrl:select(?R) 
 
This section has demonstrated how the security ontology could be exploited in the security 
requirements elicitation phase. This can provide the requirements engineers with the 
necessary knowledge.  
  
3 CONCLUSION  
This chapter presented a core ontology for the IS security requirements elicitation and 
analysis process. The completeness of the ontology proposed in this chapter was evaluated 
 126 
 
with regards to existing security ontologies used in security requirements engineering 
methods. The core security ontology was implemented as part of the tool AMAN-DATool 
(Appendix D) and was evaluated during a controlled experiment with end users (Chapter 10).  
Despite our effort, the goal of constructing this kind of security ontologies remains ambitious 
and is was found to be more complex than expected. One single team’s work is not large 
enough. This research can be improved through more collaboration with teams that worked on 
security ontologies. The ontology is of a generic nature; more mechanisms need to be 
considered to use it for different domains.  
In the next chapters, and in the context of AMAN-DA, we integrated the ontology and its 
reasoning features with Secure Tropos – the security requirements analysis approach. We will 
present how to make this security ontology more domain specific by relying on domain 
ontologies. 
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Chapter 6 
Security goals and security 
requirements 
 
 
Security goals and security requirements are both two cornerstones concepts in our 
proposition. As illustrated in the Figure 4.1. (cf. chapter 4), stakeholders’ security goals are 
inputs of the AMAN-DA method, security requirements are part of the security ontology and 
are outputs of the method. Stakeholders can express security concerns at different levels of 
detail. Therefore, there is a distinction between security goals (abstract) and security 
requirements (more detailed). According to (Fabian et al., 2010), the distinction between 
security goals and security requirements is not readily established in the requirements 
engineering community; it is not completely precise due to vagueness of subjective intuitions 
and semantic intricacies of natural languages. In this chapter, we raise the question: What 
would be the (linguistic) pattern to specify security goals and security requirements?  
AMAN-DA distinguishes between security goals and security requirements. In this chapter 
this distinction is explained. Two syntactic models are proposed: (i) a security goal model to 
capture stakeholders’ goal, and (ii) a syntactic security requirements pattern to specify 
security requirements that materialize the security goals.    
1 BETWEEN SECURITY GOALS AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS   
Many authors implicitly assume that security requirements are similar to high-level security 
goals. (Tettero et al., 1997) are explicit about this, defining security requirements as the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the entity for which protection is needed. While 
this is a clear definition, in some cases it may not result in precise enough requirements. 
Consider an example in health care: both doctors and administrators would probably agree on 
the importance of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the clinical information, but 
they could disagree on the concrete security requirements that express those goals. The 
requirements need to be more explicit about who can do what and when. 
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Some authors identify security requirements with security policies. (Devanbu and 
Stubblebine, 2000) define a security requirement as "a manifestation of a high-level 
organizational policy into the detailed requirements of a specific system. [...We] loosely 
(ab)use the term 'security policy' [...] to refer to both 'policy' and 'requirement'". Anderson 
(Anderson, 2001) is less direct; he states that a security policy is "a document that expresses 
[...] what [...] protection mechanisms are to achieve" and that "the process of developing a 
security policy [...] is the process of requirements engineering". (Haley et al., 2006) consider 
that the difficulty with security policies is their chameleon-like meaning. The term can be 
used for anything from a high-level aspiration to an implementation. Therefore, without 
accompanying detailed explanation, it is not satisfactory to define security requirements as 
security policies. However, security policies may contain security requirements. (Lee, Lee, 
and Lee, 2002) point out the importance of considering security requirements in the 
development life cycle, but do not define them.  
A number of papers (some of them presented in the state of the art of the thesis) focused on 
security requirements by describing how they may be violated. For example, (McDermott and 
Fox, 1999), followed by (Sindre and Opdahl, 2000) who described abuse and misuse cases, 
extending the use case paradigm to undesired behavior. In Secure i*; (Liu, Yu, and 
Mylopoulos, 2003) describe a method of analyzing possible illicit use of a system, but omit 
the important initial step of identifying the security requirements of the system before 
attempting to identify their violations.  
This quick bibliographic tour indicates that the difference between security requirements and 
security goals needs to be more precisely defined. This is the objective of the next sections. 
2 SECURITY GOALS  
 2.1. THE NOTION OF GOAL 
Goals have been recognized as an effective way to identify requirements for a long time now 
(Potts, 1997) (Rolland and Salinesi, 2005). They are known to be essential components 
involved in requirements engineering process (Van Lamsweerde, 2001).  
Goals are the objectives and targets of achievement for a system. According to (Van 
Lamsweerde, 2001) : “A goal is an objective the system under consideration should achieve.”  
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Goals are expressions of intent and thus declarative with a perspective nature, by opposition 
to descriptive statements  (Rolland and Salinesi, 2005). 
According to Jackson (Jackson, 1995), a goal is an “optative” statement, expressing a state 
that should be achieved or maintained.  In other words, the goal represents the objective that 
we want to achieve (“What?”) without saying “How?” to execute it.  
Goals may be formulated at different levels of abstraction, ranging from high-level concerns 
(such as “provide ubiquitous cash service” for an ATM network system) to low-level, 
technical concerns (such as “acceleration command delivered on time” for a train 
transportation). The system which a goal refers to may be the current one or the system-to-be; 
both of them are involved in the requirements engineering (RE) process. 
In requirements engineering, goal-driven approaches (KAOS (Van Lamsweerde, 2007), i* 
(Yu, Strohmaier, and Deng, 2006), and Tropos (Bresciani et al., 2004)) focus on why systems 
are constructed, expressing the rationale and justification for the proposed system. Focusing 
on goals, instead of specific requirements, allows analysts to communicate with stakeholders 
using a language based on concepts with which they are both comfortable and familiar (Antón 
and Earp, 2000). Goals are also known to be a beneficial source for requirements derivation. 
In fact, goals are operationalized and refined into requirements. 
Moreover, goals provide a precise criterion for sufficient completeness of a requirements 
specification; the specification is complete with respect to a set of goals if all the goals can be 
proved to be achieved from the specification and the properties known about the domain 
considered. Goals have various other roles in RE, such as the exploration of design choices, 
requirements tractability, requirements negotiation, conflicts detection and resolution, etc 
(Fabian et al., 2010).   
Goals must obviously be specified precisely to support requirements elaboration, verification/ 
validation, conflict management, negotiation, explanation and evolution. An informal (but 
precise) specification should always be given to make it precise what the goal name 
designates (Tettero et al., 1997).  
With the emergence of goals to the field of requirements engineering, (Prat, 1997) proposed a 
model to this notion. This model is derived from a linguistic approach, inspired by case 
grammar of Fillmore (Fillmore, 1967), and extensions from Dik (Dik, 1997).  
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Figure 6.1. Part of the goal model proposed by Prat  (Prat 1997) 
According to the model illustrated in Figure 6.1., a goal is described under the form of a verb 
associated to a target and completed by a set of optional parameters. Stating a goal is then 
represented by a verb, targets and different parameters which play specific roles in relation to 
this verb.  
 
In this model, the verb sets the action for the realization of the goal, while the target is either 
the existing object before performing the intention or the result arising from the satisfaction of 
the goal. The parameters (ways, direction, quality, quantity and beneficiary) can be useful to 
clarify the goal or express additional information. For example, G1= {#prepare, #proposition, 
∅} is composed of the verb “prepare” and the target “proposition”, that represent the actual 
result of the satisfaction of the goal. 
Last, recall that goals cover different types of concerns: functional concerns associated with 
the services to be provided, and non-functional concerns associated with quality of service --
such as safety, security, accuracy, performance, and so forth. Security goals will be described 
in the next section.  
2.2. SPECIFYING SECURITY GOALS   
In the mid ninetieth, many research explored the notion of goals to analyze security at the 
requirements engineering early phases. The state of the art in the beginning of the thesis 
report (Chapter 2) presents some goal-oriented approaches for security requirements 
engineering. All of these approaches are model-based. Their idea of security goals differ 
slightly from an approach to another as well as the concrete syntax they used to model this 
concept.  
- With Secure i*, (Liu, Yu, and Mylopoulos, 2003) identify security requirements during the 
development of multi-agent systems by analyzing the relationships between strategic actors, 
such as users and stakeholders, and potential attackers. Authors use the concept of soft-goal 
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to model and reason about security requirement. Soft-goals in Secure i* are graphically 
represented into a cloud. Iintegrity, confidentiality, availability are examples of softgoals.  
- Secure Tropos (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) (that was based on Secure i* and Tropos 
methodology) use the same concept of soft-goal; it also uses the concept of security 
constraint. A security constraint is restriction related to security issues, such as privacy, 
integrity and availability, which can influence the analysis and design of a multi-agent system 
under development by restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some 
of the requirements of the system, or by refining some of the system’s objectives. They are 
graphically represented as hexagons that are labeled with a constraint. An example of a 
security constraint would be “Keep patient anonymity”.  
- With KAOS, Lamsweerde (Van Lamsweerde, 2007) relies on the notion of anti models and 
anti-goals. An anti-model is constructed after the goals of the system-to-be have been 
elaborated and refined. Anti-models represent the scenario unwanted to happen. Anti-goals 
are obtained by negating existing goals. Once an anti-model stands and the resulting obstacles 
have been identified, the requirements engineers are expected to develop countermeasures so 
that the preconditions of the anti-goals are no longer fulfilled. 
Browsing the literature indicates some other definitions related to security goals.  Security 
goals define what a stakeholder hopes to achieve in the future in terms of security. According 
to Fabian et al. (Fabian et al., 2010):  
 “A stakeholder’s security goal expresses his or her security concerns towards an asset”  
 “Security goals are defined as very general statements about the security of an asset” 
“Security goals are traditionally classified into integrity, confidentiality, and availability 
goals.”  
While according to ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004 (ISO-b, 2004):  
“Integrity is the property of safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of assets.”  
“Confidentiality is the property that information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes.” 
 “Availability is the property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized 
entity.”  
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Figure 6.2. Security goal model. 
Based on what we found in the literature and based on the general goal model proposed by 
Prat (Prat, 1997), we propose a linguistic model to specify security goals (as presented in 
Figure 6.2.):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This can be read as follows:  
Security goals are expressed as a clause with (i) a main verb, (ii) one or many security 
criteria (e.g. confidentiality, integrity, availability) and (iii) target asset (s) that need to be 
protected.  
Thus: 
                                 Security goal = <Verb> <Security criterion> <Assets>.   
 
For example, the customers of a bank may have the goal that their financial situation remains 
confidential. This can be formalized as “(Maintain) Verb (the confidentiality) Security criterion of 
(financial situation) Asset”  
 The public, represented by a government agency, may have the goal to maintain the integrity 
of electronic financial transactions.   
(Maintain)Verb (the integrity) Security criterion of (electronic financial transactions) Asset 
Security goals are materialized by security requirements, as the next section will describe it.  
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3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS  
Security requirements capture security goals in more detail. A security requirement refines 
one or more security goal. Mayer (Mayer, 2012) defines a security requirement as “a 
condition defined on the phenomena of the environment that we wish to make true by 
installing the IS (Information System) in order to mitigate risks”.  He added that each security 
requirement contributes to cover one or more risk treatments for the target IS. (Fabian et al., 
2010) consider that a security requirement refer to a particular piece of information or service 
that explicates the meaning of the asset it concretizes in the context of the system under 
construction.  
A security requirement also indicates the counter-stakeholder against whom the requirement 
is directed. This is particularly important for confidentiality requirements, where the counter-
stakeholder is the party who must not get to know the information to which the requirement 
refers. A counter-stakeholder is not necessarily an adversary who tries to attack the system.  
Another important aspect of a security requirement concerns the circumstances in which it 
must be satisfied. These describe application conditions of functionality, temporal, or spatial 
aspects, the social relationships between stakeholders— in general, the ‘‘context’’ to which 
the requirement refers. 
(Haley et al., 2006) define security requirements as constraints on the functions of the system, 
where these constraints operationalize one or more security goals. Authors consider that 
security requirements should express the system's security goals in operational terms, precise 
enough to be given to a designer/architect. Security requirements, like functional 
requirements, are prescriptive, providing a specification (behavior in terms of phenomena) to 
achieve the desired effect. 
3.1. SPECIFYING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (SYNTACTIC PATTERNS)   
Wiegers (Wiegers, 2003) recommend to write individual requirements, and to avoid long 
narrative paragraphs that contain multiple requirements. Authors warn us that readers 
shouldn’t have to glean the individual requirements embedded in a mass of free-flowing 
descriptive language. It is advised to distinguish individual requirements from background or 
contextual information. These recommendations should be applicable also to security 
requirements known to be “the most difficult of requirements types”, and potentially the ones 
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causing the greatest risk if they are not correct (Robertson and Robertson, 2013). This 
motivates the need for a comprehensive reusable patern to specify security requirements.   
Klaus Pohl (Pohl, 2010) use the notion of syntactic requirements patterns for documenting 
requirements. The use of syntactic patterns aims, right from the beginning, at avoiding 
mistakes that frequently occur when defining textual requirements. An example of a frequent 
mistake is the use of the passive voice. Syntactic requirements patterns are defined based on 
experience with syntactic structures for textual requirements and are applied to support the 
documentation of requirements. The term “syntactic requirement pattern” is defined as 
follows:  
A syntactic requirements pattern defines a syntactic structure for documenting 
requirements in natural language and defines the meaning of each part of the syntactic 
structure.  
(Pohl,  2010) reports an example of a syntactic pattern for documenting requirements in 
natural language proposed by (Rupp, Simon, and Hocker, 2009).  
The pattern is as follows: 
 
Figure 6.3. Syntactic requireements pattern for documenting requirements with a condition (Rupp, Simon, and Hocker 2009) 
As Figure 6.3 depicts it, the pattern is composed of 6 main elements. The first element defines 
the time (when) or conditions under which the function of the requirement shall be performed. 
The second one defines the name of the system, which shall provide the documented function. 
The modal verbs “Shall/Should/Will” indicate the importance of the requirement. For 
instance, the modal verb “Shall” indicates a legally binding requirement, while “Should” 
indicates highly recommended but would not make the system unacceptable if it is not 
implemented. The Process indicates the required functionality. This functionality is 
documented by a full verb such as “print” or “transfer”. The Object describes the object for 
which the functionality is required, such as the type of document to be prented (e.g. tax form). 
The object as well as additional details about the object are documented after the process.  
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Based on the pattern of (Rupp, Simon, and Hocker, 2009), we propose the following   
syntactic pattern for documenting security requirements (Figure 6.4):  
 
Figure 6.4. A syntactic requirements pattern for documenting security requirements. 
This pattern consists of the following main structural elements:  
 <When>: This element defines the temporal or the logical conditions under which the 
function documented in the requirement shall be performed. 
  <Agent name>: This element defines the name of the agent, which shall provide the 
documented function. As security requirements are defined depending on what we 
want to protect and on the target security level, they can be related to databases, 
applications, systems, organizations, and external environments. That is why the agent 
who performs the requirement can be a system (e.g. “The system should lock 
accounts”). It can also be any agent of the domain. (e.g. “The chief engineer should 
provide fire extinguishers”). This agent is the grammatical subject of the sentence.  
 “Shall/Should/Will”: Same as in the pattern of Rupp (Rupp, Simon, and Hocker, 
2009) These elements indicate the importance of the requirement. They are consistent 
with the overarching objective of clear and effective communication. 
 <Action>: Actions constitute the activity or set of activities that processes the 
requirement (e.g. provide, lock, etc.) 
 <Assets>: Assets are the objects used for, or are part of the actions (e.g. fire 
extinguishers, accounts). They can also refer to controls as presented in the security 
ontology (Chapter 5).   
In the banking example (cf. Section 2.2), the security goal expressed by customers as: 
“(Maintain) Verb (the confidentiality) Security criterion of (financial situation) Asset”  
Can be materialized by the security requirement:  
(The system) agent (should) (ensure that) Action (customer’s balance of account) assets (is hidden 
from arbitrary bank employees) additional information   
In this example, the agent is the system under construction; the asset is the customer’s balance 
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of account.  
 3.2. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE CORE SECURITY ONTOLOGY    
In chapter 5, the core security ontology was presented.  This security ontology encapsulates 
and formalizes the security related knowledge. As reported before, in addition to threats, 
vulnerabilities, security criteria, attack methods, etc, the security ontology contains a set of 
relevant security requirements.   
In fact, security requirements in the core security ontology are organized according to the 
syntactic security requirements pattern presented in this chapter. This organization, allows 
making the security requirements in the security ontology well formalized and reusable when 
the security ontology is used in different domains. 
Figure 6.5. illustrates a deeper view the core security ontology.  
 
Figure 6.5. Deeper view on the core security ontology presented in chapter 5. 
4 CONCLUSION  
Since AMAN-DA is meant to be a generic method to be applied in different domains of 
application, well-formed artifacts were needed. In this chapter, the concentration was on 
security goals and security requirements. Based on previous well-referenced models in 
literature, a model to specify security goals was proposed. A reusable synthetic pattern to 
document security requirements was presented. The next chapter will present another facet of 
AMAN-DA, the domain knowledge.  
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Chapter 7 
Domain knowledge and domain 
ontologies  
 
AMAN-DA, the proposed method aims at providing not only the necessary security related 
knowledge for security requirements elicitation, but also at providing specific domain 
knowledge for the same purpose. This is made possible thanks to domain ontologies. Domain 
ontologies can provide knowledge about the domain assets that need to be protected, the 
agents of the organizations, their roles and responsibilities, organizations in the scope of the 
study, the organizational activities. Such a knowledge is necessary to perform a security 
requirements elicitation process. Knowing the assets helps to detect the ones that are more 
subject to vulnerabilities and sensitive to threats but also the ones that can be used as controls 
to mitigate those threats. Knowing the agents in the organization and their roles helps in 
identifying the potential threat agents (attackers). In addition to that, having the domain 
knowledge at hand helps while interviewing stakeholders and identifying their security goals. 
The other goal AMAN-DA wants to achieve is to be able to be used for different domains, 
and not to stick to only one single domain (one single domain ontology).  
To address this issue, this chapter tackles the research question: “How to represent the 
domain knowledge in a generic way to allow AMAN-DA to switch from one domain to 
another?”  
This chapter will present the formal representation of the domain knowledge.  It introduces 
and describes a multi-level domain ontology. The latter contains an upper level that covers 
high level concepts and relations that are shared with all domains. It also contains a lower 
level that contains the information specific to the application domain which can vary from a 
domain to another.   
Section 1 in this chapter describes the multi-level domain ontology. Sections 2 and 3 propose 
the representation of the online shopping and the maritime ontologies (domains).  
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1 DOMAIN ONTOLOGIES: FORMALLY REPRESENTING THE APPLICATION 
DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE  
To achieve more efficient supports for security requirements elicitation of higher quality, 
AMAN-DA method utilizes domain knowledge. In this research trend, one of the major issues 
is which artifact to model and how to represent domain knowledge for security requirements 
elicitation. The approach as discussed before uses a domain ontology as a representation of 
the domain knowledge. 
Ontology technologies are frequently applied to many problem domains nowadays (Grüninger 
and Lee, 2002). Since concepts, relationships and their categorizations in a real world can be 
represented with ontologies, they can be used as resources of domain knowledge.  
An ontology is considered (Maedche and Staab, 2001)  as a thesaurus of words and inference 
rules on it, where the words in the thesaurus represent concepts and the inference rules 
operate on the relationships on the words.  A domain ontology also defines the kinds of things 
that exist in an application domain; it is the principal conceptual and descriptive structure for 
capturing the elements that exist in a domain. It is generally comprised of domain concepts 
(or classes), coherently linked together in a logic structure that, when complete, forms a 
graph. The domain ontology should represent the application domain knowledge and business 
information required for building software applications in a specific domain. It also includes 
the semantic relationships established among their concepts from a real-world point of view 
(Castañeda et al., 2010). 
There are major benefits of applying ontology as a domain knowledge. Defining rich domain 
ontologies allow the reuse of knowledge in a domain. Domain ontologies have the advantage 
of being extensible, allowing the use of the basic concepts of the ontology and extending it 
according to the application domain where it is used. Finally, a very useful advantage lies in 
the fact that the explicit representation of the domain concepts in domain ontologies allows 
reasoning on the whole set of concepts.  
For all these reasons, in addition to the role of domain in security requirements engineering, 
the proposed method, AMAN-DA, relies on domain ontologies for security requirements 
engineering.  
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1.1. MULTI-LEVEL DOMAIN ONTOLOGY  
In the literature, we find a number of domain ontologies. As an illustration, we mention 
(Boyce et Pahl, 2007) who presented ontologies for the areas of databases and enzymology; 
(Mohan and Arumugam, 2005) which developed an ontology for the railways industry 
domain; and (Bjørner, 2007) which describes an ontology for the container line industry 
domain. The DAML Ontology Library proposes many domain ontologies in a wide variety of 
domains that researchers and developers in knowledge engineering communities, in particular 
the Semantic Web community, are constructing. Most of them are represented with 
standardized OWL based language so as to be exchanged by many people. 
To allow AMAN-DA to be independent of any pre-selected domain ontology – i.e. to allow 
the method to be applied to any domain, also to provide an extensible ontology well 
structured, easy to understand, to integrate and to extend, we developed a multi-level domain 
ontology. The "Multi-level Domain Ontology”, whose main concepts are represented in 
Figure 7.1, relies on previous studies on domain ontologies (Bjørner, 2010a), (Bjørner, 
2010b), (Kaiya and Saeki, 2006), (Borgol et al., 2009), (Bittner, Donnelly, and Smith, 2004), 
(Wang et al., 2004). The ontology was designed to be easily extensible by sub-ontologies, 
depending on the domain at hand and depending on the system it is applied to.  
The Multi-level domain ontology is represented as follows:  
 Upper-domain ontology (upper level):  The upper domain ontology represents a 
domain according to two main components: (a) concepts to which a domain refers 
(such as vessel, car, person, patient, etc.) and (b) relationships between those concepts 
(HasLength, HasLocation, etc.). All domains share common concepts represented by 
this upper view. Concepts can be perdurants or endurants. Endurant concepts are 
those entities that can be observed – perceived as a full, at no matter which given 
snapshot of time. Examples include agents and material objects (such as an apple). 
Perdurants are entities that unfold themselves over time in successive temporal parts 
or phases. Perdurants include behaviors (vessel voyage, visiting ports, etc.), events 
(e.g. new employee arrival) and actions (e.g. remove container from vessel, develop 
web page).  
Relationship between those concepts include: Is-A relationships 
(generalization/specialization, HasA (aggregation) (e.g. haveParents), SubClassOf 
(e.g. a registered customer is a SubClass of web customer), AssociatedTo (e.g. the 
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Figure 7.1. Multi-level domain ontology. 
class ‘Web developer’ is associated with the relationship PerformAction to the class 
‘Develop web application’).    
 Specific domain ontology (lower level): contains the specific information to the 
application domain. The details of basic domain information (concepts and relations) 
represented in the upper ontology are clearly defined at this lower level which is 
specific to a particular domain and can vary from a domain to another.  For example 
the concept ‘agent’ which is an endurant concept at the upper level can be specialized 
into ‘customer’ in a business domain ontology, the same concept can be ‘patient’ in a 
health domain ontology or a ’teacher’ in a education-school domain ontology.  
 
 
Based on the upper domain ontology, we distinguish key concepts and relations that AMAN-
DA method relies on:  
Organization: An organization is the structure that includes the different resources (human, 
hardware, and software). This concept provides all the organizations related to a domain of 
application. In a health domain ontology for example, we can find the ‘hospital’, and ‘the 
insurance company’ as two distinctive organizations of the domain, instances of the concept 
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‘Organization’.  
Object: The concept ‘object’ refers to the material resources of an organization in a particular 
domain of application. This domain information is used to specify the ‘assets’ field in security 
goals expressed by stakeholders. It can also used to specify the ‘asset’ field in the security 
requirements that are stored in the security ontology.  
Agent:  The agent is an important domain information.  An agent of the domain can be 
designated to be the person responsible for the security requirement. It can also be the threat 
agent who carries out an attack.  
Action: An action is “something an agent does” (Bjørner, 2010a) . This perdurant concept 
covers the different actions that are carried in an organization by its different agents in a 
particular domain of application.  
Two main relations associate the ‘agents’ with the ‘actions’: “PerformAction” and 
“RequireAction”, both of them are AssociatedTo relations. RequireAction defines the action 
required by an agent. For example, in maritime domain ontology, the agent ‘captain’ requires 
the action ‘maintain the ship engine’. PerformAction defines the agent responsible for 
performing a particular action. Following the example, the agent ‘the chief engineer’ performs 
the action ‘maintain the ship engine’.   
The relation ‘RelatedObject’ associates an ‘action’ to one or more ‘object’. This is to express 
that actions can be in relation with objects. For example, the action ‘calculate the student pass 
mark’ will be related to the object ‘student record’.   
This multi-level organization of domain ontologies, with an upper level that contains the 
main, generic and shared concepts of all domains, and a lower level containing a particular 
domain ontology, the defined concepts and relations, allow us to use the domain knowledge 
needed for the security requirements engineering process undertaken by our method.  
2 THE ONLINE SHOPPING EXAMPLE (DOMAIN ONTOLOGY) 
Figure 7.2. illustrates part of an online shopping domain ontology. This ontology encapsulates 
the knowledge related to online shopping.  In this ontology, one can see the organization 
(Online shopping company); its agents (web developer, web applications, web-customer, 
registered customer, new customer); the different actions, between these agents (e.g. register 
web-customer, show items, make purchase); and also the different objects related to these 
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Figure 7.2. Online shopping domain ontology. 
actions (e.g. customer name, customer password, items). Each concept in the lower level 
domain ontology is labeled in blue by its corresponding concept in the upper level domain 
ontology.   
 
 
This domain ontology will be used to illustrate the use of domain knowledge in the security 
requirements elicitation method (cf. Chapter 8). 
3  THE MARITIME DOMAIN ONTOLOGY  
Applying the same principle described in this chapter (multi-level domain ontology), a 
maritime domain ontology was developed. This domain ontology was the one used during the 
evaluation of AMAN-DA as will be reported in the chapter of the case study (Chapter 9) 
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The maritime domain ontology contains 85 concepts and 115 relations. Figure 7.3. in the next 
page gives an overview of part of the ontology. This maritime ontology presents the agents of 
the maritime domain (e.g. Captain, Chief engineer, Duty officer, Crew, etc.). It also presents 
some actions that these agents perform or require (e.g. manage loading/unloading of goods, 
maintain the ship engine, manage weather and data equipment, manage ship documents, etc.). 
The ontology presents many objects related to the actions such as (water flood sensor, 
abandon ship alarm, engine plans, ocean current map, etc.).   
4 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter we have proposed a formal presentation of the domain knowledge through the 
multi-level domain ontology, and explained its main concepts and relations. The next chapter 
will present how the different mechanisms, including the domain ontology, will be used by 
AMAN-DA method to assist the requirements engineer in the elicitation of domain specific 
security requirements.  
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Figure 7.3. Part of the maritime domain ontology 
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Chapter 8 
Ontology based domain security 
requirements elicitation 
 
AMAN-DA, the method proposed in this PhD thesis, is based on three main elements. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 presented these elements (core security ontology, security goals and 
requirements and the multi-level domain ontology). The question that remain open is:  “how 
to put “everything together” to perform domain specific security requirements elicitation and 
analysis?”  This chapter answers this question by proposing the necessary algorithms and 
rules to achieve that goal. This will be illustrated through the online shopping running 
example presented in chapter 4.    
 
1 DOMAIN SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY ALGORITHM  
Let us come back to the running example presented in chapter 4:  
Zach prepares specifications for different products. In these specifications, he usually focuses 
on functional requirements. His tacit knowledge about security and his primitive knowledge 
about the domain for which he elicits security requirements make his resulting security 
requirements poor and too generic. In addition, an interview of five minutes with stakeholders 
is not enough to know all the domain agents and objects that are present in the project. 
Sometimes, Zach copy/pastes the security requirements from other projects in an ad-hoc way, 
which is relatively time consuming and disorganized way of working.   
This time, Zach is asked to elicit security requirements for a web application of an online 
shopping company. The engineer wants to i) capture the stakeholders’ goals in a quick 
manner, ii) produce a well-formed Secure Tropos model, iii) generate the corresponding well–
formed textual security requirements and iv) throughout the elicitation process, he wants to 
get access to domain knowledge related to online shopping without having to refer to the 
stakeholder. 
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Figure 8.1. The domain specific knowledge discovery algorithm 
One of the security goals captured by Zach after interviewing the stakeholder is the necessity 
to maintain the confidentiality of users’ information.   
This goal is formalized as recommended in chapter 6 as:   
 “(Maintain) Verb (the confidentiality) Security criterion of (user’s information) Asset”.  
One of the security requirements (in the core security ontology) that materialize this goal is 
“The agent should lock the account after reaching the logon threshold”.  
One can notice that the “user’s information”, “the agent”, and “account” are generic 
information. We need a mechanism that makes the security related; generic knowledge 
expressed more domain specific.  
The procedure presented below computes the semantic relatedness between concepts of the 
security ontology, concepts of the captured goals, and concepts of the domain specific 
ontology (e.g. the online shopping ontology in chapter 7). The goal is to select the most 
appropriate concepts in the domain ontology to replace the generic ones that exist in the 
security ontology (security requirements) and the security goals. Note that this procedure was 
inspired and adapted from other works in the field of web semantics (Paolucci et al., 2002), 
(Toninelli, Corradi, and Montanari, 2008), (Najar et al., 2012).  
1. Function EquivalentDomainConcept (Concept Cgeneric, Type-Concept TC, Ontology DomainOnt) 
2. Cscore = 0;  
3. ConceptThresholdList= 0;  
4. For each Cdomain in DomainOnt do 
5.   If Type-Concept C generic = TC do 
6.      ConceptList += Cgeneric;  
7.      Cscore = Sim (Cgeneric, Cdomain) 
8.     If Cscore = 1 do 
9.         return ConceptList [Cgeneric];  
10.     end if  
11.     If CScore >= t  do 
12.        ConceptThresholdList. Add ( Cdomain);  
13.     end if  
14.   end if 
15. endfor 
16. If ConceptThresholdList <> 0  
17.   return Sort (ConceptThresholdList);   
18. else 
19.   return (ConceptList);  
20. endFunction;  
 
 
 147 
 
Figure 8.1. presents the domain specific knowledge discovery algorithm. It takes as an input a 
generic concept (Cgeneric), its type (TC) (e.g. agent, object, organization), and a domain 
ontology (DomainOnt). For all existing concepts (Cdomain) in the domain ontology, if the type 
of the concept (Cdomain) corresponds to the type of the concept (Cgeneric) in the input (Type-
Concept C generic = TC), the function Sim (Cgeneric, Cdomain) (line 7) calculates the degree of 
semantic similarity (Cscore) between the concept (Cgeneric) and (Cdomain). As mentioned before, 
Cgeneric corresponds to concepts in the security ontology or security goals. Cdomain corresponds 
to concepts in the domain ontology. 
The function Sim (Cgeneric, Cdomain) uses edit distance and other metrics based on words’ 
semantics in order to determine the degree of similarity of two concepts. As we are 
exclusively using the concepts’ names, we selected the Wu & Palmer (Wu et Palmer, 1994) 
metric that is based on WordNet’s structure. WordNet (Miller, 1995) is a structured English 
dictionary which provides specialization and composition relations between word senses. Wu 
and Palmer described a metric based on the depth of the words and their lowest common 
ancestor in the tree formed by composition relations. 
The function Sim (Cgeneric, Cdomain) returns a score between 0 and 1. In our case, if the Cscore   
equals 1 (line 8) that means there is a domain concept that corresponds exactly to the generic 
concept (Cgeneric) (e.g. usergeneric/userdomain). In this case, there is no need to replace it by the 
domain concept, and the algorithm returns the list ConceptList [usergeneric]. 
If Cscore is between 0 and 1 (0 <Cscore<1), we set a threshold (t), and the algorithm (lines 11, 
16, 17) returns a sorted list of domain concepts (ConceptThresholdList) whose similarity is 
greater than t.  
For example, table 8.1 displays the results of similarity relatedness between the generic 
concept (password) and the concepts of the domain ontology. If the threshold t=0.4, the 
algorithm will return the list [(1) web-customer password, (2) web-customer name].  
Table 8.1. Generic/ domain concepts similarity. 
Password 
 
Web-customer 
password 
Web-customer 
name 
Wishing 
item 
Sim (password, Cdomain) 0.75 0.41 0.26 
 
Finally, if no concept of the domain corresponds semantically to the input generic concept, 
then the algorithm will return a list of all domain concepts (line 19).  In other words, it tells 
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the user that no concept in the domain corresponds to what you are looking for, but this is the 
list of the domain concepts in case any of them interests you.  
2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ELICITATION RULES 
Given the security goal “Maintain the confidentiality of web-customer password”, the 
engineer (Zach) wishes to know what are the potential threats? The vulnerabilities? The 
attackers? The attack methods? The security requirements to mitigate the threats? Who are the 
actors related to this goal?  He also wants to produce a Secure Tropos model to have a better 
view and analysis of his assets, vulnerabilities and security requirements. To overcome these 
issues, we defined a set of mapping and production rules that build the bridge between the 
security ontology, the security goals, domain ontologies, and produce Secure Tropos (SecTro) 
models.   
Mapping rules are described under the form Concept source Concept target. A given concept in 
the source is mapped to another concept in the target, where source and target are either the 
security ontology, the domain ontology, the security goal or a SecTro concept.   
For example, the rule: “Agent Domain Ontology  Actor SecTro” means that the concept Agent in 
the domain ontology is mapped to the concept Actor in the SecTro model.   
The rule Security criterion security goal  Security Objective SecTro, means that the concept 
Security criterion in the security goal is mapped to the concept security objective in the 
SecTro model.  
Production rules are described under the form <S→C>, where S is a situation and C a 
conclusion. <S →C> means that if the situation S is meant, then the conclusion C can be 
drawn. The situation holds on input security goals, an input security ontology, and an input 
domain ontology. The situation is defined using a first order logic predicate that relies on two 
kinds of functions: 
- EquivalentDomainConcept (Concept Cgeneric, Type-Concept, Ontology DomainOnt): 
where Concept Cgeneric is a generic concept, Type-Concept is its type, DomainOnt is 
the domain ontology at hand. The function will return the concept(s) in the domain 
ontology that has(ve) the closest semantics to the concept Cgeneric in the security 
ontology or the security goal. (This function is has been detailed in Figure 8.1) 
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- OntologyLink (Type, X, Y): is true if in the input ontology there is a link from concept 
X to concept Y that has the type <Type>. For instance OntologyLink (IsAffectedBy, 
X, Y) is true if in the ontology, X and Y are related by an “affects” link from Y to X. 
 
Conclusions indicate elements that should be added to the output Secure Tropos model. There 
are two conclusions-functions: 
- CreateConcept (ClassC, X): indicates that a concept X that instantiates the <ClassC> 
class should be created in the model. 
- CreateLink(LinkTypeL, X, Y): indicates that a link from X to Y, of type 
<LinkTypeL>, should be created in the model. 
 
Using the inputs: the domain ontology (online shopping) presented in chapter 7, the core 
security ontology presented in chapter 5 and the security goal (maintain confidentiality of 
user’s information) presented below, the rules will produce a (possible) security requirements 
specification model. The following gives a detailed application of the rules to the running 
example.  
2.1. GOAL AND ASSETS ANALYZES 
The security requirements analysis process starts by analyzing the context: the organization, 
its agents, its assets and different goals. In Secure Tropos, this is done thanks to the concepts 
organization, actors, goals, and resource.  
A. Organization identification 
The concept organization in the security ontology is mapped to the concept organization in 
Secure Tropos (SecTro) model, and the concept organization in the domain ontology. 
Applying the EquivalentDomainConcept function will return the organizations that are in the 
online shopping domain ontology (here: “online shopping company”). The function 
CreateConcept will create in the SecTro specification the concept “Online shopping 
company”.  Table 8.2 summarizes the mapping and production rules (columns 1 and 2). The 
last column illustrates one possible part of the resulting SecTro model. In this case, it 
illustrates the creation of the organization (online shopping company) concept in SecTro 
model.   
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Table 8.2.  Organization identification 
Mapping Production Model (a possible part) 
 
 
Organization security ontology  
Organization domain ontology  
 
Organization domain ontology 
Organization SecTro 
 
 
EquivalentDomainConcept (Input: organization x, 
online shopping domain ontology) (Output: 
Online shopping company)  
 
CreateConcept (Organization, Online Shopping 
Company) 
 
 
 
B. Actors and goals identification 
Once the organization is identified, the SecTro’s organizational view is enriched. This view 
contains actors and goals dependencies between them.   
The asset (user’s information) identified in the security goal is mapped to the object (web-
customer password) in the domain ontology. Thanks to the OntologyLink (RelatedObject) in 
the domain ontology, the action (Register web customer) is identified. This action is mapped 
to a goal in the SecTro model. The function CreateConcept will create the goal “Register web 
customer”.  An agent in the domain ontology is mapped to an actor in the SecTro model. 
Thanks to the OntologyLink (RequireAction) and (PerformAction), the actors (web-
application) and (web-customer) are identified. The function CreateConcept will create the 
two actors (web-application) and (web-customer). The function CreateLink will create 
dependency relations between the identified actors and the identified goal. Table 8.3 
summarizes the mapping and production rules (columns 1 and 2) for actor and goals 
identification. The last column illustrates one possible part of the resulting SecTro model. In 
this case, it illustrates the creation of the actors (web-customer, web-application) and the goal 
(register web customer).  
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Table 8.3. Actors and goal identification 
C. Security goals identification  
The security goal (Keep confidentiality of web-customer password) is mapped to an 
organizational goal in SecTro model. According to Secure Tropos’s concrete syntax, both 
organizational goals and security goals are expressed by the concept goal because both of 
them (security goals as well as organizational goals) can derive security requirements.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a security goal from an organizational goal by adding 
an (S), and that what was adopted.   
The security criterion expressed in the security goal (confidentiality) is mapped to a security 
objective. The function CreateConcept will create the concepts goal (Keep confidentiality of 
web-customer password), the security objective (confidentiality), and the resource (Web 
customer password). The function CreateLink will relate the goal (Keep confidentiality of 
web-customer password) to the organizational goal (Register web customer) using the relation 
MeansEnd. 
Table 8.4 summarizes the mapping and production rules (columns 1 and 2) for actor and goals 
identification. The last column illustrates one possible part of the resulting SecTro model.  In 
this case, it illustrates the creation of the security goal ((S) keep confidentiality of web-
customer password), the organizational goal (Register web-customer), the security objective 
(Confientiality), the resource (Web customer password), as well as the necessary relations in 
the model. 
Mapping Production Model (a possible part) 
 
Asset security goal  
Object domain ontology 
 
Object domain ontology 
 Resource SecTro 
 
Action domain 
ontology Gaol SecTro 
 
Agent domain ontology 
 Actor SecTro 
 
EquivalentDomainConcept  
(Input: user’s information, Asset, online shopping 
domain ontology) (Output: Web-customer password)  
 
OntologyLink (RelatedObject, Web-customer-password, 
Register web-customer) 
 
CreateConcept (Goal, Register web-customer).  
 
OntologyLink (PerformAction, Register web-customer, 
Web-application) and  
 
OntologyLink (RequireAction, Register web-customer, 
Web-Customer). 
 
CreateConcept (Actor, Web-application) 
CreateConcept (Actor, Web customer) 
 
CreateLink (Dependency, Web-application, Register web-
customer) and 
CreateLink (Dependency, Web-application, Register web-
customer) 
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Table 8.4. Security goal identification. 
Mapping Production Model (a possible part)  
 
 
[Verb][Security 
criterion][Asset] 
Security goal  Goal 
SecTro  
 
Asset Security goal   
Ressource SecTro 
 
Security criterion 
Security goal   
Security objective 
SecTro 
 
 
 
 
OntologyLink (PerformAction, Register web-customer, 
Web-application) 
 
CreateConcept (Enhanced actor model, Enhanced Web-
application model) 
 
CreateConcept (Goal, Register web-customer).  
CreateConcept (Goal, (S) Keep confidentiality of web-
customer password).  
CreateLink (MeansEnd, Register web-customer, 
(S)Keep confidentiality of web-customer password) 
 
CreateConcept (Resource, Web-customer password).  
CreateLink (Decomposition, (S)Keep confidentiality of 
web-customer password, web-customer password);  
 
CreateConcept (Security objective, Confidentiality) 
 
  
 
2.2. THREAT ANALYSIS  
The second step is to identify the potential threats, attackers, and attack methods, 
vulnerabilities. Here too, the security ontology and the domain ontology (using the rules) will 
guide the analysis and identification.  
The concept threat in the security ontology is mapped to the concept threat in the SecTro 
model. The concept threat agent in the security ontology is mapped to the concept malicious 
agent in the SecTro model. Similarly, the concept agent in the domain ontology is mapped to 
the concept malicious agent. This is because we consider any agent in the domain as a 
potential attacker.  
The concept attack method in the security ontology is mapped to the concept attack method in 
SecTro model. The concept vulnerability in the security ontology is mapped to the concept 
vulnerability in SecTro model.   
The function OntologyLink identifies an “Affect” relation in the security ontology between the 
threat (authentication attack) and the security criterion (confidentiality). The function 
CreateConcept creates the threat (authentication attack) in the SecTro model. The function 
CreateLink creates the link Impacts that relates the threat (authentication attack) to the goal 
(Register web-customer).  
With the same way, the concepts malicious actor (Hacker), attack method (Dictionary attack), 
and vulnerability (no strong password) are created and related with each other and with the 
rest of the concepts through the appropriate relations. 
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Table 8.5 summarizes the mapping and production rules (columns 1 and 2) for threat analysis. 
The last column illustrates one possible part of the resulting SecTro model.  In this case, it 
illustrates the creation of the threat (authentification attack), the malicious actor (Hacker), the 
attack method (dictionary attack) as well as the necessary relations (attacks) and (affect) in the 
model.  
Table 8.5. Threat analysis 
Mapping Production Model (a possible part) 
 
Security criterion 
security goal  
Security criterion 
Security ontology 
 
Threat Security ontology 
 Threat SecTro 
 
Threat agent Security 
ontology  Malicious 
Actor SecTro 
 
Agent domain ontology 
 Malicious Actor 
SecTro 
 
Attack method 
security ontology  
Attack method 
SecTro 
 
Vulnerability security 
ontology  
Vulnerability SecTro 
  
OntologyLink (Affect, authentication Attack, 
Confidentiality) 
 
CreateConcept (Threat, authentication 
attack) 
 
CreateLink (Impacts, authentication attack, 
Register web customer) 
CreateLink (Impacts, authentication attack, 
web-customer password) 
 
 
OntologyLink (LedBy, authentication attack, 
hacker). 
 
CreateConcept (Malicious Actor, hacker) 
OR  
CreateConcept (Malicious Actor, Agent) 
/*in case an agent from the domain ontology 
is chosen*/ 
 
OntologyLink (UseMethod, authentification 
attack, dictionary attack). 
CreateConcept (Attack method, dictionary 
attack) 
CreateLink (Embedded, authentication 
attack, dictionary attack) 
 
OntologyLink (Exploits, authentication 
attack, no strong password) 
CreateConcept (Vulnerabity , no strong 
password) 
CreateLink(Attacks, dictionary attack, no 
strong password) 
CreateLink (Affects, no strong password, 
Register web customer) 
 
CreateLink (Affects, no strong password, (S) 
Keep confidentiality of web-customer 
password) 
 
 
 
2.3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS   
The final step is concerned about analyzing the appropriate security requirements that 
mitigate the identified threats in the previous step.   
Applying the function OntologyLink on the relation MitigatedBy the security ontology will 
allow the identification of the two security requirements:  
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Req1. “(The agent)agent should (lock)Action (accounts)Asset (after reaching logon failure 
threshold) under which condition”.  
Req2.  (The agent)agent should (validate)Action (password)Asset (minimum length and 
complexity) additional information”.  
The function EquivalentDomainConcept will help to make these two requirements more 
domain-specific by replacing the asset (accounts) by (web-customer accounts), and the asset 
(password) by (customer password). That is why the mapping rule maps the concept asset to 
object in the domain ontology.  Therefore, the new security requirements are:   
Req1. “(The agent) agent should (lock) Action (web customer accounts) Asset (after reaching logon 
failure threshold) under which condition”.  
Req2.  (The agent) agent should (validate) Action (web customer password) Asset (minimum length 
and complexity) additional information”.  
To model these two security requirements in the SecTro model, another mapping rule maps 
the part of the requirement ([Action][Asset] <Additional information>) to the concept security 
constraint in the SecTro model.  
In this example, the function CreateClass will creates two constraints:  “Lock web-customer 
accounts after reaching logon failure threshold” and “Validate web-customer password 
minimum length and complexity”. The function CreateLink will relate these two created 
constraints to the security goal ((S) Keep confidentiality of web-customer password) through 
the relation restricts. It relates the security constraint (confidentiality) to the created security 
goals through a satisfies relation.  
Applying the function OntologyLink on the relation Fulfil, the security ontology will allow 
identification of controls (security mechanisms in SecTro). Hence, the security mechanisms 
(browser alert, validation error message, and password encryption) are created and linked to 
the security constraint (validate password minimum length and complexity).  
Table 8.6 summarizes the mapping and production rules (columns 1 and 2) for security 
requirements analysis. The last column illustrates one possible part of the resulting SecTro 
model. 
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Table 8.6. Security requirements analysis 
Mapping Production Model (a possible part) 
 
Security Requirements 
Security ontology = <When, 
under which conditions>  
[The agent][should/shall/ 
will] [Action][Asset Security 
ontology]  <Additional 
information>. 
 
Asset Security ontology  
Object Domain ontology 
 
 
[Action][Object Domain 
ontology <Additional 
information>. 
 Constraint Sectro  
 
Control security ontology 
Security mechanism 
SecTro 
 
 
 
 
OntlogyLink (MitigatedBy, authentication attack, The 
agent should lock accounts after reaching logon failure 
threshold) 
OntlogyLink (MitigatedBy, authentication attack, The 
agent should validate password minimum length and 
complexity) 
 
EquivalentDomainConcept  
(Input: accounts, Asset, online shopping domain 
ontology) (Output: web-customer accounts)  
 
EquivalentDomainConcept  
(Input: password, Asset, online shopping domain 
ontology) (Output: web-customer password)  
 
 
CreateClass (Security constraint, lock web-customer 
accounts after reaching logon failure threshold).  
CreateLink (Restricts, Lock web-customer accounts 
after reaching logon failure threshold,(S)Keep 
confidentiality of web-customer password) 
 
CreateClass (Security constraint, validate web customer 
password).  
CreateLink (Restricts, Validate web customer password, 
(S)Keep confidentiality of web-customer password) 
 
OntlogyLink (Fulfils, Password encryption, The agent 
should validate password minimum length and 
complexity) 
 
CreateClass (Security mechanism, Password 
encryption).  
CreateLink (Implements, Password encryption, validate 
web customer password).  
 
CreateClass (Security mechanism, validation error 
message).  
CreateLink (Implements, validation error message, 
validate web customer password). 
 
CreateClass (Security mechanism, browser alert).  
CreateLink (Implements, security mechanism, validate 
web customer password). 
 
CreateClass (Security mechanism, account closure 
procedure).  
CreateLink (Implements, account closure procedure, 
lock customer accounts). 
 
CreateLink (Satisfies, Confidentiality, validate web 
customer password). 
CreateLink (Implements, Confidentiality, lock customer 
accounts). 
 
 
 
The mapping rules and the production rules can be applied iteratively until all the possible 
artifacts chosen by the requirement engineer have been added into the requirements model 
specification. The requirements identification process can be considered as complete when no 
new security goal can be added in the specification. The security requirements specification 
model can be considered complete when no new security threat or asset can be added. 
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Figure 8.2. Part of the security requirements specification document. 
3 PRODUCING TEXTUAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (SPECIFICATION 
DOCUMENT) 
Once his model has been constructed and his analysis finished, Zach would like to derive 
textual security requirements and organize them into a specification document.  
We propose to organize the information captured during the whole analysis process as 
follows. For each security criterion, the related identified assets are elicited, followed by the 
identified security requirements enumerated one by one.  
For each security requirements, the two rules are applied:    
 Actor Sectro Agent security requirement   
 
By default, the actor for whom the identified constaints are substituted will replace the agent 
in each security requirement. In our example, the actor (Web application) will be the agent of 
the security requirements (Req1 and Req2).  
 Agent Domain ontology Agent security requirement 
Moreover, it is also possible to delegate the requirement to any other agent in the domain 
ontology (for e.g. web developer).   
 Confidentiality:   
Assets: Web customer password.   
Req1. The web application should lock web-customer accounts after reaching logon failure threshold. 
Req2. The web application should validate web-customer password minimum length and complexity. 
   
  
4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has presented an important part of AMAN-DA. It has addressed the question of 
how to put together an input security ontology, a domain ontology and given security goals. 
The algorithm and the different rules presented make it possible to perform the ontology 
based domain security requirements engineering process. The implementability as well as the 
efficiency and ease of use of the proposed rules remains open for the moment. The chapters to 
follow will evaluate AMAN-DA. Appendix D proposes an implementation into a tool. 
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                              Part 3 
Evaluation   
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Figure 9.1. Case study process adapted from (Runeson et al. 2012) 
Chapter 9  
Case study:  
Security requirements for the maritime 
domain (and other domains)  
 
Case studies are a good empirical technique to evaluate methods in real situations. By 
definition, a case study “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” 
(Lethbridge, 2001). (Robson, 2011) consider case studies as “a strategy for doing research 
that involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its 
context using multiple sources of evidence.”   
The first part of this chapter reports the application of AMAN-DA in a real case study that 
was undertaken to address the question “Is it possible to elicit domain specific security 
requirements using AMAN-DA?”  The case study demonstrates the capability of AMAN-DA 
to handle security requirements engineering in a specific domain of application – here, the 
maritime domain. The second part of the chapter addresses the question: Can AMAN-DA be 
applied to any domain? It examines the application of AMAN-DA with two other domains 
and generalizes the results to different domains.  
1 CASE STUDY RESEARCH PROCESS AND GUIDELINES  
The research process proposed by (Runeson et al., 2012) was used and adapted for conducting 
the case study. It is based on five major steps as described in Figure 9.1.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Case study design – Objectives are defined and the 
case study is planned.  
2. Preparation for the data collection – procedures and 
protocols for the data collection are defined.  
3. Collecting evidence – data collection procedures are 
executed on the case studied.  
4. Analysis of collected data – data analysis procedures 
are applied to the data. 
5. Reporting – the study and its conclusions are 
packaged in feasible formats for reporting. 
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Figure 9.2.  Elements of the research design adapted from (Runeson et al. 2012) 
The case study process is a flexible design strategy; there is a significant amount of iteration 
over the steps. The data collection and analysis may be conducted incrementally. If 
insufficient data are collected for the analysis, more data collection may be planned. 
However, there is a limit to the flexibility; the case study should have specific objectives set 
out from the beginning. If the objectives change, it is a new case study rather than the existing 
one. During the collecting evidence step, data collection procedures are applied to the data. 
Once the data is analyzed, the study and its conclusions are packaged in a feasible format for 
reporting.  
In addition to this process, (Runeson et al., 2012) report that researchers have recognized a 
range of elements that need to be considered in the design of a case study (Figure 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These elements in addition to the research process were considered during the elaboration of 
the maritime case study as detailed in the next sections. 
2 MARITIME CASE STUDY  
2.1. CASE STUDY DESIGN  
A. Rationale:  Why was the study done?  
The study was undertaken at the stage of the research project, after the AMAN-DA method 
was proposed.  The research group (PhD student and supervisors) was interested to see how 
AMAN-DA would apply in a real context and with a particular domain of application.  
1. Rationale. Why is the study being done? 
2. Purpose. What is expected to be achieved with the study? 
3. The case. Overall, what is being studied? 
4. Units of analysis. In more detail, what is being studied? 
5. Theory. What is the theoretical frame of reference? 
6. Research questions. What knowledge will be sought or expected to be discovered? 
7. Propositions. What particular (causal) relationships are to be investigated? 
8. Define concepts and measures. How are entities and attributes being defined and measured? 
9. Methods of data collection. How will data be collected? 
10. Methods of data analysis. How will data be analyzed? 
11. Case selection strategy. How will cases (and units of analysis) be identified and selected? 
12. Data selection strategy. How will data be identified and selected. For example, who will be 
interviewed? 
13. Replication strategy. Is the study intended to literally replicate a previous study, or 
theoretically replicate a previous study, or is there no intention to replicate? 
14. Quality assurance, validity and reliability. How will the data collected be checked for quality? 
How will the analysis be checked for quality? 
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B. Purpose: What is expected to be achieved with the study?   
After having applied AMAN-DA on small-scale examples (e.g. the online shopping running 
example reported earlier), the team was interested in using AMAN-DA for a large-scale case 
study. A domain expert was interviewed and then involved in the validation of the results 
obtained from AMAN-DA. We decided to focus on the use of AMAN-DA to capture 
stakeholder’s security goals in a maritime context and elicit security requirements specific to 
the maritime domain as part of the modeling of the information system of a bulk carrier13 
independently of the other information systems of maritime transport. 
C. Case and Units of Analysis: What is being studied?  
The study is part of the elaboration of the ship’s information system, and focuses on the 
(security) requirements elicitation phase.  The considered unit of analysis is a ship (a bulk 
carrier) that belongs to a maritime company, which manages other ships too. The ship’s 
information system may interact with other systems such as the port facility information 
system or the company information system.  Figure 9.3 presents the distinction between the 
context, the case and the unit of analysis within our case as recommended by Yin (Yin, 2014). 
 
Figure 9.3. Overview of the context, case and unit of analysis according to (Yin 2014) 
 
As main information14, a ship is composed of two departments (Figure 9.4.):  
- The deck department.  
- The ship’s engine department. 
                                                          
13 A ship that carries non-liquid cargoes such as grain or ore in bulk, according to Oxford Dictionary. 
14 As the reader may notice, during the reported case study (for confidentiality and ethical considerations), the 
name of the company, the name of the captain, the various agents and any sensitive information are omitted for 
confidentiality’s sake. 
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The deck department is managed by the captain, the second officer and their subordinates. Its 
main functions involve administrative tasks such as scheduling work, quality control, 
coordinating with other departments, and conflict resolution. 
The ship’s engine department is managed by the chief engineer, the second engineer and their 
subordinates. The engine department is responsible for all maintenance and operation of the 
electrical and mechanical equipment. Besides the engines in the engine room, the engine 
department crew is responsible for all of the sewage, air conditioning, lighting, and water on 
the ship15. In addition to those main departments, crew’s cabins, offices, galley, and some 
stores are handled by the steward, the cook, the baker, the waiter and their subordinates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Theoretical Frame of Reference: What is the theoretical frame of reference? 
AMAN-DA is the theoretical framework of reference for this study. AMAN-DA looks into 
eliciting security requirements for specific domains. It relies on an input security ontology and 
in this case an input maritime domain ontology in addition to stakeholder’s security goals.  
 Stakeholder’s security goals  
AMAN-DA suggests formalizing stakeholder’s security goals according to the security goal 
template model depicted in Chapter 6.  
 Maritime domain ontology 
The maritime domain ontology is the second input of AMAN-DA. The ontology has been 
constructed from many maritime sources in addition to interviews with experts from the 
maritime domain. It contains 85 concepts and 115 relationships. This ontology was shown in 
(Chapter 7- Figure 7.4).   
                                                          
15 http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-engine-department-on-a-us-merchant-ship.htm 
Engine 
department 
Deck department 
Figure 9.4. Ship departmental composition 
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 Core security ontology  
The core security ontology presented in details chapter 5 was the third input of AMAN-DA 
within this case study. It has the necessary security-related knowledge for the security 
requirements process.  
E. Research Questions and hypothesis: What knowledge will be sought or expected to be 
discovered? 
As the goal of the case study is to evaluate the feasibility of AMAN-DA.  The main research 
question we investigated during this case study was:  
“Is it possible to elicit maritime specific domain security requirements using AMAN-DA?” 
The null hypothesis (H0) that was tested is:  
“H0: AMAN-DA is not capable of producing maritime domain specific security 
requirements”      
2.2. PLANNING  
A. Methods of Data Collection 
The main source of information for this case study were gathered after long hours interviews 
with the captain. The interviews took 3 consecutive days (~ 15 hours) the first time to capture 
as much information as possible. Then there was a meeting by Skype once every two weeks 
for two months to review some points and clarify some ambiguities. 
The interviews were performed as semi-structured interviews, more in the form of a 
discussion, using the interview instrument (a set of pre-prepared questions) as a guide of areas 
available to discuss. Some of the interviews were direct, while others were performed via 
Skype when the captain and our team were unable to meet up.   
The interview instrument was created in advance and adapted slightly as the interviews 
progressed. Adaptations were primarily made with the purpose of gaining further information 
about security issues as they are seen on the ship. The interview instrument is presented in 
Appendix C. 
The interviews concentrated mainly on understanding the structure of a ship, its departments, 
its employees (crews), and the different interactions between those parts, while seeking to 
identify some useful documents recommended by the captain that deal with security in the 
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maritime domain, as well as the main security goals of a ship as an organization during its 
travels as well as during its docking.  
The captain suggested a couple of documents that were also consulted: (IMO, 1974) (IMO 
2011) (Chebli, 2009).   
Notes were taken during the interview, and sound recorded for later transcription. The 
interviews were thus stored and analyzed later.  
B. Case and Data selection strategy  
We had from the beginning, a strategic goal to look for a domain where security is a critical 
issue. It seems like the same cases are repeated over and over again in the literature. Most of 
those dealing with security were often related to the banking sector (Salinesi, Ivankina, and 
Angole, 2008) or health insurance sector (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007). The choice of a 
different case was intended to increase evidence, strengthen findings, and avoid biasing. 
2.3. DATA ANALYSIS  
Figure 9.5 presents an overview of the analysis process. After the interviews with the ship 
captain were recorded and notes were taken, the data that had been gathered was transcribed 
and categorized. We then applied AMAN-DA on the identified security goals. The results of 
the application (the different models and specifications generated) were discussed with 
experts. The next sections discuss in detail these steps:  
 
Figure 9.5. Overview of the analysis process. 
Recording, transcribing and data categorization   
Each hour of the interview took about two hours to be transcribed. The information gathered 
from the interview was mixed and concerns different aspects of the maritime organization on 
the ship, as well as relating to different levels of abstraction.  Despite being semi-structured 
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and with pre-prepared questions, the interview with the ship captain tended from time to time 
to go out of the scope of the study. In order to keep focus, the transcribed data was 
categorized into three categories:  
 Information not useful to the case study; 
 General information useful to the case study;   
 Security goals.   
Some information was found to be useless to the case study and to the requirements elicitation 
phase.  Other data were general information useful for our own understanding of the ship 
organization only. The last category was clear security goals expressed by the ship’s captain. 
Only these were formalized using the AMAN-DA security goal linguistic template and were 
part of the input of the method.  AMAN-DA was then applied on the security goals captured. 
The outputs of the application were the different potential threats, vulnerabilities, security 
requirements that are likely to be present in the domain. The different SecTro models were 
generated as well as the final specifications. 
Table 9.1 presents part of the data categorization step. The transcribed data was stored in a 
table with the three categories identified to ensure full traceability.  
Table 9.1. Example table part corresponding to the interview with the ship’s captain. 
Category Some parts of the interview 
Information not 
useful to the case 
study  
 “I worked for passenger ships then moved to bulk carriers, it is much 
easier to work with products than people!”  
 
General useful 
information 
“A ship is composed of the deck department and the engine department. 
The deck department is managed by the captain, the second officer and 
their subordinates. The ship’s engine department is managed by the chief 
engineer, the second engineer and their subordinates.”  
 
Security goals  
“When communicating with other ships, the captain need to be sure of the 
identity of his interlocutors, especially in areas of sensitive navigation” 
 
“During navigation, the captain would like to maintain the meteorological 
data, the nautical charts, the ocean current maps, and the logbooks 
available” 
 
The next two sections present the application of AMAN-DA on some captured security goals.   
A. Application of AMAN-DA  
A.1. Inputs of AMAN-DA for the case study 
7 security goals (SGi) were captured during the initial interview. These goals are formalized 
according to the security goal template model of AMAN-DA.    
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1.  (SG1) The chief engineer is asked to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the 
ship’s engine plans.  
2. (SG2) The captain would like to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the 
documents that he manages (ship’s certificates, ship’s plans, and communication 
certificates). These documents can be consulted by the SSO (Ship Security Officer).   
3.  (SG3) Due to previous incidents, the captain would like to maintain the availability of 
the communication equipments on board such as the VHF radio, the talkie walkies.  
4. During navigation, (SG4) the captain would like to maintain the availability of the 
meteorological data, the nautical charts, the ocean current maps, and the logbooks. 
5. (SG4) The company would like to keep the evaluations of the ship’s crews 
confidential; these evaluations allow for recruitment of a crew for other missions.  
6. (SG5) During loading/unloading of goods, the captain would like to preserve the 
integrity of the bill of lading document, the stability booklet and the stowage plan. 
(SG6) He would also like to make them available for the department members.  
7. (SG7) The system should ensure the non-repudiation of communication between the 
ship and the other ships navigating in the same area.  
 
A2. Outputs of AMAN-DA for the case study 
Through the use of AMAN-DA, the security requirements (Reqi) that materialize the input 
security goals (SGi) are defined. This is done after analyzing the valuable ship assets to 
protect, and the potential risk analysis (threats (Ti), vulnerabilities (Vi)).  The corresponding 
Secure Tropos models are generated as well as the final specification.  
 Analysis  
Tables (9.2 to 9.5) present a potential analysis scenario of security goals (SG1-4). With the 
four security goals as an input, the analysis through the use of AMAN-DA discovers 8 
potential threats, 17 potential vulnerabilities, and 28 potential security requirements. Same 
analysis can be applied to SG5 and SG6.   
Table 9.2.  Analysis for SG1 
Organization Maritime organization.  
Security Goal (SG1) (Maintain) verb the (confidentiality) Security criterion of the (engine plans) asset 
Organizational goal Maintain ship engine 
Actors Captain 
Chief engineer   
 
Potential threats 
 (selected) 
(engine plans)  
T1. Unauthorized physical access.  
Potential 
vulnerabilities 
(selected) 
T1. 
V1. No key management. 
V2. No surveillance cameras. 
V3. No alarm system.  
V4. Open windows.  
 166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential security 
requirements 
(selected) 
V1. 
Req1. The chief engineer should set proper termination procedures. 
Req2. The chief engineer should sign and account engine room keys, bridge 
keys, captain cabin keys and crew keys.  
V2. 
Req 3. The chief engineer should provide an adequate maritime surveillance 
system. 
V3. 
Req4. The chief engineer should equip the structures with ship security alarm 
system, machinery space alarm. 
V4. 
Req5. After working hours, the chief engineer should lock engine room 
windows. 
Table 9.3. Analysis for SG2 
Organization Maritime organization.  
Security Goal (SG2) (Maintain) verb the (integrity) Security criterion of the (ship certificates) asset 
Organizational goal Manage ship’s documents 
Actors Company director 
Captain   
 
Potential threats 
 (selected) 
(ship certificates)  
T1. Fire.  
T2. Uncontrolled flow of water 
Potential 
vulnerabilities 
(selected) 
T1. T2. 
V1. No testing of fire extinguisher 
V2. Open fire doors. 
V3. No fire suppression  
V4. No regular testing of pipes 
V5. No water detector  
 
 
Potential security 
requirements 
(selected) 
V1. 
Req1. The ship security officer should test FlexiFog fire extinguishers, 
FlexiFoam fire extinguishers, and gaseous based fire extinguishers. 
V2. 
Req 2. After working hours, the ship security officer should lock bridge, engine 
and galley rooms’ doors.  
V3. 
Req3. The ship security officer should provide an automated and tested 
maritime fire suppression system.  
Req4. The ship security officer should make available the fire extinguishers 
(FlexiFog, FlexiFoam, and gaseous fire extinguishers). 
V4. 
Req5. The ship security officer should test the ship pipes. 
V5. 
Req6. The ship security officer should provide an automated and tested water 
flood sensor to the relevant areas.  
 
 167 
 
Table 9.4. Analysis for SG3 
Organization Maritime organization.  
Security Goal (SG3) (Maintain) verb the (availability) Security criterion of the (communication equipments: 
VHF radio, talkie walkies) asset 
Organizational goal Watch keeping the ship 
Actors Captain 
Duty officer   
 
Potential threats 
 (selected) 
(Communication equipments)   
T1. Theft  
Potential 
vulnerabilities 
(selected) 
T1. 
V1. No use of locks 
V2. No regularly reviewed resource inventory.  
 
Potential security 
requirements 
(selected) 
V1. 
Req1. The duty officer should use adequately fixed marine padlocks.   
V2. 
Req 2. Regularly, the duty officer should make and update the bridge inventory, 
bridge documentation inventory, the navigation equipment inventory, ship radio 
station equipment inventory, replacement part inventory, paint inventory, 
cleaning equipment inventory.      
 
Table 9.5. Analysis of SG4 
Organization Maritime organization.  
Security Goal (SG4) (Maintain) verb the (availability) Security criterion of the (meteorological data, ocean 
current maps) asset 
Organizational goal Manage weather data and equipment.  
Actors Captain 
Weather officer  
 
Potential threats 
 (selected) 
(meteorological data)    
T1. Configuration error.  
T2. Untrained personnel.  
T3. Failure of systems.  
T4. Network attack.  
Potential 
vulnerabilities 
(selected) 
T1. T2. T3. T4. 
V1. No change of 
preset password.  
 
V2. Insecure 
installation and 
configuration of 
password.  
V3. Lack of 
training.  
 
V4. No backups. 
V5. Insufficient 
maintenance.    
 
V6. No secure 
internet connexion.  
 
 
Potential security 
requirements 
V1. 
Req1. The weather officer should control the allocation of officers’ passwords 
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(selected) through a formal management process.    
V2. 
Req2.The weather officer should ensure appropriate installation and 
configuration of ship manager software.  
V3. 
Req3. The captain should ensure good training of the ship officers.  
Req4.  The captain should define clear roles and responsibilities of ship 
officers. 
V4. 
Req5. The weather officer should perform backups of old configurations. 
Req6. The weather officer should provide appropriate application data backup 
procedures.  
V5. 
Req7. The weather officer should ensure the maintenance of applications.  
Req8. The weather officer should ensure the existence of maintenance contracts 
for bridge applications.    
V6. 
Req9. The weather officer should update and review maritime specific 
mechanisms to secure communication.  
 
 Secure Tropos model generated 
The following figures represent the Secure Tropos models generated after applying AMAN-
DA to the previous security goals (SG1-4). Figures 9.6 to 9.11 represent the Secure Tropos 
models generated by the use of AMAN-DA. These models correspond to the analysis made in 
the previous tables.   
 
Figure 9.6 represents part of the organizational view generated. It contains the main actors 
and the goal dependencies between them as well as the name of the organization.   
Figure 9.6. Part of the organizational view 
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Figure 9.7. Part of the Security requirements view (SG1) 
Figure 9.7 represents part of the security requirements view that corresponds to the security 
goal (SG1). This view includes the main security requirements to consider (security 
constraints in Secure Tropos).  
 
Figure 9.8 represents the Secure Tropos attack view; it displays the threat (unauthorized 
physical access), the attack method (social engineering) and vulnerabilities exploited (V1 to 
V4). 
 
 
 
 170 
 
Figure 9.9. Part of the security requirements view (SG2) 
 
 
Figures 9.9, 9.10, and 9.11 represent the security requirements views generated according to 
security goals (SG2, 3 and 4).  The generated XML file that represents these models can be 
consulted in Appendix E.    
Figure 9.8.  Part of the attack view (SG1) 
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Figure 9.11.  Part of security requirements view (SG4) 
Figure 9.10.  Part of the security requirements view (SG3) 
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 Generated Specification 
The other output of AMAN-DA is the textual specification. Figure 9.12 represents part of the 
specification generated; it contains the name of the organization, the different assets to 
protect, the potential threats, the potential vulnerabilities and the security requirements to 
consider.    
Organization:  Maritime organization 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Asset: engine plans 
 
Security Criterion: Confidentiality 
 
Threat: Unauthorized physical access. 
 
Vulnerabilities: 
 
-> No key management 
 Security Requirements:  
 (Req1.) The chief engineer should set proper termination 
procedures. 
     (Req2.) The chief engineer should sign and account engine 
room keys, bridge keys, captain cabin keys and crew keys. 
 
-> No surveillance cameras 
      Security Requirements: 
     (Req3.) The chief engineer should provide an adequate 
maritime surveillance system. 
 
-> No alarm system 
      Security Requirements: 
     (Req4.) The Chief engineer should equip the structures with 
ship security alarm system, machinery space alarm. 
 
****************************************************************** 
 
Asset: ship certificates 
 
Security Criterion: integrity  
 
Threat: Fire 
 
Vulnerabilities: 
 
-> No testing of fire extinguisher 
   Security Requirements: 
   (Req1.) The ship security officer should test FlexiFog fire 
extinguishers, FlexiFoam fire extinguishers, and gaseous based 
fire extinguishers. 
 
-> Open fire doors  
   Security Requirements: 
  (Req2.)After working hours, the ship security officer should 
lock bridge, engine and galley rooms’ doors. 
 
->No fire suppression  
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   Security Requirements:  
   (Req3.) The ship security officer should provide an automated 
and tested maritime fire suppression system.  
  (Req4.) The ship security officer should make available the fire 
extinguishers (FlexiFog, FlexiFoam, and gaseous fire 
extinguishers) 
-> No regular testing of pipes 
   Security Requirements:  
  (Req5.) The ship security officer should test the ship pipes. 
 
-> No water detector 
   Security Requirements: 
   (Req6.) The ship security officer should provide an automated 
and tested water flood sensor to the relevant areas. 
 
 
2.4. DISCUSSING RESULTS WITH EXPERTS  
The data analysis process ended up with discussions on the results of AMAN-DA’s 
application (the generated security requirements models and specifications) with a group of 
four experts. The group comprises: the domain expert (the ship’s captain), the requirements 
engineering expert (a scientist known in the requirements engineering community), and two 
security standardization experts who served as security experts. The discussion was carried 
out face to face with the experts during one meeting. First, the context of the project and the 
method were presented to them. Second, experts reviewed the SecTro model and security 
requirements produced by the application of AMAN-DA.  
The results of this meeting can be summarized as follows:  
a. The main recurrent comments made by the experts were that the method and its idea 
of automation are “very” (the adverb was employed several times) “interesting”, and 
“important”.  
b. From the results of application of AMAN-DA in the maritime domain, experts 
consider that the method is capable of producing domain specific security 
requirements but asked to see more applications to other domains for a better 
generalization of this statement.    
c. One expert was interested in the richness of the security requirements modeling 
language chosen (Secure Tropos in our case) and whether it was enough to model all 
the domain concepts. Also, why is it the only language that the method handles?  
d. Experts (security and requirements) commented on the positive results of AMAN-DA 
compared to a case study undertaken by RITA in the banking sector where the 
 Figure 9.12. Part of the textual specification 
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resulting requirements were too generic and not domain specific. The experts 
recognized the capacity of AMAN-DA to achieve a better capture of stakeholders’ 
security goals, threat analysis, model and textual specifications generation.  
e. Experts suggested evaluating the method with a controlled experiment with end-users 
to evaluate the ease of use and the usefulness of the method.  
3 THREATS TO VALIDITY  
The case study might be criticized for many aspects. The main threats to validity can be as 
follows:  
- Although the choice of the captain as the person to interview was strategic, it turned 
out that interviewing only one person was not enough. In many cases, the captain 
mentioned that other persons who might be more knowledgeable about some other 
parts of the ship (e.g. the chief engineer who is an expert in the ship engine should be 
asked for example.)  
- Security goals provided by the stakeholder were sometimes ambiguous. While we 
were concerned by the informational and organizational security goals, he mostly 
focused on the security of the life of individuals on board. The links between both 
were not always explicit.   
- Discussing the results of the application of AMAN-DA with some experts was good 
but the analysis remains qualitative, which is not enough to evaluate the ease of use 
and the usefulness of AMAN-DA.  
- The experts involved in discussing and analyzing the results comprise the supervisors, 
which may have left room for subjectivity. 
- Due to the timing of the research, we could not replicate the case study in another 
domain. Application to only one domain and with one company might not be enough, 
other applications are necessary to generalize the results.  
4 LESSONS LEARNED  
The application of AMAN-DA to the case study might change established thought, in the 
sense that security knowledge by itself is not enough if it is not completed with domain 
knowledge. This result is a step forward to the research community. Vice versa, domain 
expertise alone remains weak if it is not reinforced by security knowledge. Recall that before 
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AMAN-DA, some propositions were limited to relying on generic security ontologies only 
RITA (Salinesi, Ivankina, and Angole, 2008), (Velasco et al., 2009) and their shortcoming 
was that the resulting security requirements were too generic and not specific to the domain at 
hand. Now the new open question is whether using both domain and security ontologies is 
sufficient or using domain specific security ontologies (i.e. constructing security ontologies 
for each domain and use them in AMAN-DA) would be a better solution?   
The other point learnt or noticed is that, even with the security goal model proposed by 
AMAN-DA, the step of capturing security goals from stakeholders remains difficult: careful 
recording and transcribing of stakeholder interviews was needed before applying the method. 
This step could be improved in further research on how to conduct successfully an interview 
with stakeholders in order to capture security goals. For the researchers, another open 
question would be, what are the necessary parameters to take in consideration in the 
formulation of the security goals and security requirements? For instance, the level of security 
(i.e. low, medium, high) is an example to explore. 
The case study has shown that AMAN-DA provides a methodological  and organized way to 
produce specifications (c.f. Figures 4-7). The question here is what practitioners think about 
that, and whether AMAN-DA improves their practices. That is why a controlled experiment 
with them is the next natural step needed to be implemented. 
5 APPLICATION TO OTHER DOMAINS 
In this section we attempt to validate the property of genericity of the method. That is to say 
that AMAN-DA is a generic method and can be used for more than one domain, and more 
than one domain ontology. In fact, this section addresses the question:  
RQ. Can AMAN-DA be applied to any domain?  
Chapter 8 in this thesis has already presented an application of AMAN-DA with an online 
shopping domain ontology. The previous sections of the current chapter presented the 
application of AMAN-DA with a maritime domain ontology.  
Now, let us examine two other applications: with a web publishing domain ontology, and a 
sales domain ontology.   
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6.1. APPLICATION OF AMAN-DA WITH A WEB PUBLISHING DOMAIN ONTOLOGY   
 Inputs of AMAN-DA  
Figure 9.13 presents the input ontology, a web publishing domain ontology that encapsulates 
some knowledge related to this domain. One can see the organisation (publishing company) 
which has a number of agents (editor, reader, reviewer, web publishing system). There are a 
number of objects in the ontology (web server, review, submitted article, edited article). 
Various actions are required and performed by the different agents (manage articles, submit 
review, search article, etc.)   
The security goals are captured from stakeholders and formalized according to AMAN-DA:    
SG1. Keep the integrity of the submitted articles.  
SG2. Maintain the availability of the web server.  
As the reader may recall, the third input of AMAN-DA is the core security ontology presented 
in chapter 5. 
 
Figure 9.13. A web publishing domain ontology 
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 Outputs of AMAN-DA  
Through the use of AMAN-DA, the security requirements (Reqi) that materialize the input 
security goals (SG1 and SG2) are defined. The following corresponding Secure Tropos models 
are generated as well as the final specification. 
 Secure Tropos models generated 
Figures 9.14 and 9.15 represent the Secure Tropos models generated after applying AMAN-
DA to the previous security goals (SG1 and SG2). 
Figure 9.14 presents part of the organizational view generated. It contains the main actors 
(Editor, Author, Reader, Web publishing system) and the goal dependencies between them as 
well as the name of the organization (Publishing Company).  
 
 
Figure 9.15 represents part of the security requirements view that corresponds to the security 
goal (SG2). This view includes the main security requirements to consider (security 
constarints in Secure Tropos) 
Figure 9.14. Organizational view - publishing domain 
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. 
 Generated specification  
The textual specification is the other output of AMAN-DA. Figure 9.16 represents part of the 
specification generated, it contains the name of the organization, the different asset to protect, 
the potential security requirements to consider.    
Organization: Publishing Company   
Asset: web server 
Security Criterion: availability 
Req1. The web publishing system should prevent unauthorized acess.  
Req2. The editor should ensure appropriate web server’s configuration and installation 
Req3. The editor should control physical acess to the web server and the program on it. 
Asset: submitted articles  
Security Criterion: integrity  
Req1. The web publishing system should lock editor, reviewer and author, accounts after 
defined number of login attempts. 
Req2. The web publishing system should ask for renaming administrator accounts.   
 
Figure 9.15. Security requirements view (SG1) – publishing domain 
Figure 9.16. Textual specification– publishing domain 
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6.2. APPLICATION OF AMAN-DA WITH A SALES DOMAIN ONTOLOGY   
The following application was adapted from a case study presented in (Mayer, 2012).  
  Inputs of AMAN-DA  
In addition to the core security ontology, figure 9.17 presents the input ontology, a sales 
domain ontology that encapsulates some knowledge related to the sales domain. One can see 
the organisation (sales company), which has the agents (Study office, client and sales 
department); the objects (calculations, technical plans, and estimates); the actions required 
and performed by the different agents (calculate structure, provide estimates)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the security goal captured from stakeholders and formalized according to AMAN-DA:    
SG. Keep the integrity of calculations.  
 Outputs of AMAN-DA  
Through the use of AMAN-DA, the security requirements (Reqi) that materialize the input 
security goals (SG) are defined. The following corresponding Secure Tropos models are 
generated as well as the final specification. 
 Generated Secure Tropos models 
Figures 9.18 and 9.19 represent the Secure Tropos models generated after applying AMAN-
DA to the previous security goal (SG). Figure 9.18 presents part of the organizational view 
generated. It contains the main actors (Study office, Sales departments, Clients) and the goal 
dependencies between them as well as the name of the organization (Sales company).   
Figure 9.17. Sales domain ontology 
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Figure 9.19 represents part of the security requirements view that corresponds to the security 
goal (SG). This view includes the main security requirements to consider (security constraints 
in Secure Tropos) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.19. Security requirements view – Sales domain 
Figure 9.18.Organisational view – Sales domain 
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 Generated specification  
The textual specification is the other output of AMAN-DA. Figure 9.20 represents part of the 
specification generated; it contains the name of the organization, the different assets to 
protect, and the potential security requirements to consider.    
Organization: Sales Company   
Asset: calculations 
Security Criterion: integrity  
Req1. The study office should perform awareness training.  
Req2. The study office should test fire extinguishers.  
Req3. The study office should make a fire extinguisher available. 
6.3. GENERALISATION    
In this thesis AMAN-DA has been applied to four domains (D1: online shopping, D2: 
maritime, D3: online publishing and D4: sales). With each one, AMAN-DA produced domain 
specific security requirements. Can we say that what is true for the domains D1, D2, D3 and 
D4 can be true for all domains? Now, all domains seem to share high level concepts and 
relations covered by the upper level of the multi-level domain ontology presented in chapter 
7. So to reply to the question: Can AMAN-DA be applied to any domain?   
The answer is yes, if and only if: (i) this domain can be represented with the multi-level 
domain ontology. (ii)The security goals are formalized according to AMAN-DA. (iii)The core 
security ontology is used.  
6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented first the application of AMAN-DA to a real world case study. The case 
study (the security goals) was elaborated with experts from the maritime domain. The models 
and specification generated demonstrate the ability of AMAN-DA to produce a domain 
specific security requirements engineering analysis. The chapter examines the application of 
AMAN-DA to more than one domain (through two other domain ontologies). This latter 
shows that AMAN-DA is applicable to any domain as long as this domain respects AMAN-
DA characteristics. These are promising contribution that need to be reinforced by 
experimenting with AMAN-DA and this case study with end users.   
Figure 9.20. Textual specification – Sales domain 
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Chapter 10 
 
Controlled experiment 
 
 
Any proposed method remains incomplete until its usability and benefits are evaluated by its 
end-users. Controlled experiments are one way to evaluate methods. During experiments, 
evaluators need to follow a thorough process. The process explicates the objectives of the 
evaluation, the different hypotheses to test, the subjects that perform the experiments, and the 
different variables to measure.  
This chapter evaluates the potential practical benefits for end-users that one can expect from 
the use of AMAN-DA. 
1 EVALUATION METHOD USED  
Evaluating a method is not an easy task. The evaluation of AMAN-DA was performed based 
on a selection of evaluation methods in literature.  
Note that, despite its importance in methods’ life, very little research tackles the topic of the 
evaluation of methods. Most literature deals with evaluating information systems and 
software. In (Moody, 2003), the author argues that theoretical models used to explain and 
predict user acceptance of information technology may be adapted to explain and predict the 
adoption of methods. 
The evaluation process carried out to evaluate the method was adapted from (Pfleeger, 1995). 
It contains four main steps (Objectives, Design, Protocol and Results) as depicted in Figure 
10.1. 
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Figure 10.1. Evaluation process adapted from (Pfleeger 1995) 
First, the objectives of the evaluation must be defined. The design step consists of defining 
the hypotheses to test; selecting the experimental subjects (the users that will evaluate the 
method); and stating and describing the variables to measure. The protocol describes how the 
experiments were actually performed, starting by preparing the subjects (explaining the 
method and its tool) and executing the experiments. Finally, the results of the experiment are 
analyzed and reported.  
In (Moody, 2003), the author proposes a framework to evaluate IS design methods based on 
the work of (Davis, 1989). Based on this framework, we prepared a template (measurement 
variables and their corresponding questions) to evaluate the method, according to different 
aspects that were embodied into variables: 
 Efficiency is the effort required to apply a method. 
 Perceived usefulness is defined as "the degree to which a person believes that using a 
particular system would enhance his or her job performance." 
 Perceived ease of use refers to "the degree to which a person believes that using a 
particular system would be free of effort."  
 Intention to Use: “the extent to which a person intends to use a particular system”  
 
Throughout the evaluation process, the guidelines for preceding context, design, analysis, data 
collection and reporting and interpreting results proposed by Kitchenham (Kitchenham et al., 
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2002) were taken into consideration. These guidelines were useful in, for example, defining 
the hypotheses, and the selection of the subjects.  
The next section presents the evaluation in detail.  
2 EVALUATION  
2.1.  OBJECTIVES: The main goals of experiments were to measure: 
 The coverage of the core security ontology and its usability.  
 The usage and usability of the method for producing security requirements for specific 
domains. 
 The usability of the tool. 
 
2.2. DESIGN:   
          A. Hypothesis 
Easterbrook et al. (Easterbrook et al., 2008) states that is important to define clear hypotheses 
before conducting an experiment. The validation of hypotheses will allow the achievement of 
the evaluation’s objectives.  
Table 10.1 below summarizes the hypothesis we want to test and their respective objectives 
that we want to measure.   
Table 10.1. Objectives and Hypotheses 
Objective to measure 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
The security ontology 
and its usability 
 
- The security ontology provides the main concepts for security 
requirements elicitation process. (1) 
 
- The security ontology is enough to build Secure Tropos models. (2)  
 
- The security ontology is enough for elicitating security requirements for 
different domains. (3) 
 
 
Usage of the method 
(Security ontology + 
domain ontology) 
 
- Using the method for elicitating security requirements makes a 
difference compared to using only the security ontology (4) 
 
- The method is useful for the elicitation of domain specific security 
requirements. (5) 
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- The method is useful for building domain specific Secure Tropos models. 
(6) 
 
  
Usability of method 
- The method is easy to use (7) 
- The method is efficient. (8)  
Usability of the tool 
- Users find the graphical interface to access the security ontology easy to 
use. (9) 
 
- Users find that the tool is easy to use overall. (10) 
 
- Users find that the tool is efficient. (11) 
 
B. Subjects    
In order to obtain a representative group of subjects (Kitchenham et al., 2002), we contacted, 
by mail and phone, people from requirements engineering and security communities 
(laboratories, associations, LinkedIn…). People not related to the field (industrials or 
researchers) were intentionally excluded. We used the profile page and the job position to 
include/exclude a subject.   
The experiment has been conducted on a group composed of twelve participants. Their 
average age was 31 years old (min. 25, max. 38). 7 of them were women, 5 men. Among the 
participants there were PhD students chosen based on their subjects of research that were 
related to our research area. There were research and teaching staff, and three trainee 
engineers.  
In addition to that, three participants were certified ISO27000, and three had industrial 
experience with EBIOS (EBIOS, 2004) (a well-known French risk assessment method). The 
chosen PhD students were working on subjects related to our research area. 
Table 10.2 summarizes participants’ characteristics. 
Table 10.2. Profile of the participants 
Number Age Sex Functions 
 
12 
 
 
31 years old 
(Min. 25, max 38) 
 
 
7 women, 
5 men 
 
5 PhD students, 
4 research and teaching staff, 
3 trainee engineers. 
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B.  Variables   
Throughout the experiment, the focus was on the usability of the core security ontology, the 
usage and usability of the method, and the usability of the tool.  
The usability is defined by ISO 9241 as “The extent to which a product can be used by 
specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a 
specified context of use."16. We measured the usability based on the three variables proposed 
by Moody et al. (Moody, 2003), described in the beginning of the chapter:  ease of use, 
efficiency, intention to use.  
The usage is defined as “The action of using something or the fact of being used”17; for the 
usage, the focus was on the variable:  usefulness.  (Moody, 2003) 
C. Protocol  
A mini-workshop was organized for the experiment. During the intended day, 10 participants 
were present. Two of the participants had impediments, so we booked another time with them 
and they performed the experiment separately.  
The experiment was divided into 5 phases:  
- In phase 1: participants were welcomed, the aim of the experiment was presented, 
and the timing, consent to participate and confidentiality were agreed on. The 
participants affirmed their consent to participate in the experiment by filling out the 
questionnaire. We affirmed the anonymity of the questionnaire as well as the results of 
the experiment. The participants were then asked to fill out some pre-evaluation 
questions related to their age, sex, position and sector of activity in addition to their 
daily practices related to security requirements engineering.  
- In phase 2: The core security ontology was presented. Its dimensions, concepts, 
relations and instances were described in detail. This was followed by discussion with 
participants. They were then asked to fill in the questionnaire (cf. Appendix F).  
- In phase 3 and phase 4: A presentation about Secure Tropos was made, mainly to 
participants who did not know it before. Then, the method was presented through an 
illustrative example, with its inputs and outputs and its production rules. The method 
                                                          
16 http://www.w3.org/2002/Talks/0104-usabilityprocess/slide3-0.html 
17 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/usage 
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was also presented through its tool for a better visibility and comprehension. This was 
also followed by discussions with participants and they were asked to fill in another 
part of the questionnaire. In phase 3, the questions concentrated on the usage of the 
method. Phase 4’s questions were related to the usability of the method.  
- In phase 5: participants were invited to manipulate the tool that implements the 
method and the core security ontology.  They produced their own Secure Tropos 
models and specifications. They were asked after that to evaluate the tool by replying 
to the last part of the questionnaire.  
Each series of questions in the questionnaire is intended to test one or more hypotheses and 
evaluate one or more variables. Some questions were open questions; some others were more 
satisfaction-related, with participants asked to grade their degree of agreement towards a 
question.  
The next sections describe the results obtained for each hypothesis tested.  
3 RESULTS  
A. The core security ontology and its usability  
The items in figure 10.2 allowed us to evaluate the usability of the security ontology with 
subjects.  
Q10. Do you find that the security ontology have the main concepts for security requirements 
elicitation?  
Q11. Does the security ontology help in finding new elements (security requirements, threats, 
vulnerabilities)? 
Q12. Does the security ontology help for building Secure Tropos models?  
Q13. Does the security ontology help for defining security requirements for specific domains?  
Figure 10.2. Items about the usability of the security ontology 
 
The results extracted from these questionnaires are summarised in Tables 10.3, 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6. 
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Tables 10.3 and 10.4 show a quite high level of satisfaction, which is encouraging. Most 
participants find that the security ontology includes the main concepts. Among the positive 
qualitative feedbacks that were provided by participants: “The ontology helps in discovering 
new elements even for those who are experts in security since it is not easy to have in mind 
hundreds of threats, vulnerabilities, and their corresponding security requirements”.  
According to one participant (a security expert) "I find in the ontology all concepts that are 
used in risk analysis methods such as EBIOS".  
One participant mentioned that: “The ontology seems to have main concepts and individuals, 
however it would be nice to update it constantly, there are new threats appearing every 
day!” That was an interesting point that could be improved in the future by providing a 
mechanism to update the individuals of the security ontology automatically.  Hypothesis (1) is 
then mostly validated, which means that the proposed security ontology provides the most 
important concepts for security requirements elicitation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.3. Results of Q10:  
Do you find that the security ontology has the main concepts for 
security requirements elicitation? 
Table 10.4. Results of Q11:  
Does the security ontology help in finding new elements (security 
requirements, threats, and vulnerabilities)? 
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Questions Q12 and Q13 were devoted to comparing the use of the ontology by itself without 
the proposed method. The participants were asked: (Q12) Does the core security ontology 
help in building security models? (Secure Tropos models were taken as an example of a 
security-modeling framework).   
Table 10.5 reports the results for question (Q12), most participants find it difficult to pass 
from the concepts of the core security ontology to the concepts of Secure Tropos. A common 
answer was: "We understand the existence of connections but the mapping from the core 
security ontology to Secure Tropos is not straightforward". The discussion with participants 
that followed this question shows that, although the security ontology has the main concepts, 
relations and individuals, it remains not enough for users to build security models with it. 
More guidelines or mapping rules are necessary, not in the ontology itself but in the process 
using it for security requirements elicitation. Hypothesis (2) is not validated, which means 
that the security ontology by itself is not enough to build Secure Tropos models.  
The last question was: (Q13) does the security ontology help in eliciting security requirements 
for other specific domains (health, military, and bank)? We wanted to know if the security 
ontology helps in providing more security domain specific knowledge each time one switches 
from a domain to another one.  
Table 10.6 reports results for question (Q13) and shows that most participants “disagree” on 
the fact that the security ontology by itself is sufficient for eliciting security requirements for 
Table 10.5. Results of Q12: 
 Does the security ontology help for building Secure Tropos 
models? 
Table 10.6. Results of Q13:  
Does the security ontology help for defining security 
requirements for specific domains? 
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different specific domains. One participant mentioned: “This ontology is generic and by 
definition not domain specific, something additional is required for the application to 
different specific domains”.  This allows us to say that hypothesis (3) is not validated. 
The participants started discussing how to make the ontology more domain specific by 
collaborating with domain experts and with consulting the documentation of each domain.  
Participants were wondering if this issue could be made methodological and automatic. That 
is what we presented for them during the phase 3 and 4.  
B. Usage of the method 
The items in Figure 10.3 allowed us to evaluate the usage of the method with subjects. 
 
The results extracted from these questionnaire are summed up in Tables 10.7, 10.8, and 10.9 
 
 
 
 
Q14.  Do you think the method makes an improvement in the elicitation of security requirements for 
specific domains? 
Q15. Do you think that the method will be effective in discovering new security requirements for the 
specific domain compared to other methods?  
Q16. Do you think the method is useful overall?  
Figure 10.3. Items about the usage of the method 
Table 10.8. Results of Q15:  
Do you think that the method will be effective in discovering 
new security requirements for the specific domain comparing to 
other methods? 
Table 10.7. Results of Q14:   
Do you think the method makes an improvement in the 
elicitation of security requirements for specific domains? 
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Table 10.7 and Table 10.8 report the results of participants’ answers to Q14 and Q15. The 
results express “agreement” and “strong agreement” of the participants regarding the 
advantages of the method for the elicitation of security requirements for specific domains, 
first compared to the use of the core security ontology only, and second compared to their 
previous practices using other methods.  One participant view was: “This is definitely better, 
provided that the domain specific ontology is adequate”. Another participant mentioned: 
“Yes, this is better because many specific threats/vulnerabilities, and requirements are 
listed for each asset.” 
All participants agreed on the usefulness of the proposed method (Table 10.9, Q116), “In 
particular with regard to traditional risk assessment methods like EBIOS" according to a 
participant.  
Hypotheses (4) and (5) are validated. That means that using the method for eliciting security 
requirements makes a difference compared to using the security ontology only. Also, the 
method is useful for the elicitation of domain specific security requirements.   
C. Usability of the method 
The items in Figure 10.4 allowed us to evaluate the usability of the method with subjects.  
Q17. Do you think that the method reduces the effort for eliciting security requirements? 
Q18. Do you think that the method reduces the effort required to build security requirements models 
for different domains?  
Q19. Do you think the method is easy to use overall?  
Q20. Do you have any further criticisms or modifications to suggest that improve the method? 
Figure 10.4. Items about the usability of the method 
Table 10.9. Results of Q16: 
Do you think the method is useful overall? 
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The results extracted from these questionnaires are summed up in Tables 10.10, 10.11, and 
10.12. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q17 was related to the elicitation of security requirements using the method and Q18 to 
building security requirements models. Q19 was about the ease of use of the method. Most 
participants expressed high level of agreement. One participant compared the method with her 
usual practice using security standards saying: "Reading through standards like ISO 27000 
is time and effort consuming! The reasoning that the method offers provides the right 
threats, vulnerabilities, and their corresponding security requirements ". Users of Secure 
Tropos realized how much more efficient it is to use the method compared to their usual 
practice of building Secure Tropos models where only the concepts are provided, but no 
knowledge and no reasoning is available.  
Table 10.10. Results of Q17:  
Do you think that the method reduces the effort for eliciting 
security requirements? 
Table 10.11. Results of Q18: 
Do you think that the method reduces the effort required 
to build security requirements models for different 
domains? 
Table 10.12. Results of Q19. 
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Table 10.13. Results of Q21:  
Do you find the interface to access to the core security ontology 
easy to use? 
Table 10.14.  Results of Q22: 
Is this prototype friendly (clear and easy) to use? 
However, some participants recommended the generalizing the approach to other modeling 
frameworks (not just Secure Tropos), which was a considerable point. One participant 
suggested using a verb ontology during the formalization of security goals. (Recall that a 
security goal is a combination of a verb, one or more security criteria, and one or more 
assets.) She suggested that it would be nice to have verbs that are more plausible in security 
such as: keep, maintain, protect, save… 
These results validate hypotheses (7) and (8). That implies that the method is easy to use 
and efficient with a high level of confidence.    
D. Usability of the tool implementing the method and the core security ontology 
The items in figure 10.5 allowed us to evaluate the usability of the tool implementing the 
method and the core security ontology with subjects.  
 
 
The results extracted from these questionnaires are summed up in Tables 10.13, 10.14, and 10.15. 
 
As the tool gives access to the core security ontology, almost all participants appreciated the 
interactive environment that allows this access; they revealed that is nice to have the code of 
the ontology (in OWL-Protégé) hidden.   
Q21. Do you find the interface to access to the core security ontology easy to use? 
Q22.  Is this prototype friendly (clear and easy) to use? 
Q23.  Would you need help during the use of the prototype? 
Q24.  Would you use the prototype in other projects? Which ones? 
Figure 10.5.  Items about the usability of the prototype implementing the method 
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Most participants agreed that the tool implementing the method is friendly and easy to use; 
some of them suggested using more standard interfaces, and to put only one step per window.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Surprisingly, as table 10.15 reports, most participants replied that they needed help to use the 
tool, which was quite disappointing. However when discussing with them, they emphasis that 
the help is needed only for the first time using the tool. Participants suggested adding a help 
menu and a guide user document to avoid the misuse of the tool. This was a fair point that we 
had not thought of, and will be added to the next versions of the tool.   
To Q24, plenty of participants expressed their intention to use the tool in other projects. One 
participant (academic and teacher) considered using the tool in teaching projects, case studies 
given to his students in security classes.  
These results validates hypotheses (9) and (11) which means that users find the graphical 
interface to access the security ontology easy to use and the tool efficient. Hypothesis (10) is 
partially validated, which implies that some improvements should be provided to the tool.  
4 Summary  
 
Table 10.16 presents the synthesis of the objectives we wanted to measure, their 
corresponding hypotheses and the main feedback recorded from participants. 
Table 10.15. Results of Q23 : 
Would you need help during the use of the prototype? 
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Table 10.16. Summary 
 
The method and its tool were developed to assist and guide users in the elicitation of security 
requirements during early stages of systems developments – a task known to be difficult due 
to the tacit, informal knowledge of these users about security and the domain at hand. This 
Objectives to measure  
 
Hypotheses Feedback of subjects 
 
The security ontology and 
its usability 
 
 
The security ontology provides the 
main concepts for security requirements 
elicitation process. (1) 
 
The security ontology is enough to 
build Secure Tropos models. (2)  
 
The security ontology is enough for 
eliciting security requirements for 
different domains. (3) 
 
 
The ontology covers wide 
range of concepts, but 
should be updated 
constantly with new 
elements (threats, 
vulnerabilities, 
requirements, etc.) 
The security ontology by 
itself is not enough to build 
Secure Tropos models.  
Usage of the method 
(Security ontology + 
domain ontology) 
 
 
Using the method for elicitating 
security requirements makes a 
difference regarding using the security 
ontology only (4) 
 
The method is useful for the elicitation 
of domain specific security 
requirements. (5) 
 
The method is useful to build domain 
specific Secure Tropos models. (6) 
 
 
The method makes domain 
specific security 
requirements elicitation 
better provided that the 
domain ontology is 
adequate. 
 
Specific 
vulnerabilities/threats are 
listed for each domain asset.    
 
Usability of method 
The method is easy to use (7) 
The method is efficient. (8)  
 
The method is time saving 
and easy to use.  
 
It is better than reading 
through ISO27000 
standards. 
 
 
Usability of the tool 
Users find that the graphical interface to 
access the security ontology easy to 
use. (9) 
 
Users find that the tool is easy to use 
overall. (10) 
 
Users find that the tool is efficient. (11) 
 
 
The interface is friendly and 
easy to use.  
 
The tool however, needs 
help to be used, mainly for 
the first time.  
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step is often left to ad hoc practices such as copy pasting security requirements from other 
projects. It is even harder when it comes to building security requirements models. Users left 
to the concepts of the language (Secure Tropos for example) cannot do much.  
Our method and its tool meet users’ needs (as the results of the experiment demonstrate). The 
developed core security ontology, the reasoning rules that we defined to elicit and build 
Secure Tropos models, and the mechanisms we use to make these requirements more domain 
specific via the use of different domain ontologies, all make it possible to obtain a structured 
and structuring outcome. 
Many ideas were proposed by the participants of the experiment, to improve the method and 
to make the tool more attractive.  
 
5 THREATS TO VALIDITY  
Controlled experiments are a very good way to validate methods. However, some bias may 
occur during their implementation. In our case, some threats to validity might have been 
present. The following points summarize them:  
- Despite our efforts to gather a big group of subjects through contact by mail and 
phone and taking appointments, the number of participants was relatively small (12 
persons) due to various impediments.  We would like to try the method in a larger 
group during bigger workshops.  
- Some of the participants in the experiment (5 participants) are members of the same 
laboratory, which might have biased the results.   
- The choice of the students to participate in the experiment was based on their field of 
studies that is related to security and requirements engineering. That was good but 
might not be enough, since these students lack real world experience and their 
understanding of software security and systems requirements can be quite peripheral 
and patchy. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter reported a controlled experiment performed with a group of users to evaluate the 
usage and usability of AMAN-DA, the coverage of the core security ontology and the 
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usability of the AMAN-DATool. This experiment revealed that the core security ontology 
covers the main security concepts and helps in discovering new security elements that one 
might not think of. However it can and should be updated constantly with new threats and 
vulnerabilities.  The experiment revealed also that the method is beneficial for the elicitation 
of domain specific security requirements.  Finally, users involved in the experiments find the 
tool friendly and easy to use. The discussion with users at the end of the experiment indicated 
new questions and possible improvements of the method; those will be reported as items for 
possible future research in the conclusion of this thesis. 
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Conclusions and future research 
 
 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to answer the research question: How to elicit security 
requirements that are domain specific with a reuse strategy? 
To answer this question, this thesis proposes:  
 A framework for analyzing and comparing knowledge reuse in SRE. The framework 
was defnied after a systematic mapping study of knowledge reuse in security 
requirements engineering. 
 An original framework to classify security ontologies.  
 A core security ontology.  
 A multi-level domain ontology to structure domain knowledge.   
 Linguistic templates to specify security goals and security requirements.   
 A rule-based mechanism to extract relevant knowledge from domain and security 
ontologies and produce security requirements models and textual security 
requirements specifications.   
 A tool to elicit security requirements and implement the proposed method.  
 An evaluation through a real case study and a controlled experiment with end users.  
The work presented in this PhD has been proven to be interesting and beneficial for the 
requirements engineering and security communities. This has been noticed during the 
evaluation phase. The work has been also reported and presented during different national and 
international workshops, conferences and journals. However, like any research work, there is 
always room for improvements, new research perspectives. The systematic mapping study on 
knowledge reuse in requirements engineering should be constantly updated. The SMAP 
revealed many issues related to lack of automation and standardisation in SRE methods. 
There is a lack of domain specific security requirements engineering.  One main possible 
follow-up of the SMAP is to invite the research community to collaborate more to propose 
some kind of unification (like in UML) of the different methods proposed for security 
requirements engineering taking in consideration a reuse strategy and domain specific 
analysis. Many security ontologies have been proposed by the research community but, as 
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shown by the literature survey, none of them covers all aspects of security. This thesis has 
proposed a core security ontology based on the available security ontologies existing in the 
literature, which is a step forward. However, this core security ontology needs to be updated 
constantly and automatically with new threats and vulnerabilities. Again, a call for 
standardisation seems appropriate: the community needs a good standard security ontology, 
possibly one for each domain. The one proposed in this thesis can be a good beginning for 
such a project.  
AMAN-DA, the method proposed in this thesis, has many benefits for domains specific 
security requirements elicitation. The syntactic requirements patterns for documenting 
security goals and security patterns can be improved and compared to other patterns existing 
in the literature. An open question would be, what are the necessary parameters to take in 
consideration in the formulation of the security goals and security requirements? For instance, 
the level of security (i.e. low, medium, high) is an example to explore. 
It would be nice to extend AMAN-DA to be used with other languages (and not only Secure 
Tropos), but this perspective is pending until we have final and standard versions of the 
different languages meta-models. The Secure Tropos meta-model has already gone through 
more than three versions since this PhD started, and that is almost the case for the other 
languages (such as I*, KAOS, …)..   
In this PhD thesis, we chose to use a security ontology and a domain ontology at the same 
time. Another strategy that arouses our curiosity is to try a strategy where a domain specific 
security ontology is developed for each domain, then used for security requirements 
elicitation based on the same idea of rules. A typical requirements engineering process 
includes requirements elicitation, analysis, verification and validation. AMAN-DA handles so 
far the elicitation and the analysis steps, it would be interesting to have an advanced version 
of AMAN-DA that handles the two other steps of the verification and validation of the 
security requirements.    
Using domain ontologies through AMAN-DA is useful, but one shouldn’t neglect the fact that 
the domain ontologies covers the domain knowledge related to the domain at hand and part of 
it can be very sensitive piece of domain information, for example the submitted articles in the 
web publishing domain ontology (Figure 9.13) or the crew evaluation in the maritime domain 
ontology (Figure 7.3). AMAN-DA should in the long-term future ensure the possibility to 
secure the domain information that we don’t want to be public. 
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The AMAN-DATool developed can be improved, its interface can be made more friendly, a 
help menu can be added. A project we are currently considering is to merge it with the SecTro 
Tool to have a knowledge based, domain specific SecTro analysis and elicitation. 
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Appendices 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 1 
Appendix A  
 
Systematic Mapping Study: Retrieved 
publications  
Table A.1. (in the following) presents the searches conducted and the list of all publications 
retrieved in our systematic mapping study. For each paper retrieved, the following 
information is provided: name of the first author, title of the paper, year of publication and 
digital library/resource. For each category, and for each conference/workshop, the table gives 
the number of papers found followed by the number of papers selected (using our selection 
criteria). The black color refers to papers selected; the green color refers to papers not 
selected in the SMAP.  
Table A.1. Table of all retrieved papers.    
 
First Author 
 
Title 
Pub. 
Year 
 
Digital library/resource 
Books & Book Chapters, Phd. Found=18, Selected=10     
Mayer N. Model-based Management of Information System Security Risk 2012 Amazon 
Lund, M. S. The CORAS Tool 2011 SpringerLink 
Hull, E. Requirements Engineering. 2011 GoogleBooks 
Yu, E. Modelling strategic relationships for process reengineering.  2011 GoogleBooks 
Lopez, J. 
Analysis of Security Threats, Requirements, Technologies and Standards in Wireless Sensor 
Networks 
2009 
Foundations of Security 
Analysis and Design 
Massacci, F. An ontology for secure socio-technical systems. 2007 
Handbook of Ontologies for 
Business Interaction. 
Lamsweerde, 
A.  
Engineering Requirements for System Reliability and Security. 2007 IOS press ebooks 
Giorgini, P. Security and Trust Requirements Engineering 2005 
Foundations of Security 
Analysis and Design 
Jürjens, J. Secure systems development with UML.  2005 Amazon 
Ivankina, E. 
An Approach to Guide Requirement Elicitation by Analysing the Causes and Consequences of 
Threats 
2005 
Information Modelling and 
Knowledge Bases 
Kruchten, P. The Rational Unified Process: An Introduction 2004 Amazon 
Jackson, M. J Problem Frames: Analysing & Structuring Software Development Problems 2001 Amazon 
Yu, E. Modelling Trust for System Design Using the i * Strategic Actors Framework 2001 SpringerLink 
Antón, A Strategies for Developing Policies and Requirements for Secure Electronic Commerce Systems. 2000 SpringerLink 
Jacobson, I. The unified software development process. 1999 Amazon 
Kotonya, G. Requirements engineering: processes and techniques.  1998 Amazon 
Jackson, M. J. Software requirements & specifications: a lexicon of practice, principles, and prejudices 1995 Amazon 
Abiteboul,S. Foundations of databases 1995 Amazon 
Journals, Found=31, Selected=20 
Computer, Found=1, Selected=1 
Nuseibeh,B.  Securing the skies: in requirements we trust  2009 IEEE Computer society  
Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, Found=1, Selected=0 
Ivan,F. Integrating security and usability into the requirements and design process 2007 ACM 
Journal of Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, Found=3, Selected=2  
Mouratidis, H. Modelling Secure Systems Using an Agent-Oriented Approach and Security Patterns. 2006 Google scholar 
Mouratidis, H. Secure Tropos: A Security-Oriented Extension of the Tropos Methodology  2006 Google scholar 
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Bauer, B Agent UML: A formalism for specifying multiagent software systems.  2000 citeseerx 
Electronic Journal for E-Commerce Tools and Applications. Found=1, Selected=1  
Dritsas, S.  A knowledge-based approach to security requirements for e-health applications 2006 www.ejeta.org 
Autonomous Agents and Multi- Agent Systems, Found=1, Selected=1 
Bresciani, P.  Tropos: An agent-oriented software development methodology 2004 SpringerLink 
Military Operations Research, Found=1, Selected=1 
Buckshaw, D. Mission oriented risk and design analysis of critical information systems 2005 ingentaconnect 
Security & Privacy, IEEE, Found=1, Selected=1   
Evans, S. Risk-based systems security engineering: stopping attacks with intention 2004 IEEExPlore 
Requirements Engineering Journal, Found=4, Selected=3 
Fabian, B. A comparison of security requirements engineering methods. Requirements Engineering, 2010 SpringerLink 
Sindre, G. Eliciting security requirements with misuse cases  2005 ACM 
Antón, A A requirements taxonomy for reducing Web site privacy vulnerabilities 2004 SpringerLink 
Toval, A.  Requirements Reuse for Improving Information Systems Security: A Practitioner’s Approach 2001 citeseerx 
Journal of Object Technology, Found=2, Selected=2 
Firesmith,D. Specifying reusable security requirements. 2004 www.jot.fm 
Firesmith,D. Security use cases. 2003 www.jot.fm 
Computers & Security, Found=1, Selected=0 
Gritzalis, D. Principles and requirements for a secure e-voting system. 2002 sciencedirecte 
Software Engineering, IEEE Transactions on. Found=3, Selected=1  
Breaux,T.  Analyzing Regulatory Rules for Privacy and Security Requirements 2008 ACM 
Haley, C.B. Security Requirements Engineering: A Framework for Representation and Analysis. 2008 IEEExPlore 
Rolland, C. Guiding goal modeling using scenarios. 1998 IEEExPlore 
Computer Standards & Interfaces. Found=3, Selected=2  
Mellado, D. 
A common criteria based security requirements engineering process for the development of 
secure information systems. 
2007 sciencedirecte 
 Massacci,F. 
Using a security requirements engineering methodology in practice: The compliance with the 
Italian data protection legislation 
2005 sciencedirecte 
Bhavani,T. Security standards for the semantic web  2005 sciencedirecte 
Computer Communications. Found=1, Selected=0  
Lambrinoudaki
s, C. 
 Security requirements for e-government services: a methodological approach for developing a 
common PKI-based security policy. 
2003 sciencedirecte 
International Journal of Computer Applications. Found=1, Selected=1  
Salini, P. A Knowledge-oriented Approach to Security Requirements for an E-Voting System. 2012 www.ijcaonline.org 
Informatical journal. Found=1, Selected=1  
Susi, A.  The tropos metamodel and its use. 2005 http://www.troposproject.org 
International Journal of Information Security. Found=1, Selected=1 
Giorgini, P. Requirements Engineering for Trust Management: Model, Methodology, and Reasoning.  2006 IEEExPlore 
Journal of systems and software. Found=1, Selected=1 
Mouratidis H. 
A framework to support selection of cloud providers based on security and privacy requirements. 
 
2013 Sciencedirecte 
 Journal of Research and Practice in Information Technology. Found=1, Selected=1 
Velasco, J. Modelling Reusable Security Requirements Based on an Ontology Framework 2009 Google scholar 
Information and Software Technology. Found=1, Selected=0 
Maamar, Z.  Towards an ontology-based approach for specifying and securing Web services 2006 sciencedirecte 
Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. Found=1, Selected=0 
 Kaga,L.  Modeling Conversation Policies using Permissions and Obligations  2005 ACM 
Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence. Found=1, Selected=0 
Tan,J.J. Dynamic security reconfiguration for the semantic web 2004 sciencedirecte 
Conferences  Found =70, Selected =39 
ARES. Found= 12 ,  selected  selected =6 
Beckers, K. Comparing Privacy Requirements Engineering Approaches 2012 IEEExPlore 
Beckers, K 
Using Security Requirements Engineering Approaches to Support ISO 27001 Information Security 
Management Systems Development and Documentation 
2012 IEEExPlore 
Karpati, P. Characterising and Analysing Security Requirements Modelling Initiatives 2011 IEEExPlore 
Kárpáti, P.  
Experimental Comparison of Misuse Case Maps with Misuse Cases and System Architecture 
Diagrams for Eliciting Security Vulnerabilities and Mitigations 
2011 IEEExPlore 
Okubo, T. Effective Security Impact Analysis with Patterns for Software Enhancement 2011 IEEExPlore 
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Zuccato, A.  Service Security Requirement Profiles for Telecom: How Software Engineers May Tackle Security.  2011 IEEExPlore 
Langer, L.  
A Taxonomy Refining the Security Requirements for Electronic Voting: Analyzing Helios as a 
Proof of Concept 
2010 IEEE Computer society  
Schmidt, H. Threat- and Risk-Analysis During Early Security Requirements Engineering 2010 IEEExPlore 
Hatebur, D.  A Pattern System for Security Requirements Engineering.  2007 IEEExPlore 
Asnar,Y. From Trust to Dependability through Risk Analysis. 2007 IEEExPlore 
Mellado, D. A comparison of the Common Criteria with proposals of information systems security requirements 2006 IEEExPlore 
Giorgini, P.  ST-tool: a CASE tool for security requirements engineering. 2005 IEEExPlore 
AINA, Found=1, Selected=1 
Tsoumas,B. Towards an Ontology-based Security Management  2006 IEEExPlore 
CAiSE, Found=2 , Selected=2 
Paja, E.  Modelling Security Requirements in Socio-Technical Systems with STS-Tool 2012 Google scholar 
Mouratidis, H. 
Integrating security and systems engineering: Towards the modelling of secure information 
systems.  
2003 Citeseerx 
COMPSAC; Found= 1 , Selected=0 
Elahi,G. Security Requirements Engineering in the Wild: A Survey of Common Practices 2011 IEEExPlore 
CSEE&T. Found= 1 , Selected=1 
Mead, N.R 
Security Requirements Engineering for Software Systems: Case Studies in Support of Software 
Engineering Education 
2006 IEEExPlore 
ETRICS, Found= 1 , Selected=1 
Hatebur, D. Security Engineering Using Problem Frames. 2006 SpringerLink 
EEE. Found= 1 , Selected=1  
Marti, R. Security specification and implementation for mobile e-health services. 2004 IEEExPlore 
ENASE. Found=1 , Selected=0 
Semmak, F. Extended Kaos to Support Variability for Goal Oriented Requirements Reuse 2010 SpringerLink 
 FIRA - STA. Found=1, Selected=1  
Chikh, A. An Ontology Based Information Security Requirements Engineering Framework 2011 SpringerLink 
HICSS. Found=1, Selected=0   
Goluch, G. 
Integration of an Ontological Information Security Concept in Risk-Aware Business Process 
Management 
2008 IEEExPlore 
ICSE. Found= 3, Selected =3  
Best, B., Model-Based Security Engineering of Distributed Information Systems Using UMLsec. 2007 IEEExPlore 
Firesmith,D. Engineering Safety and Security Related Requirements for Software Intensive Systems.  2007 IEEExPlore 
Van 
Lamsweed 
Elaborating security requirements by construction of intentional anti-models. 2004 IEEExPlore 
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Appendix B  
Table B.1. Core ontology concepts definition using security ontologies and models 
 Concepts of the 
ontology 
Mayer et al.  Tsoumas et 
al.  
Herzog et 
al.  
Fenz et al.  Velasco et 
al.  
Dritsas et al.  Karyda et 
al.  
Kim et al.  Undercoffer 
et al.  
Geneiatakis 
et al.  
Denker et 
al.  
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et al.  
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Asset Business Asset Asset Asset Asset Asset Asset Asset - System 
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Person - Stakeholder - Person - Stakeholder Person - - - - Person  Supplier  
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Threat Threat Threat Threat Threat Threat Threat Threat - - - - Threat Attack 
Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability - Vulnerability - - Means - - Vulnerability Vulnerability 
Risk Risk Risk - - Risk - - - - - - - - 
Severity - - - Attribute - - - - - - - - - 
Impact Impact Impact - - Valuation 
criteria 
- - - Consequence - - - Consequence 
Threat agent Threat agent Threat agent - Role - Attacker - - - - - - Agent 
Attack method Attack method Attack - - - Deliberate 
attack 
- - Intrusion SIP_attack - - - 
Attack tool - - - - - - - - - SIP message - - Tool 
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Security goal - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Security criterion Security 
criterion 
- goal Security 
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- Objective Security 
objective 
Security 
objective 
- - Security 
notation 
Objective 
mechanism 
Acess  
Requirements 
document 
- Security policy  - - - - - - - - - - - 
Control Control Countermeasure Countemeasu
re 
Asset Safeguard Countermeasur
e 
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ure 
Security 
mechanism/C
redential 
- - Security 
mechanism/ 
Credential 
Countermeasu
re/Protocol/Al
gorithm 
Correction 
Security requirement Security 
requirement 
Control - Control Security 
requirement 
- - - - - - - - 
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Appendix C  
Interview instrument 
(Maritime case study) 
The following presents part of the interview instrument that was prepared before meeting the 
ship’s captain.  
1. What is the main role of the ship captain? 
2. What are the threats that might threaten the ship, is there a document that document 
them? 
3. What are the information that the captain/crew have access to?    
4. Who manages the alarm system in the ship, who has access to it?  
5. What are the information that the ship needs to provide to access a port?  
6. What needs to be protected in a ship (data, software, equipment)?  
7. What are the information that needs to be saved?  
8. How is the information saving policy in the ship?  
9. What are the main goals of the captain to maintain the ship security systems?  
10. What are the documents to consult in terms of ship security?  
208 
 1 
Figure D.1.  Main functionalities of the tool. 
Appendix D 
Implementation 
 
AMAN-DA was automated via a tool that the requirements engineer or the security analyst 
can use during the security requirements analysis and elicitation process. The tool was 
implemented on Java Eclipse. 
1 A TOOL FOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND ELICITATION 
(AMAN-DATOOL) 
1.1. FUNCTIONAL AND TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE 
Figure D.1 summarizes the main functionalities that the tool offers to requirements engineers 
(or security analysts). The tool allows: (i) generic security requirements analysis and 
elicitation through an interface that accesses to core security ontology (presented in chapter 
5), (ii) domain specific security requirements analysis and elicitation, (iii) generating Secure 
Tropos models and natural language specification documents (using the mechanisms 
presented in chapter 8). Each functionality includes other sub-functionalities that will be 
presented in details throughout this chapter.  
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Figure D.2 describes the technical architecture of the tool.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The technical architecture of the tool is organized around five main levels (user, presentation, 
application, API, knowledge). The user (requirements engineer or security analyst) use the 
tool AMAN-DATool through its presentation windows. He/she performs his/her security 
requirements analysis starting by introducing the security goals (choosing the assets to protect 
and the security criteria), analyzing the potential risk (choosing the potential threats, 
attackers, attack methods, and vulnerabilities); finally, generating the adequate domain 
specific security requirements. The different choices of the user are translated into SQWRL 
(Semantic Query-Enhanced Web Rule Language) queries that the tool generates dynamically 
and automatically. These queries are intended to the ontologies stored in the knowledge layer. 
The interaction between the presentation and application layers and the knowledge layer 
(ontologies) is ensured thanks to the APIs and the Jess engine18. At the end of the analysis, 
AMAN-DATool offers the generation of the specification document in addition to the Secure 
Tropos model that can be visualized with SecTro tool.  
                                                          
18 http://www.jessrules.com/ 
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Here follow some more details about each layer:   
A. Knowledge 
The core security ontology and the domain ontologies were edited using the Protégé 
(Horridge et al., 2004) editor, OWL language and SWRL rules.   
There are different editors of ontologies that provide a variety of features and use different 
languages and formalisms, for instance, OntoEdit (Sure, Angele, and Staab, 2002), 
Ontolingua (Farquar, Fikes and Rice,1997). Our choice was to work with Protégé since it is 
an extensible, platform-independent environment for creating, editing, viewing, checking 
constraints, and extracting ontologies and knowledge bases. This choice was also motivated 
by the fact that Protégé has an intuitive and easy-to-use graphical user interface, is popular 
among the research community, and is also highly scalable.  
Ontologies via Protégé can be developed in a variety of formats including OWL, RDF(S)19, 
and XML Schema 20 . OWL (Web Ontology Language) was the language used for the 
development of the ontologies (security and domains ones).  OWL is recommended by the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). W3C states that OWL facilitates greater machine 
interpretability of Web content than XML, RDF, and RDF Schema (RDF-S) by providing 
additional vocabulary along with a formal semantics.  
In addition to OWL-Protégé editing, SWRL (Semantic Web Rule Language) was used to edit 
the axioms (rules) of the ontologies. SWRL allows the definition of rules (Horrocks et al. , 
2004) to enrich the semantic of OWL ontologies. The defined rules allow to deduct and to 
add new relations between the created individuals in an ontology. The structure of a SWRL 
rule respect the following schema:  
antecedent ⇒ consequent 
 
Where both antecedent and consequent are conjunctions of atoms (ai) written a1 ∧ ... ∧ an. An 
atom may refer to individuals, data literals, individual variables or data variables. Atoms can 
be of the form C(x), P(x,y), sameAs(x,y), differentFrom(x,y), where C is an OWL description 
or data range, P is an OWL property, x and y are either variables, OWL individuals or OWL 
data values, as appropriate. Variables are indicated using the standard convention of prefixing 
them with a question mark (e.g., ?x).  
                                                          
19 http://www.w3.org/RDF/ 
20 http://www.w3schools.com/schema/ 
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Based on this syntax, rules (Rule1, Rule2) were defined. Rule1 asserts that the composition 
of Related and Satisfy properties implies the Enable property. Related security goal (SGx) to 
the security criterion (Cry) and Satisfy security requirement (SRx) the security requirement 
(Cry) implies Enable (SRz), (SGx).  As for Rule 2, vulnerability (Vulx) that is MitigatedBy 
the security requirement (SRy), threat (Thz) that Exploit vulnerability (Vulx) and threat (Thz) 
that Generates (Riskt) implies the MitigatedBy property between (Riskt) and (SRy). 
 
Rule1. Related (?SGx , ?Cry) ∧ Satisfy (?SRz , ?Cry) ⇒ Enable (?SRz , ?SGx) 
Rule2. MitigatedBy (?Vulx,?SRy) ∧ Exploit (?Thz, ?Vulx) ∧ Generates (?Thz, 
?Riskt) ⇒ MitigatedBy (?Riskt, ?SRy)  
 
B. APIs  
To be able to manipulate the ontologies through the AMAN-DATool Java application, the 
layer of APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) was introduced.  
The Protégé-OWL21 API is an open-source Java library for manipulating ontologies in OWL 
format. The API provides classes and methods to load and save OWL files, to query and 
manipulate OWL data models, and to perform reasoning based on SWRL rules. Furthermore, 
the API is optimized for the implementation of graphical user interfaces. 
In our context, AMAN-DATool invokes this API to manipulate the security and domain 
ontologies.  
Jess22 (Java Expert System Shell) is an inference rules based engine completely developed in 
Java. It easily interfaces with applications developed in Java to add to them a reasoning layer. 
It has its own format of facts and rules but interprets also OWL ontologies, rules in SWRL 
format and SQWRL queries. Moreover, Jess interfaces with the Protégé ontology editor.  
In our context, Jess was used to interpret and execute SQWRL queries on the security and 
domain ontologies during security requirements analysis and elicitation (asset and goal 
analysis, risk analysis and security requirements elicitation).  
To test and extract relevant knowledge from the security and domain ontologies, SQWRL 
(Semantic Query-Enhanced Web Rule Language) was used. SQWRL is a SWRL-based for 
                                                          
21 http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/ProtegeOWL_API_Programmers_Guide 
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querying OWL ontologies. It offers operators comparable to those of SQL (Structured Query 
Language) and exploits the semantics of SWRL rules for specifying the queries. SQWRL 
define a selection operator allowing the retrieval of instances described in an ontology. This 
operator is noted sqwrl:select. It also offers aggregation functions (such as max, 
min, avg, count, etc…), set operators and grouping functions. The detailed description 
of SQWRL syntax is beyond the scope of the study; readers may refer to O'Connor et al. 
(O’Connor and Das, 2009) for further details. 
SQWRL queries are executed with the help of Jess rules engine. Some queries were already 
presented in chapter 5 (table 5.4).   For example, the following query replies to the question 
“What are the vulnerabilities exploited by the threat Thx?”    
Exploits (Thx,?V)-> sqwrl:select(?V) 
 
C. Application and presentation  
The application and presentation layer of the AMAN-DATool has been developed using the 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) Eclipse and the Java language.  This layer 
interacts with the end user during the SRE process. Depending on end user choices, it 
displays the results of queries on the ontologies based on the other layers. It also generates 
the specification documents (a word document) that contain the security requirements. 
Moreover, it generates the Secure Tropos model in XML. These models can be visualized by 
the end user using the SecTro tool.   
D. User 
The tool is intended for requirements engineers who are asked to define security requirements 
within the requirements specification elaboration. It can also be used by security analysts for 
domain specific security analyses.    
 
2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND ELICITATION USING AMAN-
DATOOL  
At the opening of the tool, the main window has a menu bar with the options (Security, 
Domain and Export) (see Figure D.3). The user can choose “Security” to perform a generic 
security requirements analysis and elicitation or “Domain” for a domain specific security 
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requirements analysis and elicitation. “Export” is intended to be used at the end of the 
analyses.  
 
Figure D.3. The menu bar of the tool. 
2.1. GENERIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND ELICITATION USING AMAN-DATOOL  
If the user chooses “Security” in the menu bar, and clicks on “Access to the core security 
ontology”, a new window opens that contains the user interface allowing access to the core 
security ontology and performing a generic security requirements and elicitation. Figure D.4 
shows a screenshot of that user interface.  
 
The interface (Figure D.4) contains three parts corresponding to the three main steps of the 
SRE process: valuable assets identification (on the left side), risk analysis, and security 
requirements elicitation (on the right side).    
This interface allows the user to choose the organization. It displays the persons involved and 
the list of all assets with their corresponding locations.  
Figure D.4. Core Security ontology 
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It also allows the user to choose valuable assets that he/she wants to protect. The latter are 
displayed at the left. For each asset the interface displays the corresponding threats (attackers 
and impact of each threat). For example, for the threat fire, a new window opens that suggest 
that this threat is led by a stowaway, and it has as impact the damage of organization assets 
(see Figure D.4 right-top). For each chosen threat, the interface displays the corresponding 
vulnerabilities. And finally, for all chosen vulnerabilities, the resulting list of security 
requirements to mitigate them is presented.  
The “Save” button (right, down in Figure D.4) leads to the generation of the specification 
document that summarizes the analysis and the relevant security requirements. 
2.2. DOMAIN SPECIFIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS AND ELICITATION USING AMAN-
DATOOL  
When the user clicks on “Domain” at the menu bar, he/she can access the different domains 
available in the knowledge layer, for which he/she can perform specific security requirements 
engineering process. The tool gives the possibility to add new domain ontologies dynamically 
so they can be available to the user (Figure D.5).  
 
 
Figure D.5.  Domain handling and selection. 
 
Once a domain is chosen, the domain specific security requirements engineering process can 
start. It contains three main steps: goal and asset identification, risk analysis, security 
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requirements elicitation.  It terminates in the generation of the SecTro model and the 
specification. 
A. Goal and asset and analyses   
The left part of the tool’s main window (Figure D.6) is dedicated to the first step (asset and 
goal analysis).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure D.6 illustrates it, the tool allows the user to choose an organization of the domain 
(chosen before). Thus, each domain has different organizations in its scope.  
Once the organization is selected, the user may form different security goals expressed by the 
stakeholder.  The tool proposes a panel to formalize the security goal (according to the form 
presented in chapter 6) containing a textbox for its verb, selection box for the security 
criterion, and another textbox for the asset. For each asset introduced by the user, the tool 
Figure D.6. Goal and asset analyzes 
 217 
 
proposes its corresponding entry in the “Domain Assets” panel; this is to make sure that the 
introduced asset is a domain asset and not just any asset.  When the security goal is 
formalized, the tool proposes the related organizational goals. Here for example: to the 
security goal “Maintain the integrity of ship plans”; corresponds the organizational goal: 
“manage the ship’s documents”. Finally, for each organizational goal chosen, the related 
actors are displayed to the user.    
B. Risk analysis  
The right-top part of the tool’s main window is meant for the risk analysis (Figure D.7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the risk analysis step, the tool allows the user to select for each domain asset, the 
potential threats. For each threat selected, the user can have more information about the 
attacker who leads it and the attack method used. For each threat selected, the tool displays 
the list of potential exploited vulnerabilities.  
C. Security requirements elicitation 
The bottom-right part of the tool’s main window (Figure D.8) is meant for the security 
requirements elicitation step. 
Figure D.7. Risk analysis 
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Figure D.8. Security requirements elicitation. 
During the security requirements elicitation step, the tool provides (according to each 
selected vulnerability) the set of security requirements to consider. First these security 
requirements are displayed in their generic form. For example, as illustrated in the figure D.8, 
to the vulnerability (No intrusion alarm) corresponds the security requirement (WN AG The 
agent should AC implement an OB alarm system that is automated and tested).  
Afterwards, the tool provides the user with the domain specific form of this security 
requirement. This is displayed in the window “Domain Specific Security Requirement”. The 
user can assign this requirement to another agent of the domain (AG). He/she can decide 
when to apply this requirement (WN), modify the action (AC) and choose another domain 
object (OB).  
2.3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS REPORT (SPECIFICATION) AND MODEL GENERATION  
During the three previous steps, according to the user choices, the tool (Figure D.9) 
dynamically generates the specification and the SecTro model (it relies on the set of rules 
presented in chapter 7).   
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As Figure D.9 illustrates, the tool offers the user three choices of exportation:  
 Security requirement analysis model: here, an XML file is created dynamically 
according to user selections in previous steps (and mapping and production rules 
presented earlier in chapter 8). This file can be displayed using the SecTro2 modeling 
toolkit. The user can then visualize his requirements models. With respect to Secure 
Tropos metamodel, the tool can generates the three views: organizational view, 
security requirement view and the attack view. Each view contains the adequate 
concepts and relations between them.  
 Security requirement analysis report: here, a doc file is created dynamically. The 
document contains the information selected by the user. It includes the security 
requirements corresponding to the user’s analysis. 
 Full security requirements analysis report:  this button allows the user to generate by 
one click the entire security requirements report – i.e., for a given security goal, all the 
possible threats, vulnerabilities and domain security requirements are generated.  
Figure D.9. Generation of security models or textual specifications 
 220 
 
3 CONCLUSION  
In the future, the aim is to integrate AMAN-DATool with existing toolkits (SecTro2) for real 
time ontology based and model based security requirements analysis. We also try to improve 
the user interface to facilitate the job of the users.  
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Appendix E 
Generated SecTro model in XML  
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE ADOXML SYSTEM "adoxml31.dtd"> 
<ADOXML version="3.1" date="26-12-14" time="13:56" database="adoxxdb" username="Admin" 
adoversion="Version 1.0 4.0"> 
<MODELS> 
<MODEL id="mod.11001" name="Maritime organization 26-12-14-13-56-39" version="1" 
modeltype="Security Model" libtype="bp" applib="SecTro2_stable_git-ef66c55"> 
<MODELATTRIBUTES> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Keywords" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Description" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Comment" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Model type" type="ENUMERATION">Current model</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="State" type="ENUMERATION">In process</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Reviewed on" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Reviewed by" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Author" type="STRING">Admin</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Creation date" type="STRING">14.01.2014, 09:38</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Last user" type="STRING">Admin</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Date last changed" type="STRING">26.02.2014,10:42:28</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Number of objects and relations" type="INTEGER">35</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Context of version" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Executive summary" type="LONGSTRING">EXEC SUMMARY: Executive summary not 
provided.</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Organisational view" type="LONGSTRING">ORGANISATIONAL VIEW: Information not 
provided.</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security requirements view" type="LONGSTRING">SECURITY REQUIREMENTS VIEW: 
Information not provided.</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security components view" type="LONGSTRING">SECURITY COMPONENTS VIEW: 
Information not provided.</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security attacks view" type="LONGSTRING">SECURITY ATTACKS VIEW: Information 
not provided.</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Cloud analysis view" type="LONGSTRING">CLOUD ANALYSIS VIEW: Information not 
provided.</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Demo settings attribute" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="SecurityModelAttrrep" type="LONGSTRING">NOTEBOOK CHAPTER "Description" ATTR 
"Keywords" ATTR "Description" ATTR "Comment" CHAPTER "User attributes" ATTR "Model type" ATTR 
"State" ATTR "Reviewed on" ATTR "Reviewed by" CHAPTER "System attributes" ATTR "Author" ATTR 
"Creation date" ATTR "Last user" ATTR "Date last changed" ATTR "Number of objects and 
relations" ATTR "Context of version" CHAPTER "Executive summary" ATTR "Executive summary" 
lines:20 CHAPTER "Organisational View" ATTR "Organisational view" lines:20 CHAPTER "Security 
Requirements View" ATTR "Security requirements view" lines:20 CHAPTER "Security Components 
View" ATTR "Security components view" lines:20 CHAPTER "Security Attacks View" ATTR "Security 
attacks view" lines:20 CHAPTER "Cloud Analysis View" ATTR "Cloud analysis view" 
lines:20</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_ModelBackgroundText" type="LONGSTRING">SRV - "Authentification 
attack"</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="SubviewGraphRep" type="LONGSTRING"> GRAPHREP layer:-1 AVAL 
modelText:"_ModelBackgroundText" IF (LEN modelText) { FONT "Helvetica" h:14pt bold 
color:darkgray TEXT (modelText) x:0.25cm y:0.25cm w:l h:t } </ATTRIBUTE> 
</MODELATTRIBUTES> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.1" class="Organisation" name="Organisation1"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:2.5cm y:1.5cm w:6.5cm h:5.5cm index:3 
visible:0 </ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Show organisation name" type="INTEGER">1</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Detailed description" type="LONGSTRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="ChildObjects" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Organisational View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_Master" type="INTEGER">1</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">Maritime organization</ATTRIBUTE> 
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<ATTRIBUTE name="_SerialiseAttrs" type="LONGSTRING"> ATTR "Detailed description" ATTR "Show 
organisation name" ATTR "Position" </ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.2" class="Goal" name="Goal-2"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:7cm y:6cm w:2cm h:1cm index:7 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Organisational View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">manage_ship_documents</ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"/> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Delegated to system" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.3" class="Is inside"> 
<FROM instance="Goal-2" class="Goal"></FROM> 
<TO instance="Organisation1" class="Organisation"></TO> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="AutoConnect" type="STRING"></ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.4" class="Goal" name="Goal-4"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:7cm y:6cm w:2cm h:1cm index:7 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">manage_ship_documents</ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"/> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Goal" tobjname="Goal-2"/> 
</INTERREF> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Delegated to system" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.5" class="SecurityConstraint" name="SecurityConstraint-5"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:5cm y:6.5cm w:2cm h:2cm index:13 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">Maintain the confidentiality of ship 
plans</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security criticality" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.6" class="Restricts"> 
<FROM instance="SecurityConstraint-5" class="SecurityConstraint"/> 
<TO instance="Goal-4" class="Goal"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:14 visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.7" class="SecurityObjective" name="SecurityObjective-7"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:7cm y:9cm w:2cm h:2cm index:15 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">Confidentiality</ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.8" class="Satisfies"> 
<FROM instance="SecurityObjective-7" class="SecurityObjective"/> 
<TO instance="SecurityConstraint-5" class="SecurityConstraint"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:16 visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.9" class="Actor" name="Actor-9"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:4cm y:4.5cm w:2cm h:2cm index:5 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Organisational View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">captain</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Show internal Goal Diagram" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
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<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramHeight" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramWidth" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Goal Diagram position" type="ENUMERATION">bottom-right</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security criticality" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SerialiseAttrs" type="LONGSTRING"> ATTR "Show internal Goal Diagram" ATTR 
"Goal Diagram position" ATTR "Position" </ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"/> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"/> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.10" class="Is inside"> 
<FROM instance="Actor-9" class="Actor"></FROM> 
<TO instance="Organisation1" class="Organisation"></TO> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="AutoConnect" type="STRING"></ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.11" class="DependencyLink"> 
<FROM instance="Goal-2" class="Goal"/> 
<TO instance="Actor-9" class="Actor"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:9</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Organisational View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security Constraints" type="PROGRAMCALL">ITEM "Security Constraints list" 
param:""</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SecurityConstraints" type="LONGSTRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_LengthA" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:3</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_LengthB" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:1.5</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_endX" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:"4"</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_endY" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:"4.5"</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_NumberOfObjects" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_startX" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:"7"</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_startY" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:"6"</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SerialiseAttrs" type="LONGSTRING">ATTR "_SecurityConstraints"</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.12" class="Actor" name="Actor-12"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:4cm y:4.5cm w:2cm h:2cm index:5 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Organisational View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">company_direction</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Show internal Goal Diagram" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramHeight" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramWidth" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Goal Diagram position" type="ENUMERATION">bottom-right</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security criticality" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SerialiseAttrs" type="LONGSTRING"> ATTR "Show internal Goal Diagram" ATTR 
"Goal Diagram position" ATTR "Position" </ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"/> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"/> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.13" class="Is inside"> 
<FROM instance="Actor-12" class="Actor"></FROM> 
<TO instance="Organisation1" class="Organisation"></TO> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="AutoConnect" type="STRING"></ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.14" class="DependencyLink"> 
<FROM instance="Actor-12" class="Actor"/> 
<TO instance="Goal-2" class="Goal"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:9</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Organisational View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security Constraints" type="PROGRAMCALL">ITEM "Security Constraints list" 
param:""</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SecurityConstraints" type="LONGSTRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_LengthA" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:3</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_LengthB" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:1.5</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_endX" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:"4"</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_endY" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:"4.5"</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_NumberOfObjects" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_startX" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:"7"</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_startY" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR val:"6"</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SerialiseAttrs" type="LONGSTRING">ATTR "_SecurityConstraints"</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.15" class="Actor" name="Actor-15"> 
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<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:4cm y:4.5cm w:2cm h:2cm index:5 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">captain</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Show internal Goal Diagram" type="INTEGER">1</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramHeight" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramWidth" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Goal Diagram position" type="ENUMERATION">bottom-right</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security criticality" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SerialiseAttrs" type="LONGSTRING"> ATTR "Show internal Goal Diagram" ATTR 
"Goal Diagram position" ATTR "Position" </ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"/> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Actor" tobjname="Actor-9"/> 
</INTERREF> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_Master" type="INTEGER">1</ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.18" class="AttackMethod" name="AttackMethod-18"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:13.5cm y:7.5cm w:2.5cm h:1.25cm 
index:8</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"></ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"></ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Attacks View@16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">null</ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Threat" tobjname="Threat-16"></IREF> 
</INTERREF> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"></INTERREF> 
</INSTANCE> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.19" class="Attacker" name="Attacker-19"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:10.5cm y:2.5cm w:10cm h:10cm 
index:7</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"></ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"></ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Attacks View@16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">null</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Show internal Goal Diagram" type="INTEGER">1</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramHeight" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramWidth" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Goal Diagram position" type="ENUMERATION">bottom-right</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security criticality" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Threat" tobjname="Threat-16"></IREF> 
</INTERREF> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"></INTERREF> 
</INSTANCE> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.17" class="Threat" name="Threat-17"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:15cm y:4.5cm w:2cm h:2cm index:7</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"></ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"></ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Attacks View@16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">Unauthorized physical access</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_HasSecurityAttacks" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SecurityAttacksLink" type="PROGRAMCALL">ITEM "_SecurityAttacksLink" 
param:"";</ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Threat" tobjname="Threat-16"></IREF> 
</INTERREF> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"></INTERREF> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_InitialObjID" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_RebuildSAV" type="PROGRAMCALL">ITEM "_RebuildSAV" param:""</ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.20" class="EmbodiesLink"> 
<FROM instance="Threat-17" class="Threat"/> 
<TO instance="AttackMethod-18" class="AttackMethod"/> 
 225 
 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:23</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Attacks View@16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_ThreatID" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.21" class="Goal" name="Goal-21"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:4cm y:5cm w:2cm h:1cm index:20</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Attacks View@16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">manage_ship_documents</ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Goal" tobjname="Goal-4"/> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Threat" tobjname="Threat-16"/> 
</INTERREF> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Delegated to system" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.22" class="Vulnerability" name="Vulnerability-22"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:4.5cm y:7cm w:2.6cm h:1.4cm 
index:24</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Attacks View@16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">No entrance control</ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Threat" tobjname="Threat-16"/></INTERREF> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"/> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.23" class="Attacks"> 
<FROM instance="AttackMethod-18" class="AttackMethod"/> 
<TO instance="Vulnerability-22" class="Vulnerability"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:25</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Attacks View@16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_ThreatID" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_Mitigated" type="EXPRESSION">EXPR 
expr:(tokcnt(cfobjs(ctobj(),"ProtectsLink"))) val:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.24" class="AffectsLink"> 
<FROM instance="Vulnerability-22" class="Vulnerability"/> 
<TO instance="Goal-21" class="Goal"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:21 visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Attacks View@16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_ThreatID" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.25" class=Constraint" name="Constraint-25"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:10cm y:7cm w:2cm h:1cm index:27 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">controll the  ship_structure  access</ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"/> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"/> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.26" class="Restricts"> 
<FROM instance="Goal-4" class="Goal"/> 
<TO instance="Constraint-25" class="Constraint"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:29 visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.27" class="Constraint" name="Constraint-27"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:10cm y:7cm w:2cm h:1cm index:27 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">restrict the  ship_structure  access to only 
local administrators</ATTRIBUTE> 
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<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"/> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"/> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.28" class="Restricts"> 
<FROM instance="Constraint-27" class="Constraint "/> 
<TO instance="Goal-4" class="Goal "/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:29 visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.29" class="Actor" name="Actor-29"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:4cm y:4.5cm w:2cm h:2cm index:5 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Attacks View@16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">captain</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Show internal Goal Diagram" type="INTEGER">1</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramHeight" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_GoalDiagramWidth" type="STRING">5cm</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Goal Diagram position" type="ENUMERATION">bottom-right</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Security criticality" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SerialiseAttrs" type="LONGSTRING"> ATTR "Show internal Goal Diagram" ATTR 
"Goal Diagram position" ATTR "Position" </ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Actor" tobjname="Actor-15"/> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Threat" tobjname="Threat-16"/> 
</INTERREF> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_Master" type="INTEGER">0</ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<INSTANCE id="obj.16" class="Threat" name="Threat-16"> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Position" type="STRING">NODE x:6.5cm y:1.5cm w:2cm h:2.15cm index:17 
visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="External tool coupling" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="NameST" type="STRING"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Object's name" type="STRING">Unauthorized physical access</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_HasSecurityAttacks" type="INTEGER">1</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_SecurityAttacksLink" type="PROGRAMCALL">ITEM "_SecurityAttacksLink" 
param:""</ATTRIBUTE> 
<INTERREF name="_ParentObj"/> 
<INTERREF name="_ChildObj"> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="AttackMethod" tobjname="AttackMethod-18"/> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Threat" tobjname="Threat-17"/> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Attacker" tobjname="Attacker-19"/> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Goal" tobjname="Goal-21 "/> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Vulnerability" tobjname="Vulnerability-22"/> 
<IREF type="objectreference" tmodeltype="Security Model" tmodelname="Maritime organization 26-
12-14-13-56-39" tmodelver="1" tclassname="Actor" tobjname="Actor-29"/> 
</INTERREF> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_InitialObjID" type="INTEGER">16</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_RebuildSAV" type="PROGRAMCALL">ITEM "_RebuildSAV" param:""</ATTRIBUTE> 
</INSTANCE> 
<CONNECTOR id="con.30" class="ImpactsLink"> 
<FROM instance="Threat-16" class="Threat"/> 
<TO instance="Goal-4" class="Goal"/> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="Positions" type="STRING">EDGE 0 index:21 visible:0</ATTRIBUTE> 
<ATTRIBUTE name="_View" type="STRING">Security Requirements View</ATTRIBUTE> 
</CONNECTOR> 
</MODEL> 
</MODELS> 
</ADOXML> 
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Appendix F   
Evaluation form  
(Controlled experiment) 
 
 
Domain Specific Security Requirements 
Engineering 
 
Aim of the experiment 
Investigate the practices related to security requirements engineering during system development 
projects, identify the state of practice, and evaluate the proposed method and its tool- implementation 
against a controlled experiment with a case study and a questionnaire. 
 
Participants 
 
The experiment is mainly intended for people (industrials and academics) who have experiences in 
early phases of systems development (requirements elicitation and analysis phases) with a focus on 
security requirements elicitation.   
  
Timing  
You will be able to complete the experiment within 45 minutes. 
 
Consent of participation and confidentiality 
 
By filling in the questionnaire you consent to your voluntary participation in this experiment. 
  
The data collected through the experiment will be kept confidential and will be stored securely, and 
will be deleted after completion of the experiment related activities. This questionnaire is anonym as 
well as the results obtained from the experiment. 
We appreciate your time and effort! Thank you very much,  
Amina Souag 
 228 
 
Age: … 
Sex: … 
Position: … 
Sector of activity: … 
 
Phase 1:  pre-evaluation questions  
1. What is your relation to security? (Consultant, DSSI, PhD student, …) 
 
2. How long has your experience with security been?  
 
3. Do you refer to methods for security requirements elicitation? Which one(s)?   
Or do you rather use a ad-hoc technique (copy/paste for example)?  Which one(s)?   
 
 
4. Do these methods seem useful for you? Why? 
 
5. Do these methods seem efficient for you?  Why? 
 
6. Which method (among the ones you cited) are the most efficient?   
 
 
 
7. Do you know any security ontology before this experiment? If yes, which one(s)?   
 
 
 
 
8. Do you want to know more about security ontologies?  
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Phase 2: The Security ontology and its usability  
 
 
 
 
9. Do you usually use a tool for the elicitation of security requirements? Which one(s) ?  
 
 
 
10. Do you find that the security ontology has the main concepts for security requirements elicitation? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
11. Does the security ontology help in finding new elements (security requirements, threats, 
vulnerabilities, …)? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
12. Does the security ontology help in building Secure Tropos models?  
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
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Phase 3:  Usage of the method I just presented to you 
 
14. Do you think the method makes an improvement in the elicitation of security requirements for 
specific domains?  
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
15. Do you think that the method will be effective in discovering new security requirements for a 
specific domain?  
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
13. Does the security ontology help in elicitating security requirements for specific domains? (The 
maritime domain for example) 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
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Comments:  
 (Would you like to give any further comments and reply to the question compared  to other methods)  
 
 
 
16. Do you think the method is overall useful? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
 
 
Phase 4:  Usability of the method 
 
17. Do you think that the method reduces the effort required for the elicitation of security requirements? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
18. Do you think that the method reduces the effort required to build security requirements models for 
different domains? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
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19. Do you think the method is easy to use overall? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
 
20. Do you have any further critics or modifications to suggest that improves the method?  
 
 
 
Phase 5:  Usability of the prototype implementing the security ontology and the presented method  
 
21. Do you find the interface to access to the core security ontology easy to use?  
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
 
 
 
22. Is this prototype friendly (clear and easy) to use? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
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Comments:  
 
 
 
23. Would you need help during the use of the prototype? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
 
Comments:  
24. Would you use the prototype in other projects? Which ones? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
Comments:  
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Appendix G  
Publications  
 
This appendix contains the titles and venues of the publications the PhD research has 
produced so far: 
 
Souag A., Mazo R., Salinesi C., Comyn-Wattiau I., Reusable knowledge in security 
requirements engineering: a systematic mapping study, Requirements Engineering Journal, 
2015.  
Souag A., Mazo R., Salinesi C., Comyn-Wattiau I. A Security Ontology for Security 
Requirements Elicitation, International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and 
Systems, ESSoS 2015.  
 
Souag A., Mazo R., Salinesi C., Comyn-Wattiau I. Using the AMAN-DA method to generate 
security requirements: a case study in the maritime domain, Requirements Engineering, 
Foundation for Software Quality, REFSQ 2016. Submitted.  
 
Souag A. Bououd I. L’approche I*,  Revue Genie logiciel, n°111, 2014.  
 
Souag A., Salinesi C., Comyn-Wattiau I., A Methodology for Defining Security 
Requirements using Security and Domain Ontologies. Journal of International Council on 
Systems Engineering (Incosee). Insight, 2013.  
 
Souag A., Salinesi C., Comyn-Wattiau I., Mouratidis H. Using Security and Domain 
ontologies for Security Requirements Analysis. Computer Software and Applications 
Conference Workshops (COMPSACW) 2013.  
 
Souag A., Salinesi C., Comyn-Wattiau I., Security requirements analysis based on security 
and domain ontologies, REFSQ 2013.  
    
Souag A. Une méthode de définition des exigences de sécurité fondée sur l'utilisation des 
ontologies. Séminaire Doctoral du Forum Académie-Industrie de l'AFIS, 2013.  
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Souag A., Salinesi C., Comyn-Wattiau I., Ontologies for security requirements: A literature 
survey and classification, Advanced Information Systems Engineering Workshops, 61-69, 
CAiSEW 2012.  
 
Souag A., Towards a new generation of security requirements definition methodology using 
ontologies, 24th International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering, 
CAiSE 2012.  
 
Souag A., Vers une nouvelle génération de définition des exigences de sécurité fondée sur 
l'utilisation des ontologies, INFormatique des Organisation et des Systèmes d’Information de 
Décision, INFORSID 2012. Best Paper Award.    
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